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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this study I will suggest a theory of the avatar in singleplayer computer games1, and discuss 
how avatar-based games are different from other kinds of computer games as well as from 
other kinds of media. I believe that a closer study of the role of the avatar will cast light on 
some of the central aesthetic parameters that structure both how we play and why we play 
computer games. This knowledge will also have potential implications for our understanding 
of other formats and genres in the wider domain of digital media and culture. 
 
The notion of the avatar that I am suggesting is not concerned with playable characters as a 
vehicle of communication and self-expression, but addresses how players engage with 
singleplayer gameworlds through fictional and vicarious embodiment. This approach connects 
computer game avatars to a broader category of avatars, from radio-controlled model planes 
to Lego men and paper dolls. In computer games, the vicarious body can take different forms; 
a character, a racing car, a rolling ball, a camera, a gun.  
 
The emphasis on the role of the avatar also reflects a theoretical concern with the notion of 
embodiment and the notion of fictionality in computer games. My general claim is that the 
concepts of ‘fiction’ and ‘representation’, as these are typically being employed in game 
research and analysis, should be critically discussed and revised. Game studies needs a new 
concept of fiction, which can better account for the relationship between play and simulation, 
and which is more sensitive to the distinctive characteristics of computer-simulated and 
screen-projected gaming environments. This re-orientation needs to question the assumption 
that ‘fiction’ is synonymous with recounted (or diegetic) fiction, and it needs to be able to 
address the different mechanisms of embodied interaction and corporealized pleasure that are 
involved in computer game play. My analysis of avatar-based play in computer games is 
meant as a step in this direction2.  
                                                 
1 While it is common to differentiate between ’video games’ (console games) and ’computer games’ (PC or 
Mac), the two terms are also sometimes used interchangeably. Used as a general term covering games on all 
platforms, I have chosen in this thesis to use ’computer game’ rather than the more widespread term ’video 
game’. As I will be arguing in chapters 3 and 5, the central element that distinguishes computer games from 
other types of games is the computer, not the (’video’) screen. 
2 My approach here differs from, and partly conflicts with, my earlier ‘In Defence of Cutscenes’ (Klevjer 2002), 
which was, broadly speaking, an attempt to analyse narration in games from the point of view of communication 
and rhetoric. While this effort was not entirely unproductive, it suffers from a lack of theoretical tools to describe 
the basic operations of fiction in simulation-based game environments. Also, my discussion pays little attention 
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The computer game avatar, as I will define it in this thesis, exploits the digital computer’s 
unique capacity for realistic simulation, and acts as a mediator of the player’s embodied 
interaction with the gameworld, The relationship between the player and the avatar is a 
prosthetic relationship; through a process of learning and habituation, the avatar becomes an 
extension of the player’s own body. Via the interface of screen, speakers and controllers, the 
player incorporates the computer game avatar as second nature, and the avatar disciplines the 
player’s body.  
 
However, the computer game avatar is not to be understood as a tool or a mouse cursor; it 
gives the player a subject-position within a simulated environment, a vicarious body through 
which the player can act as an agent in a fictional world. This vicarious body is not merely a 
mediator of agency or ‘interactivity’ in a general sense, but belongs to and is exposed to its 
environment. In other words, an avatar is interesting and playable not just because of what it 
makes us able to do or perform, but because of what happens to us in the world that the avatar 
lets us inhabit. The avatar is the embodied manifestation of the player’ engagement with the 
gameworld; it is the player incarnated.  
 
There are different kinds of avatars, and different forms of avatar-based play. A central 
concern in this thesis is with the difference between the 2D avatar and the 3D avatar, as well 
as with the various ways in which the relationship between the player and the avatar can be 
configured in different types of games. The 3D avatar is the more radical and ambitious 
variant of the computer game avatar. The central perceiving body of the 3D avatar, I will 
argue, is the navigable camera, which situates the player perceptually within a gameworld that 
is no longer flat, and no longer a miniature. This camera-avatar (or avatarial camera) brings 
avatar-based games closer to the aesthetics and discourses of cinema and Virtual Reality. 
However, in games, spatial continuity and visual realism has a different role to play. The goal 
of visual realism in avatar-based 3D is not to imitate cinema or to make cinema interactive, 
but to give the player realistic agency within the gameworld. On the other hand, the strict 
disciplining of avatarial embodiment, and the embracing of the simulated cinematic camera as 
a prosthetic perceptual apparatus, can only be seen as counterintuitive and inhibiting from the 
point of view of fully immersive VR.  
                                                                                                                                                        
to the fact that different genres of games follow very different principles and mechanisms of fictional 
participation. 
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The generic category of ‘avatar-based’ singleplayer computer games does not refer to a 
clearly delimited group of games, which any given game would either belong to or not. It 
defines a particular kind of play, a game form, which is centred around avatarial embodiment 
as the primary mediator of interaction with the game space. In this sense we can talk about 
‘weak’ or ‘strong’ avatars, depending on the relative importance of the interaction that is 
performed independently of the avatarial prosthesis. As a generic form, the avatar has a 
central position in the contemporary computer games market, especially on consoles, which 
have been more or less designed for this particular mode of play3.  
 
I will also argue that avatar-based play is a form of make-believe, a fictional form, which 
defines a particular way of participating with simulated environments and fictional worlds. 
Considered as a fictional form, avatar-based interaction has grown out of and is embedded in 
computer games and computer game culture. On one hand, the avatar can be thought of as 
relatively independent from computer game play – as a principle for interacting with 
computer-simulated environments in general. On the other hand, the notion of avatarial 
embodiment that I am suggesting implies that as long as there is an avatar, fictional 
participation cannot be detached from play. Without a gameworld, or at least some kind of 
playworld, the central motivation for vicarious embodiment falls away.  
 
My emphasis on the significance of avatar-based play in computer games is not meant to 
support any notion of ‘invisible’ (or ‘embodied’ for that matter) interface design. Avatarial 
embodiment is a particular way of fictionalising play and interaction. From the point of view 
of human-computer interaction, this fictionalisation is rooted in the principles of reification 
and concretisation. As I will be arguing in chapters 5 and 6, this process is antagonistic to 
other and more transparent forms of human-computer interaction, including many kinds of 
computer games4.  
 
                                                 
3 This tendency excludes, notably, the Nintendo DS’ touch-screen interface, as well as, possibly, the innovative 
hardware interface of the upcoming Nintendo Wii.  
4 The concept of reification that I will be using in chapter 5 overlaps with but is far more limited that the Marxist 
and more socially oriented concept of reification. At the same time, it can be argued that reified forms of 
computer interaction, when applied as a norm for interface design, also have problematic ideological 
implications. See Kirkpatrick (2004:53ff) for a discussion of reification (or ‘double reification’) as a paradigm 
for human-computer interaction design.  
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My aim is not to argue that avatar-based play is more valuable or more artistically interesting 
that other forms of play – and certainly not that it should be a general norm for human-
computer interaction – but to describe what avatarial embodiment is, and how it structures our 
interaction with game spaces. The analysis does not aim to produce rules or guidelines for 
computer game design, but it may still carry some implications for how to think about the role 
of the avatar within the overall player experience; what kind of play and what kind of make-
believe are we designing for if we choose to build a design around the vicarious embodiment 
of an avatar?  
 
The concept of the avatar that I am suggesting here is different from how the term is typically 
used. In computer game discourse, the most general and accepted meaning of ‘avatar’ seems 
to be synonymous with ‘playable character’, in all its diverse aspects. However there is still 
an important common ground between this general meaning and my own definition, namely 
the basic idea of embodiment or ‘incarnation’, which connects computerised avatarhood to 
the original religious meaning of the concept.  
 
The dominant definition of the concept of the avatar in computer game discourses originates 
in the tradition of role-playing games5, but its typical use has been expanded to include also 
distinctly non-configurable and ready-made playable characters like Mario and Lara Croft. 
More narrowly even, and further removed from my own use of the concept, ‘avatar’ is also 
sometimes used to refer to the playable character as a mediator of communication and self-
expression in multi-user virtual worlds. This use of the term – which refers to the ‘virtual 
persona’ of the user or player – was introduced by the massive multiplayer online game 
Habitat (1987:103), and popularised through Neal Stephenson’s influential 1992 novel Snow 
Crash. 
 
The notion of the ‘avatar’ as prosthetic vicarious embodiment, in contrast, emerges from the 
tradition of action, racing and action adventure computer games, from Spacewar! 
(Russel/Graetz/Wiitanen 2006[1962]) and Donkey Kong (Nintendo 1981), via Super Mario 
Bros. (Nintendo 2004[1985]) and The Legend of Zelda (Nintendo 2004[1986]), to Tomb 
Raider (Core Design 1996), Halo (Bungie 2001), Gran Turismo (Polyphony Digital 1998) or 
                                                 
5 The notion of the ‘avatar’ was introduced in the Ultima role-playing game series with Ultima IV: Quest of the 
Avatar (Origin 1985). In role-playing games, the ‘avatar’ is the player’s customisable on-screen character or 
persona in the game. 
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Super Monkey Ball (Amusement Vision 2002). In all these games, the relationship between 
the player and the gameworld is rooted in the principle of prosthetic and vicarious 
embodiment.  
 
The category of the ‘action adventure’, as I will be using it here, is broader than how the term 
is typically used in the gaming press and gamers’ communities. In those contexts, ‘action 
adventure’ (2D or 3D) is usually taken to be a very specific genre, which includes as part of 
its definition a significant proportion of puzzle-based challenges. While this definition of the 
genre includes Prince of Persia (Brøderbund Software 1990), Tomb Raider and their 
followers, it does not include – as my own broader category does – platform games, First 
Person Shooters or action-oriented role-playing games, all of which do not necessarily put a 
lot of emphasis on puzzle-solving6. 
 
Fighting games and action-oriented sport games are left partly on a sidetrack in this study, 
even if they definitely belong to the broad family of ‘avatar-based’ games. This relative 
neglect is mainly the result of the analysis’ central focus on avatar-based 3D as a specific 
form of avatar-based computer gaming. Fighting games like Ready 2 Rumble Boxing (Point of 
View 1999) or Dead or Alive (Temco 1998), and action-based sport games like FIFA 06 (EA 
Canada 2005a) or NBA Live 06 (EA Canada 2005b) do not adopt the navigable camera as part 
of the player-avatar relationship in the same way that the 3D action adventures and racing 
games do. This means that the distinction between two-dimensional game spaces and three-
dimensional games spaces, which is one of the central concerns of this thesis, becomes less 
important. It also means that, from a historical point of view, sport games have not to the 
same extent gone through a marked transition between a 2D and a 3D ‘era’; with respect to 
avatar-based play, the difference between FIFA International Soccer (Extended Play 1993) 
and FIFA 06 is of less significance than the difference between The Legend of Zelda: A Link 
to the Past (Nintendo 2003[1991]) and The Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time (Nintendo 
1998). 
 
                                                 
6 Next to the action adventure, racing is the other major genre of avatar-based play among today’s computer 
games. Compared to the action adventure, racing in its various forms – and here I would include also games like 
SSX (EA Canada 2000) or Tony Hawk’s Pro Skater (Neversoft 1999) – represent a relatively ‘pure’ form of 
avatar-based play, placing considerably less emphasis on narrative, dramatic and cinematic elements. This makes 
racing games a good case for illustrating some of the basic principles of avatarial embodiment, but makes them 
less relevant to the study of hybridisations and tensions between avatar-based interaction and other forms of play 
and fiction. 
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As noted above, the role playing Avatar – somewhat paradoxically – is not my object of 
study. Role-playing games have their own specific characteristics and their own history, a 
topic that would need a dedicated study beyond the scope of this thesis. Nor do I discuss in 
much detail the particular characteristics of action-RPG’s like Diablo (Blizzard 1996) or 
Fable (Lionhead Studios 2004) – games that marry the stats-oriented play of role-playing 
games with the prosthetic extension of the avatar. For the purposes of this study, in other 
words, the action-RPG genre is treated as a sub-genre of the broad action adventure genre 
rather than as a sub-genre of role playing. The distinctive role-playing elements of these 
games may serve to put avatar-based play and avatar-based fiction into sharper focus; one of 
the defining features of the prosthetic avatar is precisely that it does not depend on role 
playing or character customisation, and that it structures the relationship between the player 
and the gameworld in a different way than the role-playing avatar does.  
 
My analysis of avatar-based play is restricted to singleplayer games, and is motivated by a 
specific interest in singleplayer games as a particular form of play and as a unique type of 
gaming experience; the focus is on how the avatar mediates between the player and the game, 
not how it mediates between the player and other players. This implies addressing the 
relationship between the player and the game system, between the player and the simulated 
environment, and between the player and a fictional world. These concerns are of course 
relevant to any kind of game, but in multiplayer and online environments the social 
interaction of play nevertheless demands primary attention. 
 
Methodologically, the study implies a relatively wide sweep of empirical observation and 
analysis. I cannot of course aim to get a complete first-hand knowledge of all games that 
could be relevant to the concerns of the analysis. In trying to capture the essentials of avatar-
based play and its major variations, my strategy has been to play through a limited number of 
popular games that have been recognised as classics in some respect within their (sub-)genre, 
and then add to this by playing a larger number of games only briefly (1-4 hours of play). I 
have also been able to draw on fan-based knowledge from the numerous reviews, FAQs and 
walkthroughs that exist for practically every game that exists out there. Such written sources 
are particularly valuable in this kind of broad descriptive-analytical research.  
 
The research process itself has evolved in a relatively disorderly hermeneutical fashion. I 
started out with a few games that were perceived to be central to my concerns, with no clear 
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idea as to what would be the conceptual and generic boundaries of the study. Originally, the 
project started out as a study of a more specific genre within the action adventure umbrella: 
the First Person Shooter. I eventually discovered, however, that the aspects that this genre 
shares with a wider category of games needed a more dedicated focus, particularly because 
very little research has been done in this area. While the FPS definitely boasts a few 
interesting ‘special features’ that are specific this particular genre, those features would be 
difficult to describe without positioning them within a more general generic domain. Of 
particular importance to my change of emphasis from the FPS genre to avatar-based play as a 
game form – and to avatar-based 3D in particular – was the realisation that the ‘first-person’ 
camera, which is supposed to be the ultimate marker of the genre (hence its name), is not 
different in its basic functioning from the camera in Tomb Raider or Super Mario 64 
(Nintendo 1996). In other words: the most distinctive feature of the FPS is not the perspective 
but the gun.  
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Chapter 2: Simulations, games and make-believe 
In this chapter I will discuss the differences and overlaps between games, simulations and 
diegetic fictions as distinct cultural forms. Drawing on the theories of Kendall L Walton, 
Marie-Laure Ryan and Gregory Bateson, I suggest a concept of fiction that is based on 
simulation and play, and which provides analytical tools to distinguish between different 
modalities and principles of participation in different media. In particular, the idea that 
fictional participation is a practice of re-positioning or ‘re-centring’ – whether in the worlds of 
paintings, books or children’s games of make-believe – is particularly useful for rethinking 
the relationship between players, avatars and fictional worlds in computer games.  
Procedural representation 
Any implementation of a model is a simulation. A model is, following the standard military 
use of the term, “A physical, mathematical or otherwise logical representation of a system, 
entity, phenomenon, or process”7. This definition covers all models, from scientific climate 
models to Barbie dolls or model cars. A simulation represents the world not through 
description, narration or argument, but through the construction of a model that is meant to in 
some respect mirror the underlying regularities of selected phenomena, events and processes 
in the world.  
 
Espen Aarseth argues that simulation is a highly distinctive type of discourse, quite unlike 
other forms of communication. He calls it a 'virtual hermeneutic', emphasising that the 
simulation represents an ever more influential alternative to the established story-mode of 
understanding the world. The simulation represents, Aarseth argues, a distinct way of 
interpreting and understanding the world (Aarseth 2000). From the point of view of semiotics, 
Umberto Eco, even if he is not addressing simulations directly, notes that certain forms of 
sign-relations are established on the basis of an ‘identity of function’; a broom handle stands 
for a horse not via an iconic relation, but because it can be straddled. A broom handle can be 
used as a substitute (‘ersatz’) for an actual horse because it “serves an analogous function” 
(Eco 1976:209).  
 
                                                 
7 See Online M&S Glossary, Defense Modelling and Simulation Office, at 
https://www.dmso.mil/public/resources/glossary/ [accessed 25. July 2005]. 
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A simulation re-constructs (in some respects) a behaviour that we can recognise as familiar 
from the world outside the simulation. It does so by using models, which are functional or in 
some way ‘logical’ representations. Models can be abstract (a mathematical model) or 
concrete (a tin soldier)8. Traditionally, models can only be implemented by humans, who run 
simulations for the purpose of play, training and cultural expression (as with Eco’s example 
of the broom handle). However, algorithmic abstract models are built as a system of 
instructions and procedures that can be implemented by computers as well as by humans. 
Computer simulations are simulations that are run by computers (which are simulating 
machines or ‘simulators’), or by humans and computers in concert. Taking a cue from Janet 
Murray’s categories in Hamlet on the Holodeck (1997), we may say that a computer 
simulation is a ‘procedural representation’; the world interpreted in terms of a system of 
instructions or rules (Klevjer 2002:200)9.  
The worlds of play 
The majority of games are in fact also simulations (although not necessarily computerised 
simulations), because they are governed by sets of rules that model some phenomenon in the 
world. Chess, for example, models the conflict between two forces on a battlefield (the 
board). As a model it may leave a lot to be desired in terms of scope, detail and accuracy, but 
it still qualifies as an abstract, procedural representation. This does not mean that all games 
are simulations, or that all simulations are games. Simulations do not necessarily stage or 
prescribe a contest between the participants. They do not necessarily, as games do, model a 
conflict, and they do not have to define a goal for the participants in terms of a winning or 
loosing condition10.  
 
                                                 
8 A concrete model is “A model in which at least one component represented is a tangible object; for example, a 
physical replica of a building.” For definitions of terms of simulation and modelling as they are used by the US 
military, see Online M&S Glossary by the Defense Modelling and Simulation Office (2005). 
9 Hamlet on the Holodeck focuses on narrative structure and narrative agency in ‘cyberspace’ – that is in digital 
environments of all kinds, from sprawling databases to VR installations. All these computerised environments 
have, Murray suggests, four essential properties. They are ‘procedural’, ‘participatory’, ‘spatial’ and 
‘encyclopaedic’ (1997:71). My own adaptation of the concept of ‘procedural representation’ is also a more 
generalised version of the term as it can be found in the field of computer graphics. See David D. Grossman’s 
“Procedural Representation of Three-dimensional Objects” (1976). Salen and Zimmermann (2004) make use of 
the same concept, expanding considerably from the basic idea by discussing various implications for game 
design. 
10 In literature on games well as in the newer literature on computer games there are a variety of definitions as to 
how games are different from playful activity in general. All of them in one way or another emphasise the 
importance of conflict, as well as a winning condition or alternatively a ‘negotiable and quantifiable outcome’ 
(Juul 2005). See Salen and Zimmerman (Salen and Zimmerman 2004) for a review of definitions found in the 
literature. 
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Nevertheless, both simulations and games establish a separate realm of activity that is 
governed by a set of formal procedures. The activity is motivated in the external reality in 
which they exist as sub-systems, and the activity may even have very serious implications 
beyond the boundaries of the system itself (think of for example Russian roulette, gladiator 
contests or military simulations). The important point is that this relationship will always be, 
as Jesper Juul (2005) points out, ‘negotiable’; the participants define the real-world 
consequences in advance. They can do so because games and simulations are autonomous 
systems of meaning with clear (although permeable) boundaries, and therefore are meaningful 
in themselves; Russian roulette may well be played with harmless blanks, and military 
simulations are often enjoyed on the couch, with cheese doodles.  
 
With games as well as for simulations, their significance in relation to their contexts is 
premised on the fact that they possess a basic autonomy. This autonomy, according to Johan 
Huizinga (1955[1950]), is no less than the historical and aesthetic essence of all kinds of 
competitive play; all artificially staged contests. The key quality of play is irreducible, 
Huizinga argues; its meaning cannot be attributed to any purpose outside play. Play is 
meaningful in itself. Autonomy and non-instrumentality is at the heart of the ‘play function’ 
in culture, a principle which can be traced in all human activity through history. The essence 
of play, states Huizinga, with reference to the religious and ritualistic practices of pre-modern 
cultures, is the encapsulation of imagination and conflict within a magic circle. The magic 
circle signifies a separate realm of internally defined meaning, a ‘world’ of objective and 
shared truths within which the participants make serious intellectual effort and emotional 
investment. This is the familiar paradox of games – they mean nothing (because a game is just 
a game), yet seen from the inside of the magic circle they mean everything. 
 
Play becomes serious, sometimes even deadly, not in spite of but because of its characteristic 
as a separate realm, according to Huizinga. The magic circle is a ‘sacred circle’, rooted in the 
rituals and contest of archaic cultures. 
 
The arena, the card-table, the magic circle, the temple, the stage, the screen, the tennis 
court, the court of justice, etc., are all in form and function play-grounds, i.e. forbidden 
spots, isolated, hedged round, hallowed, within which special rules obtain. All are 
temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an act 
apart. (Huizinga 1955[1950]:19). 
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It is precisely the meanings guaranteed by the principle of the magic circle that make the 
practices of ritualistic contest, warfare, law, poetry and philosophy possible. Modern 
computer-simulated systems tap into this same cultural realm of meaning. Through their self-
contained detachment, they bring forward the autotelic ‘play function’ in (or of) culture. This 
cultural heritage partly explains why we will always encounter, with any participatory 
dynamic model, the latent temptation of non-serious play; the invitation to fool around. 
Computer games do not abandon the didactic and scientific rationale of abstract models, but 
re-contextualise this rationale within the cultural realm of play, turning latent temptations into 
shameless pleasure. We could say that computer games are simulations in reverse: they draw 
on our familiarity with the world to empower us within the simulation rather than using the 
simulation to empower us to handle the world. The primary function of modelling in 
computer games is to provide a playground, a material magic circle, a pointless system of 
meanings. 
 
It is because games and simulations present themselves to us as autonomous meaning-making 
systems that we sometimes refer to them as worlds. In everyday language, when given no 
further qualifications or specifications, the term ‘world’ will usually refer to something like 
‘the totality of our existence’. The degrees and modalities of metaphorical meaning vary from 
the presumably literal (‘world’ meaning our planet) to the more abstract (the ‘world’ of 
dating). All variants and shades of the term, however, resonate with the basic notion of 
totality; a presumed all-encompassing boundary, an outer rim that conditions meaningful 
practice. In the ‘world’ of dating, behaviours that would be ridiculous outside that game can 
still be perfectly meaningful within it. Equally, when we say that a person ‘lives in his own 
world’ it would typically mean that his behaviour (or a certain aspect of it) does not make 
sense to us. In order for something apparently meaningless to be able to make sense after all, 
it needs to bring its own world – its own sub-totality, its own magic circle – along with it. 
Given this premise, as Huizinga’s detailed historical accounts illustrate, pointless exercises 
can generate all sorts of serious meanings and consequences in their interfaces with the 
outside world, and typically will do so – even if they do not depend on such consequences to 
be meaningful and engaging.  
Contest versus mimesis 
The ‘world’ of the sacred circle captures a cultural modality that is common to games, 
simulated systems (whether serious or not) and to play in general. Still, imaginary worlds of 
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literary or cinematic fiction do not easily fit into this picture. There seems to be, on a general 
level, a natural affinity between Huizinga’s ‘magic circle’ and Coleridge’s ‘suspension of 
disbelief’. Both refer to an experience of – somehow – stepping into an alternative reality, a 
separate and encapsulating realm of meaningful experience. However, the concept of the 
magic circle does not address the phenomenon of imaginary worlds – let alone the worlds of 
narrative. 
 
While Huizinga’s magic circle allows for fiction and fantasy as a natural element of playful 
activity, the phenomenon of make-believe is not considered part of the core of play; it is not 
integral to the play-principle of culture. This principle, or cultural function, is an agonistic 
principle; its paradigmatic and originating form is to be found in the ritualistic contests of 
archaic culture. In Homo Ludens (1955[1950]), Huizinga never addresses the role of drama or 
storytelling as such, seen as separate from the functions of the contest. All play-derived 
civilising practices that he discusses throughout the book, including music and poetry, are 
described in terms of how they instantiate and develop the agonistic principle in culture. At 
heart, the ‘magic circle’ is a realm of artificial or ‘staged’ contest, not fiction.  
 
In privileging the principle of the contest, Huizinga’s theoretical perspective mirrors Roger 
Caillois’ classifications of play in Man, Play and Games (2001 [1961]). Caillois focuses on 
play and games as concrete activities rather than any abstract ‘function’ or ‘principle’ in 
culture, and he is therefore interested in the mimetic as well as the agonistic elements of play. 
However, Caillois stresses the inherent conflict and incompatibility between agonistic and 
mimetic play11. If they mix, he argues, mimetic play will unavoidably ruin agonistic play, and 
vice versa. Huizinga, in contrast, never argues that the contest should be seen as incompatible 
with mimetic play, probably because he does not pay any attention to the ‘worlds’ of 
imagination and fiction at all. In any case, we can use neither Huizinga nor Caillois to argue 
that the ‘world’ of a game is similar to the ‘world’ of a novel or a film.  
 
In spite of the potential conflicts between the two, games and fictions often blend into one 
single, autotelic realm of practice. In games, the world of the contest is often also an 
                                                 
11 In his influential categorisation of play-forms in Man, Play and Games (2001[1961]), Roger Caillois lists agon 
(competition), alea (chance), mimicry and vertigo (games of physical disorientation). Whereas the latter two 
belong to the category of free play (‘paidiea’), the first two belong to the category of ludus, which includes 
formally rule-based and goal-oriented forms of play. 
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imaginary world, a world of make-believe, both dimensions converging in the principle of 
simulation. The marriage between contest and mimesis is absent from the majority of modern 
sports and contests, with a few major exceptions like wrestling or similar types of 
‘gladiatorial’ entertainment contests that is generally not regarded as honest and serious 
competition. This confirms Caillois’ observation that the mimetic and the agonistic do not 
mix well. At the same time, a natural relation between mimesis and the contest seems to be 
almost uniformly confirmed in the various ritualistic practices that Huizinga identifies as 
historically originating of the play-principle in culture. 
World as the diegetic 
In the third book of the Republic, Plato distinguishes between diegesis, which is the practice 
of storytelling, and mimesis, which is the practice of imitation or dramatic performance (Plato 
1941). The modern notion of the diegetic or the story-world, introduced by Gerard Genette 
(1980), is rooted in the same distinction, although re-framing it within a structuralist-linguistic 
understanding of narrative. For Genette, story (‘histoire’) is the signified of narrative 
discourse; the ‘diégesè’ that is constructed by the ‘diegesis’. The notion of the diegetic is used 
as a basis for developing a theory of how different levels of the narrative relate to each other – 
different levels of ‘worlds’ in which the events of the story take place, and in relation to 
which the narrator can be positioned in different ways. In a ‘homodiegetic’ narrative, for 
example, the narrator is present as a character in the world of which he narrates (1980:245). 
Moreover, the diegetic level of the narrative (or ‘intradiegetic’ level) refers to the primary 
world as it is being signified by the narrative discourse.  
 
Genette’s notion of the diegetic, formulated in the early seventies, has been highly influential 
in shaping today’s dominant understandings of what a fictional world is in film and literature. 
This influence is in no small part due to the adoption of the term into film theory via Bordwell 
and Thompson’s distinction between ‘plot’ and ‘story’ in their introductory textbook Film Art 
(1993[1979]). Here they establish a distinction between diegetic and nondiegetic elements of 
a film, a distinction which has become common reference in film theory:  
 
For example, while the opening of North by Northwest is portraying rush hour in 
Manhattan, we also see the film’s credits and hear orchestral music. Neither of these 
elements is diegetic, since they are brought from outside the story world. (The 
characters cannot read the credits or hear the music). Credits and such extraneous 
music are thus nondiegetic elements. (Bordwell and Thompson 1993[1979]:67).  
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Via the notion of the ‘diegetic’, the concept of ‘story-world’ is rooted in the semiotic 
distinction between discourse (signifier) and that which the discourse is about; its signified. 
What is distinctive to worlds of narrative fiction, according to this theoretical model, is that 
they are told12.  
 
Diegetic theories of narrative worlds of fiction implicitly accentuate the difference between 
play and fiction. There are few similarities between Huizinga’s ‘magic circle’ and the idea of 
a ‘story world’ as constituted by narrative discourse. Huizinga’s ‘play-function’ subdues the 
mimetic under the performance of agonistic practice. If there is at all any concept of fiction to 
be extracted from the historical and etymological studies of Homo Ludens, it would be that 
fiction – including stories – is something that we do, not something that is told or shown. 
Such a non-enunciative and non-narrative model of fiction would seem to fit simulated 
environments better than traditional mimetic or diegetic conceptions do. However, as I argued 
above, this model is premised on the cultural logic of the artificial contest. Huizinga is neither 
interested in fictional worlds nor narrative in particular. 
 
We should note, however, that the linguistic model of narrative fiction also points to a 
contradiction that is inherent to the phenomenon of recounted narrative worlds. On the one 
hand, the primacy of language is asserted; narrative is a recounting, an utterance, a result of an 
act of enunciation. On the other hand, the ‘world’ that is established by this act has the 
capacity to present itself to us as a form of mimesis, as ‘histoire’, defying the enunciation that 
creates and upholds it13. It is as if – in the phrasing of Emile Benveniste – “No one speaks 
                                                 
12 Bordwell and Thompson’s use of the model in Film Art is not explicitly attributed to narratology (– their most 
direct reference is that plot and story is also ”sometimes called ”story” and ”discourse”” ), and they do not make 
very clear what their own modifications to the original model is (66-67). In Narration in the Fiction Film (1985), 
Bordwell replaces the loose, structuralist theoretical framework from Film Art with a more precise and elaborate 
version of ‘plot’ versus ‘story’, based on the binary of ‘syuzhet’ and ‘fabula’ from Russian formalism. Here 
Bordwell makes the point that the latter distinction should not be confused with the story/discourse-model 
advocated by theories of ‘enunciation’ – a category in which Bordwell includes Gerard Genette (Bordwell 
1985:51).  
13 The concept of ’enunciation’ was introduced to structuralist theory by Emile Benveniste. His notion of 
discours refers to the particular mode of enunciation in which the enunciation itself, as an act, is made visible, as 
opposed to historie, where enunciation is hidden. However it is Genette’s modified variant of the concept that 
has given the dominant meaning to the English term ‘discourse’ in narrative theory. To Genette, all strings of 
utterances are ‘discours’, and the signified of narrative discourse – the story – can be compared to Benveniste’s 
histoire in the sense that the traces of enunciation are expelled from it. For an introduction to central concepts in 
narratology as they relate to film theory, see Narration in the Fiction Film (Bordwell 1985), pages 21-22. 
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here; the events seem to recount themselves.” (Bordwell 1985:21). In this sense, we can say 
that the ‘world’ of a story transcends the act of communication that it is a part of.  
Mimesis as Make-Believe 
Kendall L. Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe (Walton 1990) suggests a play-based theory of 
the nature of representation, but from a very different theoretical perspective than the play-
theorists Huizinga or Caillois. Walton belongs to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of analytic 
philosophy. He seeks to account for the representational arts and the nature of representation 
in general, not the cultural role of play and games. Although imaginative play is used as the 
central model for understanding representation in the arts, Walton never makes any reference 
to Huizinga or to other theories of play from anthropology, sociology, pedagogy, philosophy 
or literary theory. 
 
As a theory of representation, Walton’s approach can be seen as pragmatic or process-
oriented, even if he himself never uses those terms. It is motivated by the typical theoretical 
problems and debates within a branch of analytic philosophy often referred to as ‘semantics of 
fiction’; questions that address the ‘truth’ of fiction and the relationship between fiction and 
reality. However, Walton does not rely much on the usual tools of the trade, largely 
discarding possible world theory and other standard concepts derived from formal semantics. 
Instead he builds his arguments from detailed examples which he refers to as the 
‘phenomenology’ of art appreciation, including analysis of the language that is being used in 
everyday discourses to describe how we experience works of art and literature.  
 
According to Walton, an object should be considered a representation neither in terms of a 
semantic relation (its reference), nor in terms of its role within a linguistic and communicative 
act, but because it has a specific purpose, namely to engage us in imaginative practice. 
Artistic representations (books, paintings, film, sculpture etc) should primarily be understood 
as props in games of make-believe, no different from children’s toys and other tokens of 
imaginative play. This model implies that all representations – including factual 
representations – construct fiction. The defining function of a prop is to prescribe fictional 
truths in correspondence with the rules of the game, and these fictional truths evoke imagined 
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objects and events14. Fiction is a function of our engagement with representations, understood 
as props. Imaginary realms, Walton argues, have nothing to do with language nor the 
specificities of narrative discourse.  
 
It is important to note that, within the context of a rule-based game of make-believe, fiction is 
prescribed by (not inspired or suggested by) props and rules. Consider the following example 
used by Walton, in which Gregory and Eric, playing in the forest, have decided that all 
stumps are bears:  
 
“They approach the bear cautiously, but only to discover that the stump is not a stump 
at all but a moss-covered boulder. “False alarm. There isn’t a bear there after all,” 
Gregory observes with surprise and relief.” (…) Meanwhile, however, unbeknownst to 
everyone, there is an actual stump buried in a thicket not twenty feet behind Eric. 
Fictionally a bear is lurking in the thicket, although neither Eric nor Gregory realizes 
the danger. No one imagines a bear in the thicket; it is not fictional that a bear is there 
because somebody imagines that there is. But it is fictional. What makes it fictional? 
The stump. Thus does the stump generate a fictional truth. It is a prop. Props are 
generators of fictional truths, things which, by virtue of their nature or existence, make 
propositions fictional.” (Walton 1990:37).  
 
The concept of fictional truth is at the heart of Walton’s theory. If one does not accept a 
fictional truth, one is stepping outside the fiction, and choosing not to play the game anymore. 
The theory of fictional truth asserts that fiction is not, as common sense often seems to imply, 
something that resides in our imagination; it is not ‘that which is imagined’. Props are 
generators of fictional truths “…independently of what anyone does or does not imagine” 
(1990:38). Fictional propositions, “…are propositions that are to be imagined – whether or 
not they are in fact imagined” (1990:39). A proposition that is ‘made fictional’ is made true in 
the world of the game. Once the wheels of the game have been set in motion, this truth does 
not depend on subjective imagination, but is an objective fact, generated by rules and props, 
and guaranteed by the autonomy of the game-world.  
 
Walton’s game-based theory of the representational arts can be related to a number of other 
philosophers and theorists who discuss artistic representation in terms of play and games15. It 
                                                 
14 Walton’s idea of fiction differs significantly from the general interpretation of the term ‘fiction’ as that which 
is not true, or, alternatively, as that which is not factual. All representations are fictions, Walton asserts; all are 
part of games of make-believe. A game of make-believe may be a factual, if that which is to be imagined is 
accompanied by a referential commitment to historical reality. Some fictional truths are claimed to be true, some 
are not.  
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is important to emphasise, however, that Walton’s work deals exclusively with the realm of 
representation, or ‘mimicry’ if we follow Roger Caillois’ categorisation of game-forms 
(Caillois 1961). Walton does not include into his discussion the notion of play as contest. His 
area of interest is the representational arts, not play and culture. Still, I want to argue, Mimesis 
of Make-Believe gives us a valuable theoretical tool for analysing the role of fiction in 
simulation-based play. Indeed, it could be said that Walton’s comprehensive conceptual 
model is a systematic attempt to re-define fiction as simulation. 
Fictional subjectivity: fiction as simulation 
Unlike the play-theorists from the continental traditions of philosophy, anthropology and 
cultural history, Walton’s theory of fiction is also a theory of immersion, and a theory of 
‘virtual reality’. A fictional world, he claims, is a game in which we as ‘appreciators’ are 
invited to participate: 
 
“We are to imagine that Willy Loman lost his job, that Superman rescues people from 
tall buildings, and so on. Such imaginings are part of our games of make-believe, 
games that have their own fictional worlds distinct from work worlds. (…) It is a 
mistake to think of appreciators as mere spectators of work worlds, observers from the 
outside of what is fictional in them. That leaves out our participation in games in 
which representations are props.” (Walton 1990:208). 
 
Walton’s approach implies that there is no essential difference between how we engage with 
the ‘fictions’ of Monopoly or Scrabble and the fictions of a painting. The ‘appreciator’ of any 
work of art is a player in a game of make-believe and a participant in a fiction, much like a 
little girl who is playing with her paper dolls. The appreciator herself, in order to appreciate 
an artwork from the inside, as it were (in order to play the game), has to take part in the 
fiction by imagining about herself a subject-position that is fictional. When we stand in front 
of a painting and say for example “I see a ship in the background”, we are able to say this 
(instead of saying “I am looking at a depiction of a ship”) precisely because of this fictional 
subject-position. We are given the role of a prop whose behaviours generates fictional truths 
about itself; we become ourselves a ‘reflexive prop’ (1990:213) – like a toy truck that 
generates about itself the properties of a fictional car.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Roger Caillois (Caillois 2001[1961]), Gregory Bateson (1972), and Donald C. Winnicott in Playing and 
Reality (1971) all include art, music and literature as part of a broader notion of play. Several philosophers argue 
that play is central to art and philosophy – among them Kant, Nietzsche, Gadamer and Derrida. 
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This reflexivity re-locates our subject-position within the boundaries of the game of make-
believe, so that we become fictional subjects; the fact that I am looking at an image of a 
woman in Mona Lisa makes it fictional that I am looking at the woman Mona Lisa. The fact 
that I feel fear when I am looking at a monster in a horror film makes it fictional that I am 
afraid of the monster. Distanced observation, or “appreciation without participation” (Walton 
1990:274) in which we detach ourselves from the fictional subjectivity that the painting 
encourages, becomes a secondary option, an activity of meta-reflection and as such a meta-
game in relation to the primary game the painting invites us to join.  
 
The theory of fictional subjectivity – which Walton elaborates on at length with respect to 
different kinds of representations and empirical situations – is an interaction-oriented and 
process-oriented theory of immersive fiction. It is not concerned with the relationship 
between the representation and the world, but the relationship between the representation (as 
prop) and the participant. It is a theory of doing fiction, a theory that emphasises how fictional 
truths are experienced as actual truths via the acts of imagination and perception. In 
discussing the ‘in-game’ appreciation of a traditional painting, Walton describes the various 
types of ‘lookings’ that we perform, and in what way different ways of looking translate to 
different fictional roles and positions as well as different mechanisms or modes of 
‘generating’ fictional truths. For example, a painting is considered ‘realistic’ to the extent that 
my way of looking at it is analogous to the way that I actually look at objects and 
environments in the real world; the way I take in the whole before I start moving the focus 
across the canvas to inspect the individual elements, the way that I might move closer to the 
painting in order to discover fine details, and so on. When there are such analogies, the 
manner in which we interact with artworks is constituted as an object to be imagined, a 
fictional truth that is generated by the interaction itself. 
 
Participation, then, in less technical terms, means playing the game of make-believe, as 
opposed to observing or analysing it. The essential and defining premise of all 
representations, according to Walton, is that role-playing is required. The kind of activity that 
is expected and permitted as role-playing varies between the expressive body-language of 
children’s games to the highly restricted and (predominantly) contemplative participation in a 
game of for example reading Henry David Thoreau’s Walden. In-game activities, Walton 
argues, will usually be fairly well distinguished from ‘out of character’-interaction. Whereas, 
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for example, kissing an icon would typically be considered in-game and part of the fiction, 
wrapping the icon up and taking it to storage would not. 
 
Re-phrasing Walton’s argument, we might say that representations – all representations – are 
essentially seductive in nature. They pull us into a role, a fictional subjectivity according to 
which we engage our thoughts and feelings. It is this subjectivity that, for example, makes it 
natural to feel deeply sorry for, even to cry over, the heroine in a well-crafted tragedy. Our 
fictional self laments her fate and desperately wants her to be happy instead. Seen from 
outside of the game of ‘tragedy’, however, we do not really want a tragedy to have a happy 
ending. Still, it would be absurd, as Walton points out, to consider appreciators of tragedy as 
accomplices to the sad and undeserved fates of their heroes, as if they were ‘double-crossing’ 
them by pretending to cry for them while secretly taking part in a plot to kill them. Once the 
game of tragedy is set up, as participants we cannot be blamed, because we are not 
responsible for the sad fictional truth. It is not that we want to save the heroine but cannot. 
Rather, within the game of the fiction, the question of agency is irrelevant; we neither can nor 
cannot. Re-writing the ending would clearly not qualify as ‘saving’ the heroine. It would only 
destroy the game, and our imagined subject-position along with it.  
Work worlds 
Walton’s concept of the ‘world’ of fiction, in the primary instance, refers to the world of the 
game in which the representation is included as a prop. In the quote above, Walton points out 
that this kind of ‘world’, which is the world that is constituted through our participation with 
paintings, novels or films artworks, is distinct from the ‘work worlds’ of those artworks, as 
projected by the representation itself. Our games of make-believe “have their own fictional 
worlds distinct from work worlds.” (Walton 1990:208).  
 
Roughly, ‘work-world’ refers to any cluster or grouping of fictional truths within a game of 
make-believe that can be attributed to the objective properties of the particular 
representational work that is being used as a prop. A work-world of fictional truths is 
autonomous and non-negotiable, which means that its fictional truths will be prescribed in any 
game in which that particular representation is a prop16.  
                                                 
16 The concept of the work-world is somewhat less well defined than other and more central concepts in 
Walton’s theory, but it still serves a function within his overall framework. It is necessary in order to account for 
the role of all-encompassing props like for example a novel in the game of ‘reading a novel’. Without the notion 
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However, in the context of the concerns of this thesis, the notion of the ‘work world’ is not 
primarily interesting as tool for defining the objectivity and shared nature of representation in 
artworks, but as a tool to distinguish between different types of props: what kinds of props 
have ‘worlds’, and which do not? When comparing across different forms, modalities and 
genres of representation – and especially if we are concerned with complex and relatively 
unfamiliar media forms – any concept that differentiates between species of props is 
potentially very useful. However, Walton does not provide any clear or definitive criteria for 
distinguishing between what we might call ‘world-props’ and other props – although novels 
or films would be fairly straightforward examples of the former. He leaves the question open 
as to what kind of prop-generated objective clustering of fictional truths can be said to 
constitute a ‘world’ in any given case. He notes that, in the case of a doll, the fictional truths 
generated by the doll itself will not normally be experienced or referred to by the participants 
as the ‘world’ of the doll, and therefore – under most circumstances – a doll does not project a 
world; it has no ‘work world’ in the same that a novel has: 
 
We are not as often interested in dolls themselves apart from games played with them. 
The contributions most dolls make to such games are relatively insignificant. What is 
important is usually the fictional truths generated by what is done with the dolls—that 
fictionally Heather bathes or dresses or scolds a baby, for instance. (Walton 1990:62). 
 
Walton does not proceed from this observation to propose any conceptual distinction between 
props that have work worlds and props that do not17. However he makes an interesting remark 
– although in passing – with respect to how dolls or statues are different from paintings or 
tapestries: 
 
“...a doll’s location in real space is significant in a way in which the actual location of 
a painting is not. The fact that a doll is in Heather’s arms or on her bed probably makes 
it fictional (in her game) that a baby is in her arms or on her bed. But the fact that the 
Unicorn Tapestries hang on the walls of the Metropolitan Museum does not make it 
fictional that there are unicorns there. (Walton 1990:62-63). 
                                                                                                                                                        
of work-world, Walton points out, we would have to concede that any kind of game can be played with any kind 
of novel – meaning that any reading of a novel, taken as a whole, would be equally valid. The category of the 
work-world, designating a non-negotiable and rule-generating power in games of make-believe, serves to secure 
and strengthen the objectivity and shared nature of the magic circle of make-believe. 
17 It should be remembered here that Walton’s aim is not to give precise or exhaustive descriptions of different 
types and categories of props, but to investigate how various capacities of props shed light on the nature of 
representation. 
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This distinction, which has to do with the space of fiction and fictional participation, may not 
be important to Walton’s general definition of fictionality, but it may be quite useful to cast 
light on more complex props – like computer games – that are, in a sense, both like tapestries 
and statues at the same time, which I will return to in chapter 5. What we may conclude from 
Walton’s observation, I want suggest, is that a prop is a ‘world-prop’ when it prescribes 
fictional truths in a game of make-believe without being a reflexive prop with respect to how 
it relates to its environment. By virtue of its own properties as a truth-generating prop, it 
encloses the user within a separate space of game-relevant activity (a game-dedicated ad-hoc 
world), while at the same time blocking out the external environment, precluding this 
environment from having relevance within the game of make-believe. A teddy bear, therefore, 
cannot be a world-prop, at least not according to the typical modes of participation that we are 
familiar with. As with Heather’s doll in the Walton’s example above, the external 
environment will always matter; indeed it is a central attraction of teddy bears that shifting 
environments do matter to the fiction. I can take my teddy for a stroll in the garden, bring him 
with me on holiday, and so on. In comparison, it does not matter where I bring my book or 
my DVD, because as world-props they do not interact fictionally with their environment. A 
world-prop, I suggest, is a self-contained prop; a game of make-believe incarnated as prop.  
A prop-centred approach 
Kendall Walton’s conceptual framework in Mimesis as Make-Believe is highly productive to 
the analysis computer game fictions. The basic idea is that fiction – any kind fiction – is a 
rule-based activity, and that props, used according to their specific capacities as props and in 
accordance with the rules of the game, create a shared reality of make-believe for the 
participants to play within. Props and rules create fictional truths. These truths constitute the 
basis for a fictional environment that can be explored as autonomous and independent of the 
participants’ own subjective imaginations.  
 
Moreover, Walton’s theory draws attention to how different types of props (verbal props, 
visual props etc) encourage and discourage different types of make-believe – or, we could 
say, how different props draw up different types of playgrounds, suited to different kinds of 
mimetic play. In other words, Walton’s concept of the prop offers a tool for the theoretical 
reflection on the technologies of fiction – even if his own elaborate discussions of the 
materialities and typical uses of various kinds of props do not include any consideration of 
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what might be specific or unique to ‘computerised props’, or to the computer as a particular 
technology of make-believe.  
 
Finally, Walton’s analysis of a wide range of representational forms is useful in that it 
describes how different modalities of fictional participation and subject-positioning relate to 
different types of props – from toy trucks and Barbie dolls to novels and expressionist 
paintings. Even if he does not consider computer games, his categories for thinking about 
different mechanisms and principles of fictional engagement – in relation to different 
technological and perceptual determinants of the props – are well-suited to the task of 
mapping and investigating the typically multi-modal and multi-generic nature of computer 
game aesthetics.  
Recentring 
Marie-Laure Ryan’s Narrative as Virtual Reality. Immersion and Interactivity in Literature 
and Electronic Media (2001) sums up much of her earlier work and establishes a unified 
theoretical perspective on the relationship between interactivity, immersion and fiction in 
literature and in digital media. In envisioning the promises of narrative in digital media, 
Ryan’s main focus is on the mechanisms of immersion rather than on digital media’s capacity 
for textual self-reflexivity and play, as emphasised by hypertext theorists Jay David Bolter 
(1991) and George P. Landow (1992). Ryan aims to explore the potential of digital fictions as 
a new form of ‘total art’, appealing as much to our bodies as to our minds, and utilising the 
richness of a multitude of media forms. As the title indicates, the central theoretical idea 
throughout the book is that virtuality or ‘presence’ is at the core of fiction and narrative – in 
novels and films as in digital media. Fictional phenomena present us with ‘virtual realities’ in 
the sense that we can relate to them as actual worlds.  
 
Ryan’s approach implies a shift from a text-oriented to a world-oriented paradigm of 
interaction and engagement in digital media; it is of crucial importance to our engagement 
with fiction and narrative, Ryan argues, that we are able to experience a fictional world as 
being an actual world rather than as ‘world’ simply as a metaphor; a textual web of meanings. 
In other words, the experience of being ‘lost’ in a book or a film is not something that we 
should discard or trivialise as incidental to the higher and proper goals of artistic expression 
and engagement, but is, on the contrary, at the core of what fictional and narrative phenomena 
are all about. If we loose ‘immersion’, we loose the key to the power of narrative.  
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What Ryan refers to as a ‘poetics of immersion’ (2001:87ff) addresses the relationship 
between literary immersion and computer-based interactivity, combining Walton’s theory of 
participation with possible worlds theory. In the field of formal semantics, possible worlds 
theory is a way of expressing the logical status of the modal operators possibility and 
necessity. Possibility means that a state of affairs exists in at least one possible world – under 
the condition that this world needs to be logically consistent. Conversely, the modality of 
necessity means that, given the positive truth-value of a certain proposition (‘if’), in any 
possible world, then a specific other proposition (‘then’) must also be true18.  
 
The modal system of possible worlds, as formulated by Saul Kripke, refers to the organisation 
of possible worlds around a privileged centre, the actual world, a position from which all 
other worlds express modalities (as intentions, wishes, counterfactuals, goals etc). Taken as a 
whole, the modal system is a logical expression of everything that we can imagine, the totality 
of the thinkable. It is important to note that the modal system is more than just a formal, 
semantic tool. It also articulates a basic phenomenological experience of being a subject who 
relates to state of affairs in the world. According to David Lewis, possible world theory is the 
logical expression of our intuitive acknowledging that, at any point in time, “things might be 
otherwise than they are”19. I could, for example, be writing a different sentence than this one. 
Moreover, the logical construct of ‘possible world’ is by definition complete. It refers to a 
particular semantic universe of propositions and their truth-values; to the exclusively and 
exhaustively defined propositional configuration of all there is.  
 
As a formal method of explaining how relationships between the actual and the possible are 
organised, possible world theory can be used for a variety of purposes, including 
investigations into the nature of fictional worlds. Marie-Laure Ryan’s adaptation of possible 
world theory draws on Thomas Pavel’s concept of the ‘actual possible world’ (Pavel 1986). 
Fictional worlds are autonomous, according to Pavel, because when we engage with them 
imaginatively, they enforce onto us a new ontological position, from which the fictional world 
becomes an actual world. The actual possible world is the absolute reference world for the 
judgment of truth-values of the propositions put forward by characters in that world. Ryan 
develops from this idea the notion of recentring; the subject-position of the reader is re-
                                                 
18 My account of possible worlds theory builds on Ryan (2001; Ryan 1992). 
19 Quoted in Ryan (1992:528). 
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located and re-centred within a new modal system of worlds, in which the possible actual 
world (the ‘textual actual world’) is defined in relation to other satellite possible worlds – 
other modalities or ‘virtualities’ that include character’s beliefs and goals. This ontological re-
orientation is a ‘space travel’ of the imagination, assigning to the fictional world the same 
privileged position as the real world; a world that appears autonomous in relation to the 
subject. Through recentring, the virtual is experienced as real. Non-immersive fiction, on the 
other hand, is more like a ‘telescope’ rather than a ‘space travel’: 
 
In the telescope mode, consciousness remains anchored in its native reality, and 
possible worlds are contemplated from the outside. In the space-travel mode, 
consciousness relocates itself to another world and, taking advantage of the indexical 
definition of actuality, reorganizes the entire universe of being around this virtual 
reality. I call this move recentering, and I regard it as constitutive of the fictional mode 
of reading. Insofar as fictional worlds are, objectively speaking, non-actual possible 
worlds, it takes recentering to experience them as actual – an experience that forms the 
basic condition for immersive reading.” (Ryan 2001:103).  
 
With the adaptation of possible worlds theory as a theory of literary immersion, the ‘modal 
system’ has been re-articulated as phenomenology – as a philosophy that attempts to describe 
intuitive experience. Ryan’s poetics of immersive fiction, like Walton’s theory of make-
believe, highlights a mode of interaction according to which both diegetic texts and magic 
circles can be considered different incarnations of the same basic kind of imaginative practice; 
mimetic discourses and mimetic contests, however different in many respects, are both 
practices of recentring, of experiencing the virtual as actual.  
 
Experiencing the virtual as real, moreover, also implies that we experience the fictional world 
as complete. Fictional worlds, when contemplated from outside, as clusters of propositions 
about state of affairs, are far from complete. The exact family relationship between Donald 
Duck and his nephews, for example, cannot be decided. Considered from the point of view of 
our actual world, fictional realities are always radically underdetermined. The process of 
reading requires us to fill in the gaps, so that worlds are constructed. The whole point of 
recentring, however, is to relocate or re-orient ourselves into a position from which we 
imagine a world that is complete. The logical construct of a possible world is an adequate 
expression for our experience of the textual world being an actual world, a proper world with 
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an autonomous existence in relation to ourselves, the kind of world in which questions 
concerning state-of-affairs can always, in principle, be decided20.  
 
Kendall Walton argues that the worlds of make-believe should not be confused with the 
logical constructs of possible worlds, because the former are not complete. This is a relevant 
argument, provided that he never considers describing the act of fictional re-positioning itself 
in terms of possible world theory, as Ryan does. A game of make-believe, considered as a 
rule-based and self-contained system, could be considered as either complete or non-
complete, depending on whether the participant is positioning herself inside or outside of the 
system. Games and literary fictions are equally underdetermined in this respect. In any kind of 
fictional world, including mimetic contests, completeness is a mode of experiencing a world, a 
‘space travel’ which is, following Ryan’s argument, the constitutive mode of experience of 
immersive fiction.  
 
Ryan’s broad analysis of immersion and interactivity in digital media provides valuable tools 
for the analysis of avatar-based interaction in computer games. At the same time, for the 
purpose this thesis, the primary limitation of Narrative as Virtual Reality is that the specific 
mechanisms of play and fictional participation in computer games are not taken into account. 
As I will return to in chapter 8, her theories are mainly oriented towards in the dominant (and 
distinctly avatar-less) paradigm of Virtual Reality. This means that avatar-based computer 
games end up in the periphery of her otherwise fairly comprehensive and unifying theoretical 
framework.  
The paradox of play 
Oscillations and conflicts between imagined and actual subject-positions are integral to how 
we engage with fictions. Games structure these oscillations differently from novels or films, 
and they typically encourage what Ryan would call the ‘telescope’ mode of interaction. 
However, in principle, games are no less ‘complete’ as fictional worlds, nor do they 
necessarily encourage us to engage with them in telescope mode. Mimetic games, simulations 
and literary fictions are all accessible to us as ‘actual fictional worlds’. Gregory Bateson’s 
                                                 
20 ’In principle’ means that we are always able to describe the conditions under which it would be possible to 
determine the truth-value of a proposition. We do not know, for example, whether there is life somewhere else in 
the universe, but we are able to specify the conditions under which we could find out (conditions which, I 
assume, in effect make it impossible to actually find out). 
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classical essay “A Theory of Play and Fantasy” (1972) casts more light on the nature of this 
paradox.  
 
Bateson is concerned with the significance of play in the evolution of human communication, 
and with the role of play in psychotherapy. He defines ‘play’ as follows: 
 
I saw two young monkeys playing, i.e., engaged in an interactive sequence of which 
the unit actions or signals were similar to but not the same as those of combat (...) 
Now, this phenomenon, play, could only occur if the participant organisms were 
capable of some degree of metacommunication, i.e., of exchanging signals which 
would carry the message "this is play." (Bateson 1972:179). 
 
We see that Bateson here describes make-believe from a slightly different angle than Walton 
does, emphasising the metacommunicative nature of the rule that defines the boundary of 
play. The act of metacommunication (communication about communication), Bateson argues, 
establishes a frame for meaningful activity: within this frame, there is play. Through framing, 
humans communicate to each other what the situation is about, how the communication is to 
be understood. Framing – or metacommunication – defines the communicative situation, 
defines what is going on: ‘This is humour’; ‘This is poetry’. Because play is a basic and 
primitive form of metacommunication – animals do it – Bateson considers play as a driving 
factor in the evolution of all other kinds of metacommunication, including the development of 
language:  
 
We therefore meet in play with an instance of signals standing for other events, and it 
appears, therefore, that the evolution of play may have been an important step in the 
evolution of communication”. (Bateson 1972:181).  
 
Play, in other words, can be seen as the most basic form of representation, of “signals 
standing for other events”; through the metacommunication of play, the human species 
learned to discriminate between map and territory. The evolution of human communication is 
rooted in our ability to metacommunicate, and this ability finds its simplest form in the 
activity of play. If there was no metacommunication, human communication would be 
restricted to involuntary mood signals.  
 
However, Bateson’s main focus is not on the discriminating function of metacommunicative 
framing in its most straightforward sense. His main concern is with the paradox of mimetic 
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play. Play establishes a paradoxical frame through the logical self-reference of the meta-
statement “This is play”; the establishing may itself be included in the frame that it 
establishes. This paradoxical frame can be compared to the classical philosophical paradox 
that is referred to as Epimenides’ paradox or the liar’s paradox: ‘This sentence is false’21. The 
paradox follows logically from the principle of metacommunication, but takes on a particular 
significance, Bateson argues, in the psychological framing of play. Play is an activity that 
goes beyond the simple act of discriminating between map and territory, or the ability to tell 
fantasy from nonfantasy: 
 
The discrimination between ‘play’ and ‘nonplay’, like the discrimination between 
fantasy and nonfantasy, is certainly a function of secondary process, or “ego”. Within 
the dream the dreamer is usually unaware that he is dreaming, and within “play” he 
must often be reminded that “This is play” (...) In the primary process, map and 
territory are equated; in secondary process, they can be discriminated. In play, they are 
both equated and discriminated". (Bateson 1972:185).  
 
From a psychological and therapeutic point of view, the establishing of the frame ‘This is 
play’ is always fragile and vulnerable. The ‘play frame’ brings forward and accentuates the 
paradox that is inherent in metacommunication. While ‘This is play’ is a strategy for avoiding 
paradox (a strategy of discriminating play from non-play), it also recognises and affirms the 
paradox precisely by engaging so strongly with it. In play, therefore – as in ritual, Bateson 
notes – the discrimination between map and territory is always labile; always liable to brake 
down (1972:182). According to Bateson, the peculiar psychology of play – which goes 
beyond the ‘secondary processes’ of discrimination – has been central to the evolution of 
human communication, and must also be a necessary ingredient in psychotherapy:  
 
The resemblance between the process of therapy and the phenomenon of play is, in 
fact, profound. Both occur within a delimited psychological frame, a spatial and 
temporal bounding of a set of interactive messages. In both play and therapy, the 
messages have a special and peculiar relationship to a more concrete or basic reality. 
Just as the pseudocombat of play is not real combat, so also the pseudolove and 
pseudohate of therapy are not real love and hate. (Bateson 1972:191). 
 
In Walton’s terminology, we could say that Bateson describes the game of psychotherapy as a 
game of make-believe. His use of the prefix ‘pseudo’- in the context of psychotherapy echoes 
                                                 
21 ” In sum, it is our hypothesis that the message “This is play” establishes a paradoxical frame comparable to 
Epimenides’ paradox.” (Bateson 1972:184).  
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his comment on the terror that is caused by a spear flung at cinema viewer from a ‘3D screen’, 
or the (homoerotic) ‘pseudosexual fantasy’ that may be offered in a Hollywood film 
(1972:183).  
 
For the purpose of psychotherapy, which aims to “change the patient’s metacommunicative 
habits” (1972:191), the challenge posed by cognitive and emotional ‘pseudoreality’ is 
twofold. First, Bateson points out that communicative competence includes, in its most 
elemental form, the ability to manipulate and make use of the kind of framing that play 
constructs. This is the problem with the schizophrenic, who does not “recognize the 
metaphoric nature of his fantasies”, as he is not able to set or interpret metacommunicative 
frames (1972:190). Secondly, the healthy communicative mind must also learn to accept and 
to make use of the vulnerable and paradoxical nature of the play frame. This is why, as 
Bateson points out, rule-based games can only serve as an ‘imperfect model’ of the formal 
structure of therapeutic interaction. In a game like for example Canasta, the players avoid a 
logical paradox “... by separating their discussion of the rules from their play, and it is 
precisely this separation that is impossible in psychotherapy” (1972:192). In psychotherapy, 
rules may be implicit and constantly subject to change through experimental action. The 
resulting ambiguity is a challenge for the neurotic, who must learn that fantasy contains truth 
(1972:192).  
 
Bateson’s notion of play is similar to Walton’s notion of make-believe, and as such we can 
also consider it as a theory of fictionality. Both theories claim that the ‘as if’ of mimetic play 
– or of simulation, in the broad sense of the term – contains the essential premise for 
representation. Bateson’s concept of framing, however, highlights the relationships between 
play and non-play (or the fictional and the actual) rather than the internal and generative 
mechanisms of play itself. Moreover, Bateson’s approach is more psychological than 
philosophical or phenomenological, emphasising how and why we differentiate between play 
and non-play, and how therapy can strengthen people’s capacity to relate to and manipulate 
meta-communicative framings. This competence would include, we may add – even if 
Bateson only mentions this briefly, in the Canasta example – people’s capacity to position 
themselves differently in relation to, or oscillate between, different metacommunicative 
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frames; in one moment, we may be playing the game, in the next we may be communicating 
about our playing of the game22.  
 
We should note that A theory of Play and Fantasy does not concern itself with the question of 
‘suspension of disbelief’, or with the conditions for how we are able to re-position within 
(actual) fictional worlds. Rather, it seems that the immersive attitude is simply taken as a 
given when Bateson discusses the psychology of the pseudoreality of play. Also, it is the 
paradoxical nature of this psychological framing that mainly interests Bateson; the strong 
emotions of ‘pseudolove’ and ‘pseudohate’ hence testify to the paradoxical nature of the 
frame. At the same time, there is very little romantic tendency or mystification to be found in 
Bateson’s conceptualisation of fantasy and play. There is nothing particularly peculiar about 
the relationship between play and non-play; play merely brings forward or accentuates a 
paradox that is so general that it is hardly considered as a paradox at all: the paradox that is 
implied by our capacity for self-referential abstraction. This is the ‘paradox’ of human 
communication, which enables us to exchange more than involuntary mood signals. The play 
of make-believe is a type of communication in which we engage more seriously with the 
implications of this basic paradox.  
 
Finally, Bateson’s investigation into the secret of mimetic play does not include the role of 
externalised representations, or props, in Walton’s terminology. On the contrary, his focus of 
interest is specifically on a type of play-framed interaction that does not rely on props. In the  
“more complex form of play” that can be utilised in therapy, frame-setting is a fleeting and 
self-negotiating process, where frames can only be articulated and changed through their own 
application, from the inside; the defining statement is not “This is play”, but “Is this play?” 
(1972:182). This process of paradoxical self-framing is contradicted by the implementation of 
props. We could say that props externalise and thereby objectify the frames of play, stabilising 
and ‘disciplining’ the paradoxes that they carry. Bateson does make a hint in this direction 
when he observes that any psychological frame has “some degree of real existence” and that it 
is therefore often “...consciously recognized and even represented in vocabulary (“play,” 
“movie,” “interview,” “job,” “language,” etc.)”. These are examples where framing has 
                                                 
22 It is illustrative for Bateson’s overall concern and perspective that he only refers to non-mimetic and formally 
rule-based games once, as a model of therapeutic interaction – and as a model that mainly illustrates how the 
therapeutic use of play-framings is not structured. It is clear that he is neither interested in the phenomenon of 
non-mimetic play per se, nor in the most common way of organising metacommunication: as structured and 
unambiguous oscillations or frame-shifts. 
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become institutionalised and standardised, as it were. A similar principle is involved when we 
externalise frames as physical objects: 
 
The psychological concept which we are trying to define is neither physical nor 
logical. Rather, the actual physical frame is, we believe, added by human beings to 
physical pictures because these human beings operate more easily in a universe in 
which some of their psychological characteristics are externalised. (Bateson 
1972:187). 
 
Props, if we follow this line of thought, can be thought of as externalised 
metacommunication, which provides objective, recognisable and shared frames of “This is 
play”. This does not mean that paintings or novels escape the paradoxes of mimetic play; on 
the contrary, there is a way in which the paradoxical nature of ‘pseudoreality’ becomes more 
pronounced with the use of elaborate props (especially with world-props). The safety of 
externalised and mutually recognised frames gives us permission to intensify and to throw 
ourselves into the paradox of the experience, so to speak, without worrying that other people 
is going to question our emotional stability. Also, we may add, although Bateson does not 
take his argument in that direction: the stability provided by external representations increases 
our cognitive capability to oscillate between – and play with – multiple frames of play. Also, 
the shared nature of the props gives us permission to do so without running the risk of loosing 
(or appearing to loose) our grasp of reality.  
 
Drawing on the perspective as outlined above, I will in the next chapter give a critical 
discussion of contemporary computer game theory that specifically addresses the role of 
fiction and fictional immersion in computer games, and the role of avatars. This discussion 
also aims to point out the tensions, links and overlaps between my own approach and the 
approaches that are dominant in the field. I will place particular emphasis on Jesper Juul’s 
book Half-Real (2005), which is the leading and most comprehensive theoretical contribution 
on the subject.  
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Chapter 3: Computer game fiction 
First-person experience 
Torben Grodal’s article “Stories for Eye, Ear, and Muscles: Video Games, Media, and 
Embodied experiences” (2003) presents a view on computer game experience that ties in with 
the theoretical perspective of Walton and Ryan in some important respects. Grodal’ point of 
departure is that playing a computer game, unlike watching films or reading books, is not 
something that is mediated and second-hand; it is not a representation of someone else’s 
experience. Like real-life experience, computer game experience is ‘embodied’. It is first-
hand and takes place in ‘a progressing present’ (2003:134). Videogames, Grodal argues, “are 
simulations of basic modes of real-life experiences” (2003:130). He then extends this basic 
argument into a discussion of ‘story’ and the essence of narrative structure: Discursive 
narrative (as found in books and films) is derived from a more fundamental ‘narrative format’ 
of first-person and pre-discursive experience, and the stories of computer games must 
primarily be understood and theorised as a more direct variation of the latter. Computer 
games, just like life, offer basic, real-time and embodied ‘story-experience’ rather than 
‘stories’ understood as discursive mediation.  
 
This perspective has similarities to the concepts of simulation and fiction as they are 
discussed in the two previous chapters. The basic model of make-believe defines fiction in 
terms of active and embodied simulation, performed in real time, as opposed to a linguistic or 
diegetic model of fiction in which fiction is always something that is communicated, 
something that is told. Grodal’s contribution, which shows no direct links to literary theory or 
philosophical aesthetics, is a kind of no-nonsense variant of the anti-linguistic approach, 
essentially claiming that virtual experiences should be treated no differently than any other 
first-hand and ‘first-person’ experience. This approach deserves attention as a critical and 
potentially useful alternative to dominant theories of computer game representation. However, 
at the same time Grodal seems to avoid or ignore some of unique and defining aspects of 
gaming ‘experience’. Also, his analysis draws heavily on a set of contested philosophical 
assumptions, which limits the potential applications of his theory and diverts the attention 
from the specificity of games and game genres.   
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Grodal is right to point out that computer games model real life experiences in terms of 
similarly ‘first-person’ experiences. In simulations as in real life, meaningful action requires 
mastery and control, and has actual (– and, in principle, unpredictable) consequences. Also, 
on the most general level, Grodal’s theoretical perspective draws on fairly uncontroversial 
and established philosophical ideas about how human beings make sense of the world and 
their immediate surroundings. His basic orientation is evolutionary and ecological, taking the 
notion of embodied subjectivity as point of departure. Meaningful interaction and self-
reflection, including language and culture, must be understood in the context of how an 
organism has evolved within an environment, within its particular ecological niche. This 
resonates with the theories of James Gibson – which I will return to below – even if Grodal 
does not comment on this relationship in the relatively brief article.  
 
However, even if one points out the link between computer game ‘stories’ and real-life 
experience, the question still remains how best to study and describe the meanings of 
embodied experience in its various aspects – whether in games or in life. We can agree that 
simulated environments in games are similar to real-life practices in some important respects, 
but the question of how human embodied practices in general should be theoretically in the 
first place opens up, obviously, a broad field of philosophical discussion. Grodal’s 
elaborations on what constitutes the ‘basic embodied experience’ is rooted in the theories and 
findings of cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on pre-linguistic and pre-communicative 
“story-mechanisms in the brain” (2003:130). 
 
This theoretical tradition is committed to the idea of pre-linguistic thought, a discussion of 
which goes beyond the scope of the present study. What I want to emphasise in the context of 
my own argument is that it is possible to advocate non-linguistic and – in the case of fiction – 
non-diegetic theoretical descriptions of human practice without implying any specific claims 
about the relationship between thought and language more generally. On the contrary, I would 
say that to rigidly delineate a sphere of ‘experience’ that is disconnected from language and 
culture constructs an unnecessary limitation on how to understand embodied practices, 
especially when fiction is concerned. Within Grodal’s conceptual framework, the cultural and 
artistic dimension of simulated practices becomes hardly more than a footnote. This is 
because his category of the ‘unmediated’ is never relaxed or questioned. In comparison, even 
if Kendall L. Walton in Mimesis of Make-Believe also argues against the hegemony of the 
linguistic paradigm in the study of fiction and narrative, he is not committed to an idea of 
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‘raw’ experience. Walton’s concern is the non-linguistic dimension of symbolic practice, not 
the pre-linguistic and ‘unmediated’ status of non-symbolic practice. Because Walton 
emphasises the non-discursive rather than the pre-discursive, he assumes no sharp distinction 
between what is mediated by language and what is not.  
 
More specifically, the central difference between Grodal’s and my own approach to computer 
game aesthetics is that Grodal only sees computer games as a matter of embodied experience, 
not as a matter of embodied fiction. Within the perspective of cognitive psychology, the 
notion of subjectivity becomes quite irrelevant: there is only one subject who interacts, 
namely the actual subject – or, to be more precise, the embodied (and decidedly non-fictional) 
brain of the playing subject. This means that Grodal does not need to address the role of the 
avatar in computer game ‘experience’. In contrast, my argument is that we need a concept of 
fiction and a concept of fictional embodiment in order to account for the central mechanisms 
of computer game representation and interaction. Recognising and analysing the ‘full 
experiential flow’ of perception, cognition, emotion and action (2003:132) does not 
necessarily tell us – specifically – what makes computer game play meaningful as different 
from other types of embodied ‘flows’. 
 
We should note that Grodal does not address the fact that our ‘real-life’ interaction (pressing 
buttons or moving a mouse) translates into something quite different when mediated via a 
screen, into a ‘world’ that is conveyed to me as sounds and images. In other words, the 
embodied ‘rehearsals’ of the actual and the simulated do not correspond to each other. 
Without a concept of embodied fiction rather than just ‘experience’, the experiential 
significance of these projections and transformations is not being accounted for.  
 
Moreover, as long as the researcher’s eye is on brains rather than subjects, genre-dependent 
relationships between fictional and actual practice recede to the background. In fact, Grodal 
never makes much reference to computer game genre at all. From the examples that he uses, it 
seems that he is primarily talking about avatar-based and three-dimensional simulated 
environments (and specifically First Person Shooters), but no explicit generic qualifications 
are made. The central ‘story mechanisms’ of the embodied brain presumably apply to the 
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computer game experience on a general level, of which genres, we must assume, are different 
variants over the same basic type of ‘first-person’ interaction23.  
 
In other words, Grodal seems to imply that an FPS is engaging for largely the same reasons 
that The Sims is engaging. This generalising assumption weakens his arguments and makes it 
unclear what kind of ‘experiences’ he is actually talking about. When he argues, for example, 
that ‘interactivity is not centrally about changing a world’ (2003:143), my objection would be 
that the ‘centrally’ will depend on what type of game he is talking about.  
 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that our ‘first-person’ relationship to computer games 
is made possible within a self-contained and formally defined rule-system – a rigidly 
articulated magic circle. This rule-system describes the possible operations of the computer, 
and also integrates the rules that construct the computer game as a game rather than merely as 
a simulated environment. By comparison, life outside the contained spaces of games is not a 
system of formalised procedures, even if our everyday environments (roads, buildings, cars 
etc) obviously are, as Grodal points out, designed in ways that enable, restrict or encourage 
particular behaviours24. Computer game environments are designed in a more radical sense 
than the designed environments of non-fictional, everyday life. Not only are gameworlds 
formally defined and closed-off from the rest of the world, but they are also unified as a self-
contained whole, subject to a coherent purpose, a ‘master plan’ (– however haphazard or 
flawed) that runs through every detail of the environment. The notion of general ‘design’ does 
not cover it, as Grodal seems to imply. A theory of world-interaction in computer games, 
whether focussing on fictional or non-fictional aspects, must somehow relate to the unity, the 
artificiality and the gameness of game-worlds. Why do, for example, Hitler’s soldiers in 
Brothers in Arms: Road to Hill (Gearbox Software 2005) have bright red circles over their 
heads?  
 
Moreover, we should note that the kind of games Grodal mainly seems to be talking about – 
contemporary, three-dimensional and avatar-based games – are also often governed by rules 
                                                 
23 We may note that the central ‘generic’ difference in Grodal’s account is discussed on the level of the player 
rather than the level of the game itself; the nature of the experience depends crucially on whether the player is a 
novice or a master (Grodal 2003:144).  
24 “In a real world as well as in simulated worlds our influence is limited by the general design of that world: we 
follow roads, tunnels or career tracks, and obey rules, but within a given framework we may alter some 
elements, take different roads, build houses, and so on.” (Grodal 2003:142).  
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of dramatic design, in a way that makes them not directly comparable to architecture or city 
planning. In these cases, game-space is not just a gaming environment but also functions as a 
stage, which frames and gives dramatic significance to actions. This dramatic quality requires 
that the events taking place in the game are somehow scripted to achieve dramatic 
significance. In Grodal’s own terms, we could say that certain kinds of avatar-based computer 
games are scripted first-person experiences.  
 
If we accept that dominant types of gameworlds are worlds in which principles of dramatic, 
cinematic or literary orchestration also determine the modality of our ‘experience’, we will 
also need to discuss the role of textuality and of narrative – both as this relates to notions of 
‘gameness’, and as it relates to the concept of fiction as outlined in chapter 2. In the following 
I will discuss some of the major theoretical efforts within computer game studies that address 
this question. I will start with Espen Aarseth’s pioneering work Cybertext (1997).  
Cybertext 
Cybertext is not primarily about games, or about the notion of fiction in simulated 
environments; it investigates, as the title says, a particular type of literature – computerised as 
well as non-computerised – and uses the puzzle-based adventure genre of computer games as 
a central example. As such, the work addresses the concerns of this study only indirectly. On 
the other hand, Cybertext has been influential to how the questions of gameness and 
fictionality are being addressed in contemporary studies of game aesthetics, both directly and 
indirectly, via its strong influence on the so-called ‘ludological’ strand of game theory, which 
I will return to below. 
 
The concept of cybertext focuses on the mechanical organization of the text, by 
positing the intricacies of the medium as an integral part of the literary exchange. 
However, it also centres attention on the consumer, or user, of the text, as a more 
integrated figure than even reader-response theorists would claim. The performance of 
their reader takes place all in his head, while the user of cybertext also performs in an 
extranoematic sense. During the cybertextual process, the user will have effectuated a 
semiotic sequence, and this selective movement is a work of physical construction that 
the various concepts of ‘reading’ does not account for. This phenomenon I call 
ergodic, using the term appropriated from physics that derives from the Greek words 
ergon and hodos, meaning ‘work’ or ‘path’. In ergodic literature, nontrivial effort is 
required to allow the reader to traverse the text. (Aarseth 1997:1).   
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The ergodic refers to the principle of having to work with the materiality of a text, of having 
to participate in the construction of its material structure. While some ergodic works lead us 
towards a fixed solution – like jigsaw puzzles or adventure games – others can be 
unpredictable and open-ended, like for example an experimental hypertext novel. The 
cybertext, more specifically, is a ‘computerised’ text (although not necessarily computed by a 
digital computer); an ergodic text that calculates its response to our input25. The cybertext is a 
“machine for the production of variety of expression” (Aarseth 1997:3). 
 
The ergodic overlaps with the notion of play: 
 
The cybertext reader is a player, a gambler; the cybertext is a game-world and a world-
game; it is possible to explore, get lost, and discover secret paths in these texts, not 
metaphorically, but through the topological structures of the textual machinery. 
(Aarseth 1997:4). 
 
If we choose a relatively broad definition of ‘game’ and ‘gameness’ (or the ludic), which 
covers any type of rule-based and (however loosely) goal-oriented ‘magic circle’ of self-
contained activity, we could define the cybertext as a game-text, or maybe better, as a text-
game. A cybertext is a configurable and playable text. From this point of view we could say 
that, while Kendall L. Walton directs our attention to games of make-believe, Aarseth directs 
our attention to games of literature; to game-like literariness.  
 
This ‘ludic turn’ also implies a theory of the relationship between computer games and 
literature, which centrally focuses on the distinction between games and narration. Ergodics, 
Aarseth suggests, is not a variant of narrative, but constitutes a mode of discourse of its own, 
a different model of literariness, which is separate from and in potential conflict with 
narrative – although the two forms typically co-mingle and interact in a number of ways 
(1997:5)26. In narrative discourse, the user is invited only to engage in the semantics of the 
text and does not have to worry about its material configuration; the user is only a reader, not 
a co-constructor in the material sense, not a player.  
                                                 
25 As I am not here concerned with the distinction between ‘ergodic’ texts and cybertexts, the latter concept is 
simplified somewhat. According to Aarseth, a ‘cybertext’ does not have to be ergodic; the category of the 
cybertext would also include machines that calculate linear texts, as illustrated in his model at page 64 (Aarseth 
1997). 
26 See also Aarseth (1999), where he adds that the relationship is ”...dialectic, not dichotomic. Narrative 
structures and elements can be found in ergodic works, and narrative works may contain ergodic features, to the 
extent that only a single element from one mode is found in a work belonging to the other” (Aarseth 1999:34).  
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The ergodic, in other words, describes a type of textuality, not simulation or fictionality. 
Some ergodic works have little to do with simulation (like for example computer-generated 
poetry), whereas others can also be considered as models, as functional representations. 
Conversely, many simulations can be said to be ‘ergodic’, which would mean that we choose 
to look at them as texts. In computer game studies, a text-oriented approach may in certain 
cases be useful, depending on the genre and the aims of our study. Clearly, text-based 
adventure games, which Aarseth analyses in Cybertext, invite this type of approach, as they 
are, in a literal sense, ‘text-games’, setting up an explicit dialogue between the player/reader 
and the textual machine. Aarseth analyses this dialogue in narrotological terms: The playful 
text is an ‘intrigue’ in which there is an exchange between the ‘intrigant’ of the textual 
machine and the ‘intriguee’ of the (implied) player, who is being challenged by the intrigant 
(1997:112-114). 
 
Although Aarseth’s model operates within the established narratological frameworks of 
Gerard Genette and Seymour Chatman, the focus is moved elsewhere; in adventure games, 
the interesting action is no longer going on in the world of the diegesis, but on the level of 
discourse itself, on the level of the dialogical text. While narrative discourse produces a story 
world, ergodic discourse produces an intrigue, a game of narration. ‘Ergodics’ can therefore 
be considered as an anti-narrativist branch of structuralist narratology, which can be used as a 
building-block for a dedicated theory of computer game representation.  
 
However, as Aarseth has demonstrated also in later works, the formal structures or types of 
‘paths’ that can be revealed by the ergodic approach may be valid and productive also beyond 
a linguistic and text-oriented framework. Notably, this applies to what Aarseth calls the 
‘master figures’ of ergodic aesthetics, aporia and epiphany, which articulate the dialogical 
relationship between the player and the voice of the game. In games, these should not be seen 
as literary tropes, but as formal figures that reflect the most basic structure of the ergodic 
experience.  
 
When an aporia is overcome, it is replaced by an epiphany: a sudden, often unexpected 
solution to the impasse in the event space. Compared to the epiphanies of narrative 
texts, the ergodic epiphanies are not optional, something to enhance the aesthetic 
experience, but essential to the exploration of the event space. Without them, the rest 
of the world cannot be realized. (Aarseth 1999:38).  
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Inspired by Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative (Ricoeur 1984-1988) – and tying in with 
Grodal’s later emphasis on ‘first-person’ experience – Aarseth argues that aporia and 
epiphany are the ‘pre-narrative master figures of experience, from which narratives are spun’ 
(1999:39). Operating on the same level as Ricoeur’s epistemological variant of ‘narrative’, 
aporia-epiphany is a figure through which time manifests itself as experienced time.  
 
With respect to the question of fiction in games, the notion of ergodic discourse has been 
productive because it represents an alternative to standard diegesis-based models of narrative 
and fictionality: games are not told, even if they may contain narration as well as other forms 
of mediation. The worlds that they invite us to engage with are not primarily diegetic worlds, 
but gameworlds. The specific nature and status of a gameworld as opposed to other kinds of 
worlds is a dimension that is lacking from Grodal’s account. 
 
However, the textual approach is limited in that it neither addresses the role of simulation nor 
fiction. While Aarseth’s approach does not reject or deny the dimension of world simulation 
in computer games, it is nevertheless being subordinated under the model of the dialogical 
text. Consequently, the worldness of games is seen as a device in the repertoire of the 
intrigant rather than as a world in which intrigues take place. From this structuralist 
perspective, not much separates Doom (id Software 1993) from Zork (Infocom 2005[1981]) 
or Castle Wolfenstein (Muse Software 1984), because the world simulation – and the 
particular kinds of perceptual participation that follows with it – is incidental to their primary 
functioning as ergodic works.  
 
In contrast, I want to argue that in avatar-based games, the world simulation is the primary 
world of the game, a world that has the capacity to contain or colonise the ‘intrigue’ that 
structures interaction. Through simulation, the ‘master experience’ of aporia and epiphany 
does not have to be told (as in narrative) or enacted (as in drama), but can be experienced first 
hand. After Cybertext, Aarseth has moved on to more specifically game-oriented research, 
emphasising the role of simulation and virtuality rather than text-based interaction or 
‘ergodics’. However, as I will return to in chapter 4, Aarseth’s concept of virtuality is 
articulated in opposition to the notion of fiction.  
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Ludology 
Although ludology constitutes no clear group of theorists or tradition of works, the general 
term as it is typically being used nevertheless captures a distinctly game-centred and anti-
narrativist strand of thought which developed in the wake of Aarseths’s Cybertext, and which 
has developed as a response to the lack of a dedicated theoretical perspective on computer 
games in theories of digital media. 
 
Following up on the general narrative-versus-ergodics model proposed by Aarseth, the Danish 
game designer and game theorist Jesper Juul (1998; Juul 2004) developed more specifically 
game-oriented ideas about how to understand the relationship between narration and play, 
calling special attention to the difference in temporality between narration and play. Playing a 
game is an activity that is always in the present, happening now, while narration is about the 
prior, what has happened. Therefore, Juul claims, you cannot have narration (the act of telling 
a story) and interactivity at the same time.  
 
Other theorists who have been most commonly referred to as ‘ludologists’ are Markku 
Eskelinen (2001) and Gonzalo Frasca (Frasca 1999) – the latter being the one who most 
explicitly advocates ludology as the ‘father discipline’ of computer game studies27. As the 
name indicates, this strand of theory emphasises the distinctive nature of ‘ludus’: the activity 
of playing a game. As a privileged way of analysing this activity, ludology focuses on the 
formal mechanisms of games, with attention to the basic elements and structures that 
distinguish different kinds of game systems. Following up Aarseth’s structuralist approach in 
Cybertext, Eskelinen and Frasca (especially the former) draw on literary semiotics28 to argue 
how games require a parallel but different ludology.  
 
Even if ludology in its anti-narrative, polemic and ‘purist’ form is today largely denounced in 
computer games theory (including by Jesper Juul himself), the ludologist argument has had a 
strong and lasting impact on computer game theory during the early and formative years of 
                                                 
27 For an overview of the main arguments in the ludological position, see Frasca (2003). For my own critical 
review of the game-centred formalist approach, especially in its radical variant as represented by Markku 
Eskelinen, see Klevjer (2002)  
28 While Eskelinen seems to be the only ‘narratologist’ in the group (– developing his formal theoretical 
framework of the ‘gaming situation’ in dialogue with leading figures like Gerard Genette, Seymour Chatman and 
Gerald Prince), Frasca’s thesis Video Games of the Oppressed: Video Games as a Means for Critical Thinking 
and Debate (Frasca 2001) draws mainly on the semiotics of Charles S. Pierce.  
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the field of game studies. Game researchers now generally recognise that the overwhelming 
majority of computer games are not primarily in the business of telling stories, and that 
narrative in games performs a very different role from narrative in novels or films. Moreover, 
the tradition following Aarseth has brought attention to the aesthetic and cultural importance 
of what Jesper Juul refers to as the ‘gameness’ of games (Juul 2003a). The game, understood 
as an artificial conflict taking place within a rule-based system, is a distinct yet diverse 
cultural form that often blends with but should not be conflated with either ‘fiction’, 
‘simulation’ or any other mode of practice or discourse.  
 
Without a basic understanding of how different types of games are structured on a formal 
level, we will not be able to understand any of the complexity or representational messiness of 
game aesthetics as expressed through different technologies, genres and gaming situations. 
Also, the formalist approach – whether we call them ludologists or not – has contributed 
strongly to the construction of computer game studies as field of research with its own 
identity. The so-called ludology-narratology debate is so far the only obvious candidate for a 
disciplinary ‘tradition’ that might identify the young field of computer game studies.  
 
My dedicated focus on simulated environments and the role of the avatar at the expense of 
formal game structures represents in this context a complimentary perspective, but also 
implies a critique of a tendency to place too much weight on the structures and mechanisms of 
the abstract game system, particularly with respect to avatar-based games. My approach also 
implies that the difference between a game and a computer game is more significant than the 
term ‘ludology’ in many cases seem to imply. As I will return to below, the formalist and 
structuralist approaches are also often problematic in the way they tend to confirm and 
reinforce an unproductive binary of ‘representation’ versus action and control, and in the way 
they are uncritically borrowing established conceptions of fiction from film and literature. 
 
On the other hand, I find that a particularly productive element to be taken from the formalist 
tradition is the concern with simulation as a fundamental representational form of the 
computer game. This emphasis is especially strong in Frasca (2003) and Aarseth (2004), both 
of whom have informed the general orientation of my own work. The centrality of simulation 
and the principle of the model is my most direct link to the formalist tradition, although re-
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interpreted via Kendall L Walton’s theory of representation, and applied to the more specific 
context of avatar-based singleplayer games29.  
I also want to point out that my own approach is less directly design-oriented than some 
variants of the formalist approach (notably Frasca and Juul). My main focus is on the role of 
fiction and embodiment, not on how game systems and game mechanics are (or should be) 
designed from a formal and structural point of view. As noted in the introduction, my analysis 
could have implications for certain aspects of computer game design, but the traditional issues 
and problems of game design are not addressed.  
Textplay 
Julian Kücklich’s paper “The playbility of text vs. the readability of games: towards a holistic 
theory of fictionality” (Kücklich 2003) applies possible world theory to the analysis of 
computer game fictions, emphasising the process of ‘fiction-making’ (2003:101), of how 
fictional worlds are established and maintained through the interaction between player and the 
game system. However, Kücklich’s application of possible world theory is different from 
Ryan’s theory of recentring. A central concept in Kücklich’s ‘holistic’ approach is Wolfgang 
Iser’s notion of textspiel (‘text-play’), which posits the reading of literary texts as an 
interactive process, in which the reader ‘plays’ with the text in order to establish meaning. 
Just as the reading of literary texts is an interactive process, Kücklich argues, playing a game 
can also be considered a form of reading, an interactive process of meaning-making. Texts 
and games are analogous processes of fiction-making (‘poiesis’); as readers/players we 
construct worlds by ‘gap-filling’ the real into the imaginary, and it is this interplay between 
real and fictional worlds which can be described in terms of possible worlds theory. The 
playing of a computer game, Kücklich suggests, is a ‘semiotic machine’ (a concept borrowed 
from Umberto Eco) in which different processes of meaning-making (or ‘semiosis’) interlock 
with each other in the interaction between the player and the game.  
 
Kücklich’s unified model of playing-as-reading or reading-as-playing represents in many 
ways an antithesis to the concept of ‘fictional world’ as found in Walton and Ryan. While 
Ryan uses the category of possible world to formulate a theory of immersion and subjectivity, 
Kücklich adopts it as part of a reader-response theory of fiction in computer games. ‘Fiction’, 
                                                 
29 The relationship between the ‘Waltonian’ notion of fiction and Aarseth’s recent discussion on the ‘virtual’ as 
applied to games will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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according to Kücklich, whether in literary texts or in computer games, is the result of reading, 
a semiotic process of world-building in which the reader ‘plays’ the text. This notion of 
fiction has no place for simulation, other than as a metaphor for a semiotic process of 
interpretation: 
 
However, in fictional texts, the procedural activity is something external to the text, 
something that takes place in the reader’s mind rather than within the text itself. In this 
sense, fictional texts are more interactive than simulations, because they absolutely 
require the participation of the reader. Simulations, on the other hand, are mostly self-
sufficient enough to run at least for some time without external input. (…) Many 
digital games, however, are both: simulations and fictions. The physical aspects of the 
game-world are simulated by the game’s physics engine, while the aesthetic aspects 
are the product of a process of fiction-making that takes place between the player and 
the game itself. (Kücklich 2003:101).  
 
This model is quite instructive in the way it contrasts with the notion of fiction that has been 
outlined in the previous chapter. The archetypical model of simulation is the closed computer 
simulation, which simulates all by itself and does not need our participation. Fiction-making 
is then something that goes on ‘in the reader’s mind’, as an interaction-based interpretation of 
what the simulation means. This ‘de-fictionalisation’ of simulation in games makes perfect 
sense from the point of view of reader-response literary theory; simulation is seen as 
discourse, as ‘text’, which is being read as fiction when we interact with it. Our interaction is 
not merely a ‘material construction’, as Aarseth would say, but becomes an ‘investment of 
belief’ into the simulated environment: 
 
The player’s role in the process of fiction-making cannot be overestimated. It is only 
through the player’s investment of belief into that world that the game-simulation 
becomes a fictional world that can be inhabited and explored by the player. Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief” is of equal importance in game-
fictions as in literary texts or in other forms of fiction. Therefore, if we want to 
understand digital games as forms of fiction, we must take the player’s interaction with 
the game into account. (Kücklich 2003:102).  
 
What Kücklich argues is that the fictions of literary texts and computer games are constructed 
via analogous processes of reading. This ‘textplay’ unifies the literary world and the computer 
game world under a single (holistic) concept of fiction-making, according to which game-
playing is seen as a semiotic construction of diegetic worlds. In this perspective, whether a 
computer simulation is entirely self-sufficient or ‘mostly’ self-sufficient is of little 
 51
importance, as it is not the interaction itself but the interpretation of this interaction that 
matters to the establishing of a fictional world. Interaction (playing) is the means through 
which the player can comprehend and understand what the simulation is about. The player-
reader puts the pieces together, in an act of practical (or experiential) hermeneutics.  
 
We should note that Kücklich’s notion of the text-game is different from the ‘intrigue’ of 
Aarseth’s ergodics. While both variants highlight the playable text, Kücklich emphasises that 
the play of ergodic construction is also a play of interpretation, an investment of belief into a 
fictional world. In other words: ‘ergodics’ cannot be separated from the semiotic process of 
constructing a fictional world, and this process can be described with the help of possible 
world theory.  
 
Kücklich’s theory of play-reading is a useful alternative to Aarseth’s distinctly anti-diegetic 
dialogical model, and it highlights the importance of the process of fiction-making over the 
ergodics of material construction. However, the notion of gap-filling does not capture the 
fictional rationale of the interaction itself, as a practice of make-believe. This practice of 
make-believe is itself not a textual practice, not a reading, although it can be interpreted or 
read in various ways.  
Half-Real 
The aims of this study partly converge with the concerns in Jesper Juul’s recent book Half-
Real. Videogames between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds (2005), which is so far the only 
systematic and genre-oriented analysis of the role of fiction in computer games30. While the 
book clearly differs in important respects from Juul’s earlier ‘ludological’ work, the central 
themes and arguments still inform his conceptualisation of fiction in games. Theoretically, 
there are many points of contact between Half-Real and my own approach – including a 
central focus on the relationship between ‘world’ and ‘system’, and a concern with the 
uniquely computerised nature of computer games. Like Ryan and Kücklich, Juul also draws 
on possible worlds theory to conceptualise the notion of ‘fictional world’, and proposes a 
                                                 
30 Juul’s Ph.D dissertation from 2003 and his book from 2005 have identical titles – the latter being a revised 
version of the former, but differing from it in a number of respects. Theoretically, a notable difference is that the 
dissertation uses Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe to describe the relationship between rules and fiction, a 
reference which (for good reasons) has been removed entirely from the book version. My discussion here uses 
the revised book edition as a point of departure, but refers specifically to the theoretically more elaborated 
dissertation version when indicated.  
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dualist model that is similar to Kücklich’s model of ‘simulation’ versus ‘fiction’. The main 
concern of Half-Real, as the title indicates, is the relationship between the reality of the game 
and the imagined world of the fiction. The book analyses how game rules and fictional worlds 
combine, collaborate and compete in different ways in different categories and genres of 
computer games. When we play games that encourage us to imagine worlds, Juul argues, our 
actions are at once meaningful here-and-now (in the actuality of playing the game) and in the 
fictional world that is projected by the game. At the same time, he emphasises that playing a 
game is at heart a rule-based activity that does not need make-believe in order to be 
meaningful and interesting; many types of games have no fictional worlds at all, and many 
have ‘incoherent’ worlds which strongly discourage us from imagining them as worlds (Juul 
2005:123).  
 
The notion of the ‘half-real’ resonates with Ryan’s distinction between the ‘telescope’ and the 
‘space travel’ mode of interaction; we could say that whereas the former positions the user in 
front of a rule-system, the latter encapsulates the user within fictional world. However, Juul’s 
dualist ontology is not articulated in terms of subject-positions; it is not to do with the 
recentring or non-recentring of the subject. As Kücklich, Juul does not employ possible 
worlds theory as a theory of immersion, but as a theory of interpretation, of ‘gap-filling’; a 
theory of how we as players construct fictional worlds out of the ‘cues’ given to us in the 
game. 
 
In Juul (2003b), the concept of ‘cuing’ is proposed with reference to Walton’s Mimesis as 
Make-Believe; the various elements of the game (including the rules) are props that ‘prompt’ 
imaginings when we play. In this ‘prop-centric’ account (2003b:119), Juul emphasises that 
actions also function as props in games of make-believe.  
 
Games can prompt players into imagining worlds in a large number of ways: graphics, 
sound, text, cut-scenes, the game title, the box or manual, haptics and rules. 
Additionally, the actions that the player performs by moving a mouse, pressing a key 
on a keyboard or using a game controller, are props that signify actions in the game 
world: pressing the mouse button may signify shooting a gun; pushing the stick on the 
game controller to the right may signify moving a character to the right in the game 
world. (Juul 2003b:120). 
 
In Juul (2005), Walton’s theories are left out, with little or no change to the analysis. The 
most immediate reason for this seems to be that a theory of ‘props’ and ‘prompters’ is not 
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really needed in the context of his argument, as the notion of ‘cuing’ brings the idea across 
well enough. Also, I would argue, Walton’s theory of make-believe, if implemented as more 
than merely a theory of prompting or ‘cuing’, would in fact conflict directly with Juul’s 
formal separation between rules and fictional world. Whereas the former is a theory of games 
of make-believe, Juul attempts to explain games as make-believe. Walton’s central argument 
throughout Mimesis as Make-Believe is rooted in the concept of fictional truth; fiction is that 
which is to be imagined. Juul’s notion of fiction, in contrast, represents precisely the position 
that Walton argues against: fiction is that which is imagined. It is this imagined world that is 
‘cued’ by the playing of a game; whereas the playing takes place in the rule-governed reality 
of here-and-now, this (real) activity also projects a fictional world. The projected fictional 
world is constructed in the mind of the players, as “the player fills in any gaps in the fictional 
world” (Juul 2005:121). 
 
The projected world, according to Juul’s model, must be separated from the notion of game 
space, which is a space defined by rules:  
 
Rules separate the game from the rest of the world by carving out an area where the 
rules apply; fiction projects a world different from the real world. The space of the 
game is part of the game in which it is played, but the space of a fiction is outside the 
world from which it is created. (Juul 2005:164). 
 
This strikes a chord with Huizinga’s notion of the ‘magic circle’ as discussed in chapter 2; the 
‘world’ of games is not the same as the ‘world’ of fictions. Juul’s distinction between ‘world 
space’ and ‘game space’ is an attempt to clarify this relationship with respect to the particular 
case of computer games. He points out that computer games typically structure the 
relationship between game space and world space differently than board games or sport. He 
uses computer sport games as a central example: in those games, the (playable) game space is 
placed inside a fictional world, delineated as for example a fictional football field or a 
fictional boxing ring (2005:165). 
 
How this relationship between game-space and fictional space is played out in games like 
Super Mario 64 (Nintendo 1996) is more unclear from Juul’s argument. Without going into 
specifics, he concludes that the bounds of a ‘coherent world game’ are ‘reasonably motivated 
by the fictional world’ (2005:166) – with reference to the phenomenon of ‘invisible walls’, 
which is a common (and often debated) feature of contemporary action adventure games. It 
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could be that he considers game spaces of such games to be framed within a fictional world in 
a similar fashion as with sport games, only less explicitly so, and with a need for invisible 
boundaries to define the game space. The game space that is projected on the screen is placed 
in a fictional context, but is nevertheless delineated as part of the real world, otherwise it 
could not be a game space; otherwise it could not be played.  
 
This is a paradox that sits well with Juul’s general model of the ‘half-real’: A real, playable 
space is being framed within a fictional world. While Juul’s primary concern is with how the 
meanings of the latter are being ‘cued’ by what is going on in the game space, he also 
emphasises how the rules of game are typically ‘cued’ by the fictional world; when we face 
evil-looking monsters, we are usually correct to assume that there is a rule prescribing that 
they should be destroyed or avoided (2005:177).  
 
Unlike game spaces, in which our activity necessarily takes place in the here-and-now of play, 
projected fiction is separated from the actual world by virtue of also projecting its own 
temporality; the fiction of games, Juul argues, just like the story worlds of film or literature, 
takes place in a different time-space. Whereas play is real-time, fictional space has its own 
fictional time (Juul 2005:141). In a game like for example Tomb Raider, Juul argues, 
 
(...) the actions that we perform have the duality of being real events and being 
assigned another meaning in a fictional world. Additionally, since our actions take 
place in time, that time shares the duality of being both real time and fictional world 
time. (2005:142).  
 
Fictional time is ontologically separated from play time (the time it takes to play the game), 
the former being a projection of the latter. The time of the (fictional) game world is a 
projection of the time of the (real) play world. In real-time games, the play time “has a 1:1 
projection to the game world’s fictional time”. A game like SimCity (Maxis Software 1989) is 
not real-time, because fictional time maps onto play time in a different way: “Playing for two 
minutes can make a year pass in the fictional time/game world.” (2005:143).  
 
The theory of how fictional time is ‘cued’ by play is linked to Juul’s distinction between 
coherent and incoherent game worlds. An incoherent game world is when “the game 
contradicts itself or prevents the player from imagining a complete fictional world” 
(2005:123). It is difficult to understand, for example, why Mario in Donkey Kong (Nintendo 
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1981) has three lives, and this makes it difficult for us fill in the blanks, to imagine a coherent 
fictional world. Instead we simply explain it with reference to the rules of the game; we 
accept that three lives is a game convention: 
 
While, technically, any world can be imagined, and we could explain Mario’s 
reappearance by appealing to magic or reincarnation, the point here is that nothing in 
Donkey Kong suggests a world where people magically come back to life after dying. 
In an informal survey of Donkey Kong players, all players explained the three lives by 
appealing to the rules of the game: With only one life, the game would be too hard 
(Juul 2005:130). 
 
Fiction in incoherent games like Donkey Kong, Juul concludes, is a provisional matter, and it 
makes the players more aware that imagining the fictional world of a game is optional; we can 
choose to believe in the fiction, or we can choose not to (Juul 2005:141).  
 
Most contemporary avatar-based games in the action adventure genre, according to this 
perspective, are both real-time and coherent, and they generally do not have ‘provisional’ 
fictional worlds. The principle of the avatar serves as a privileged interface, as it were, which 
secures a 1:1 relationship between play time and ‘fictional time’. As Juul notes, singleplayer 
adventure or ‘journey’ games, through their linear and progressive structure, bring the 
fictional world more to the fore of experience. Because the spaces and events of the fictional 
world are meant to be experienced only once, and because the journey model encourages a lot 
of ‘local’ variation of rules and potential actions along the way, the adventuring player is 
more likely to become oriented toward the fictional meanings at the expense of the underlying 
rules that define the game space (Juul 2005:195). 
A critical approach to the rules perspective 
Half-Real’s investigation into the role of fiction in computer games is a vital contribution to 
the field, integrating a theory of fictionality in games with a systematic and empirically 
founded account of central generic variations. In comparison to more general theories of 
fictionality (or narrative), Juul’s conceptual framework is dedicated to games and – 
specifically – to computer games. The role of fictional worlds is analysed from the point of 
view of the abstract rules that structure games, and this is a perspective that is not included in 
Walton and Ryan’s account as outlined in the previous chapter. Whereas Walton never 
considers the function of rules in games that are not games of make-believe – essentially 
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because his theory is a theory of representation, not of games – the attention to this type of 
rules is precisely Juul’s point of departure; rules of play have the capacity to operate as game 
systems that structure meaningful activity independently of any mimetic dimension. Such 
rules are abstract in the sense that they constitute a set of instructions, which has a non-
ambiguous formal structure. It is because a rule-set is given an abstract and formal 
articulation that we can think of it, on a formal level, as themable, in the sense that “a set of 
rules can be assigned a new fictional world without modifying the rules” (2005:199). The 
unique status and functioning of formal rule-sets is lost if we uncritically apply traditional 
theories of representation to the study of games. 
 
An emphasis on the abstract articulation of rules and game systems also makes sense when 
applied to computer games. Because the rules need to be implemented by a computer, they 
need to be expressed in terms of an abstract, formal system. The central difference between 
games and computer games is that in the case of computer games, instructions are not 
instructions to the player directly but instructions to the computer31. Consequently, the player 
cannot break the rules unless the computer can be manipulated or otherwise made to 
cooperate. This also means that the player cannot relate directly to the instructions without 
somehow sharing the point of view of the computer.  
 
Finally, Juul makes an important point when he observes that screen-mediated environments 
are ‘carved out’ from the larger world in a different way than other game spaces. In this 
respect, Walton’s discussion of ‘modes and manners’ of make-believe is unsatisfactory, as he 
does not address directly the difference between screen-based ‘work-worlds’ and the worlds 
of, for example, children playing make-believe in the woods. It is hard to see how this 
distinction would not be significant in terms of how fictionality and participation is structured 
in the process of make-believe; screen-based spaces – unlike other spaces of mimetic play – 
are information spaces, projected as synthetic images but still playable in a concrete and 
tangible sense. Juul goes some way to account for the paradox of how play relates to fiction in 
those kinds of information spaces.  
 
                                                 
31 This point only applies to instructions that are actually implemented by the computer, which the central rules 
usually are in computer games. Obviously, we can think of rules that are not implemented by the computer but 
which are still considered as authoritative game rules by the players; an example would be online racing games 
where the simulation allows you to go in the reverse direction on the track and crash into your fellow players – a 
possibility that is most often blocked, as it tends to ruin the fun for the majority of players. 
 57
However, the rule-based perspective on fiction in computer games also has a number of 
limitations, some of which are not adequately addressed, I would argue, in Half-Real. Firstly, 
the links to a larger tradition of mimetic play are not addressed. This leads to an over-
emphasis on the dimensions that distinguish formally articulated game-play from less rigid 
(and less agonistic) forms of mimetic play, and a theoretical blindness to what Walton would 
call the objectivity, the ‘truths’, or shared nature of (explorable) make-believe environments. 
Walton’s basic argument that rules of games of make-believe generate fiction independently 
of what the participants imagine about those truths may be referred to in the dissertation 
version of Half-Real, yet it is not seriously taken into account, as it does not fit with the rules-
versus-fiction model.  
 
Because the rule perspective does not accommodate any notion of fictional truth or fictional 
objectivity, there is a lack of attention to the process of simulation as something that the 
players perform. This implies that Half-Real – maybe because one of its critical concerns is to 
refute literary notions of ‘immersion’ – has no theory of the role of participation and 
subjectivity in the construction of fiction. As with Kücklich’s notion of ‘textplay’, fiction is 
instead conceptualised merely as subjective imagination; fiction is not constituted by acts of 
simulation, but by the (gap-filling) ‘projection’, reading, or interpretation of what goes on in 
the game space – ‘simulation’ apparently assumed to be something that the computer (or the 
‘rules’) is doing, not the player.  
 
Secondly, Juul’s concept of fiction is too strictly committed to the literary notion of ‘diegesis’ 
or story-world; fiction is never considered as anything other than projected fiction, operating 
in its own separate time-space, its own ‘fictional time’ – or we could add: operating in 
diegetic time, the time of the told. This mirroring of the narratological divide between 
discourse and story, as established by Gerard Genette and Seymour Chatman, is explicitly 
acknowledged by Juul32, yet he does not consider whether computer games (or mimetic 
games in general) could be a phenomenon that calls for alternative and non-diegetic 
conceptualisations of fictionality. As a literary theorist, Juul never questions whether the dual-
level model is applicable to games and simulated environments in the same way as it is to 
novels or films; in the theoretical universe of Half-Real, ‘fiction’ is simply synonymous with 
‘diegesis’. This straightforward import from literary and film theory has strong limitations, 
                                                 
32 “In my description of time in games, play time is comparable to discourse time, and fictional time is 
comparable to story time” (2005:160). 
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because it implies that the activity of play is only fictionally relevant to the extent that we can 
consider it as homologous to discourse. It rules out the idea of real-time fictional worlds, and 
it separates considerations of fictionality from considerations of embodiment and subject-
positioning.  
 
The diegetic (or discursive) notion of fiction also grounds, I would argue, Juul’s theory of 
‘coherent’ versus ‘incoherent’ fictional worlds. What is lacking from the surreal world of 
Donkey Kong, according to Juul’s analysis, is the lack of an explanation for why Mario has 
three lives. In other words: the challenge to the player is here a lack of diegetic coherence, 
which could be fixed with a little more context – a little more narration to explain how things 
work out Mario’s world.  
 
However, if we accept that the notions of ‘fictional world’ and ‘story’ should be kept distinct, 
a nonsensical storyline does not in itself prevent us from imagining a fictional world as 
complete – given that the world is not so self-contradictory that it becomes impossible to 
imagine it as an actual possible world. From the point of view of Walton’s theory of fictional 
truths, Mario’s three lives is simply a fact within that world, no matter how puzzling or 
‘improvised’ it would seem to a player; take it or leave it. Surely Mario’s destiny is a strange 
thing, but fictional worlds are often very strange for no particular reasons. Mario can 
magically resurrect because, we must assume, he is given three attempts to complete his 
mission in a hostile world that is especially staged for him. It is this gameworld that we are 
invited to participate in, a world that is no less of a ‘world’ because it is organically structured 
as a stage for a contest. And it is certainly no more incoherent or provisional just because it 
appears surreal. We may be inclined to engage with this world in a more distanced and 
‘telescopic’ (and in this sense ‘provisional’) manner than, say, Metroid Prime, but this 
tendency cannot be ascribed to fictional incoherence. It would not encourage any deeper or 
less provisional commitment to the fictional world, I would argue, if the Donkey Kong 
universe were provided with a storyline that specified why Mario were only given three lives 
instead of four. In simulated environments, being immersed into the fiction is not the same as 
being immersed into a story, although the two often collaborate and merge in various ways. 
This also implies that the ‘blue arrows’ of videogames (Juul 2005:190) – elements of the 
gameworld that are not recognised by the characters of the gameworld – may well belong to 
the fictional world even if they do not belong to the diegetic world.  
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The fact that simulated environments are not primarily diegetic (or story-based) fictional 
worlds also accounts for the typical implementation in games of ‘characters who know you’ 
(Juul 2005:183). This seemingly strange but very common phenomenon occurs when, for 
example, in Sly 2: Band of Thieves (Sucker Punch Productions 2004), the sidekick Bentley the 
turtle guides Sly (and the player) through the mission via some sort of communication device 
while referring to the buttons on the controller. This type of instruction and guiding may also 
feature in less cartoonish games, like for example Metal Gear Solid 3 (Konami 2005). While 
such a ‘subversive’ transgression of boundaries may be prohibited by certain types of 
gameworlds, I want to argue that as a general principle, there is in fact no ‘cross-dimensional’ 
issue at play here, as game fictions are not delineated by a ‘fourth wall’ as in film or literature. 
While ‘breaking out’ from a diegetic world into the realm of the discourse that produces this 
same world is surely a dimensional leap (as seen for example in the film Last Action Hero or 
the didactic novel Sophie’s World), the boundaries of non-diegetic fiction are always, by their 
nature, more unclear and more ambiguous. Those boundaries do not separate between the 
time-space of the telling and the time-space of the told, but between different frames of make-
believe – boundaries that do not carry the same ontological significance. This means that 
when Bentley or Major Tom start talking about button configurations, we do not necessarily 
need to position ourselves outside the boundaries of fiction to make sense of it, as Juul 
implies; it simply means that the boundaries of the make-believe, in some important respects, 
are extended (as they sometimes are) to include elements of the physical interface of the game 
world. This kind of ‘extended fiction’ may not be compatible with a certain type of 
seriousness demanded by some story worlds, but seriousness is not a requirement in the 
construction of fictional worlds.  
 
Finally, the rules-and-fiction approach implies a notion of rules that is unable to capture 
players’ involvement with computer-simulated environments, and hence also poorly suited to 
account for the unique role and status of fictional worlds in avatar-based computer games. 
Even if, as Juul emphasises, “...fiction matters in games and it is important to remember the 
duality of the formal and the experiential perspectives on fiction in games” (2005:199), that 
does not change the fact that rules and fiction are ‘formally separable’ (2005:177). In this 
perspective, the distinction between game rules – which Juul specifies as ‘explicit game rules’ 
(2005:58) – and regularities (or ‘laws’) becomes less significant:  
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A computer-based soccer game needs to implement the physics of the players and the 
soccer pitch as well as the rules of the game. Gravity existed prior to the invention of 
soccer, and the human body existed prior to the invention of the foot race, so including 
them in a game is a choice that the creators of the game make. It therefore makes sense 
to see the laws of physics on the same level as the conventional rules in soccer: The 
main difference between the rules of a video game and the rules of a sport is that sports 
use the preexisting systems of the physical world in the game. (Juul 2005:58-59). 
  
Gravity and offside rules are here seen as being on the same level, because, from the point of 
view of the computer, both are instructions; the kind of rules that specify or instruct 
limitations and affordances. Generally speaking, instructions exist independently of their 
implementation by a player; rules are rules whether they are followed or not, and we can 
specify them, write them down on paper. These particular kinds of instructions are also, by 
definition, formal and domain-independent – or ‘themable’ – otherwise they could not be 
implemented by a computer. In contrast, regularities are not independent from action; they 
exist only in so far as they are being ‘followed’; we do not ‘implement’ regularities the way 
we implement instructions. It does not make sense to say that regularities are themable, unless 
we give them, for heuristic and scientific purposes, a formal articulation; we specify them as a 
set of instructions, as an abstract model.  
 
The emphasis on formal rules instead of laws and regularities is necessary and productive 
when we want to understand how game systems (computerised or non-computerised) 
structure the activity of play. However, the rule-oriented approach does not adequately 
account for the phenomenological status of ‘rules’ from the point of view of the player. From 
this perspective, it becomes important that computer games – unlike non-computerised games 
– have the capacity to turn instructions into regularities or laws; into ‘rules’ that we do not 
‘follow’ the way we follow the rules of Monopoly. This also implies that the computer has the 
capacity to integrate the rules of the game (including, in many cases, the rules that define 
goals and winning conditions) with the regularities of a concretised, simulated environment. 
In typically avatar-based games, like for example Halo (Bungie 2001), the explicit game rules 
are almost completely integrated with the behaviours of the simulated agents and 
environments; the equivalent to the conventional rules of computer game football would be 
the instruction to progress and to fulfil the mission objectives, as well as, in some sense (by a 
stretch), the general imperative to stay alive. Other than that, there are no conventional game 
rules to enforce or ‘uphold’ (Juul 2005:53). Whereas a referee in a football match can be said 
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to uphold the rules of the game, the central task of the computer is of a considerably more 
god-like nature; to uphold the simulation as such; to uphold a world.  
 
This ‘worldness’ of the computer simulation, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter 5, 
calls for an alternative ontology of computer games. As long as we keep within a theoretical 
model that focuses our attention on the collaboration (or ‘interplay’) between ‘rules’ and the 
‘representational layer’ (Juul 2005:136), the fictional worlds of avatar-based computer games 
will boil down to a long list of ‘modifications’ or exceptions to the general rule of 
themeability. It is illustrative that when Juul considers the dimension of space in computer 
games – which is hardly a small detail – the rules-versus-fiction model is dangerously close to 
the breaking point; space, Juul observes, is a “special issue between rules and fiction”, where 
the two ‘completely overlap’ (2005:188). He ends up by concluding that “...level design, 
space, and the shape of game objects refer simultaneously to rules and fiction. This is a case 
where in which rules and fiction do overlap” (2005:189). It is not hard not to agree with this 
analysis. What Juul is saying, in effect, is that our engagement with simulated environments is 
the (notable) exception that does not respond very well to the rules-plus-fiction model. This 
engagement is typically mediated by the principle of the avatar. The archetypical ‘special 
issue’ of computer game representation, in other words, is avatarial embodiment.  
The cursor theory 
In “The Myth of the Ergodic Videogame. Some thoughts on player-character relationships in 
videogames” (2002), James Newman rejects a character-based understanding of the role of 
the avatar, which would emphasise the role of ‘identification’ in relation to the visual or 
cinematic features the avatar. His concern is with the avatarial relationship of agency and 
control, and he distinguishes sharply between the player-character as part of our ‘On-Line’ 
activity of play (when the player is in active control) and the same player-character as 
perceived ‘Off-Line’ – in “periods where no registered input control is received from the 
player” (Newman 2002:4). The player’s immersion with the game, he argues, is based on the 
On-Line ‘interface-level connection’ with the player-character, which defines how the player 
is able to engage with the world of the game. The visual representation of the player-character 
is not important to play if it has no impact on what the player is able to do through the player-
character. This ‘representational’ aspect of the player-character has significance through the 
Off-Line dimension of play; the visual appearance of on-screen characters is therefore 
important when we are watching rather than playing.  
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My own understanding of the role of the avatar is in line with Newman’s central argument: 
the avatar is primarily a mediator of agency and control, not a ‘character’ that we identify 
with on the basis of its visual appearance or what it may do or say as a character in ‘Off-Line’ 
sequences of the game like cutscenes, pre-written dialoges and so on. As an embodied 
extension or prosthesis, the avatar is important because it enables us to act in the world of the 
game. However, Newman’s account of the ‘On-Line’ player-character relationship is also 
significantly different from my own conceptualisation of the avatar. The central difference is 
that, according to Newman’s model, the player-character, because it does not function as a 
character in a film, is to be understood as more of a tool than as a subject-position. The 
primary player-character relationship, he argues, “is one of vehicular embodiment”, and the 
playable character is a “suite of characteristics or equipment utilised and embodied by the 
controlling player.” (2002:1). He explains: 
 
Thus, On-Line "character" in the sense we understand it in non-ergodic media, 
dissolves. Characters On-Line are embodied as sets of available capabilities and 
capacities. They are equipment to be utilised in the gameworld by the player. They are 
vehicles. This is easier to come to terms with when we think of a racing game like 
Gran Turismo where we drive a literal vehicle, but I am suggesting that, despite their 
representational traits, we can think of all videogame characters in this manner. On-
Line, Lara Croft is defined less by appearance than by the fact that "she" allows the 
player to jump distance x, while the ravine in front of us is larger than that, so we 
better start thinking of a new way round… (Newman 2002:9).  
 
My objection would be that Lara Croft or Mario, considered as ‘On-Line’ player extensions, 
are far more than ‘sets of available capabilities’. At the same time it is important to 
emphasise, as Newman does, that computer game avatars are primarily mediators of agency 
rather than characters in the literary or cinematic sense of the term. Newman here draws on 
Mary Fuller and Henry Jenkins’ influential analysis of narrative in Nintendo platform-
adventure games, which also highlights the distinction between ‘character’ (as we know it 
from other media) and what children’s interaction with Nintendo characters is really about: 
 
In Nintendo®'s narratives, characters play a minimal role, displaying traits that are 
largely capacities for action: fighting skills, modes of transportation, preestablished 
goals. The game's dependence on characters (Ninja Turtles, Bart Simpson, etc.) 
borrowed from other media allows them to simply evoke those characters rather than 
to fully develop them. The character is little more than a cursor that mediates the 
player's relationship to the story world (Fuller and Jenkins 1995). 
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As with Newman, who explicitly links his argument on to their analysis, Fuller and Jenkins’ 
rejection of cross-media character leads to the claim (admittedly almost as a footnote) that 
playable characters are to be considered merely as tools or as vehicles of action. If we follow 
this lead, the theoretical framework is set: Mario must either be conceptualised as ‘character’, 
or, alternatively, as ‘little more than’ a cursor. When ‘agency’ is being defined in opposition 
to (visual) ‘representation’ or appearance, and ‘capacity’ is contrasted with (diegetic and 
cinematic) ‘character’, embodiment gets lost in the analysis, and fiction is assigned to the 
inconsequential (and Off-Line) realm of visual appearances. 
 
The cursor theory of avatarhood has heuristic value if we think of games as a relatively new 
and unfamiliar medium. When we look at computer game interaction in comparison to how 
we interact with and make sense of traditional media, the persistent instrumentality of the 
gaming experience stands out as a striking differentiating factor between the two (especially if 
we watch kids play, who are often relentlessly cynical and competitive). However, it seems to 
me that this initial academic shock or surprise over the sheer ‘gameness’ of computer games 
has led to a theoretical over-emphasis on the instrumental imperative that computer game 
interaction carries, at the expense of a consideration of how the fictional as well as the 
agonistic relates to the mechanisms of embodiment and subjectivity in play. Whereas the 
various dimensions of virtual embodiment have been thoroughly philosophised and celebrated 
by visionaries and theorists of art-based and industrial VR, children’s (and adults’) play with 
Mario or Luigi has mostly either been ignored or interpreted through a distinctly ‘no-
nonsense’ comparison with the abstract cursor. The cursor is, Marie-Laure Ryan suggests, 
‘the minimal form’ of the screen-projected avatar33. 
 
However, while the cursor is the ‘minimal’ as well as a paradigmatic form of instrumental 
agency with screen-projected environments in general, it does not in any way capture the 
essence of avatar-based play. For the cursor to be able to function as an avatar, it would need 
to belong to the simulated environment in some way. Like the spaceships in Spacewar! 
(Russel/Graetz/Wiitanen 2006[1962]) or Mario in Super Mario Bros. (Nintendo 2004[1985]), 
the ‘cursor’ would have to be, at least in a minimal fashion, restricted by and responding to 
                                                 
33 “In third-person games, such as the Mario Brothers games for the Nintendo Play Stations, the user controls a 
tiny graphic of his character. The minimal form of this representation is the abstract shape of the cursor.” (Ryan 
2001:309).  
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the limitations and forces of the environment. It would have to be able to move – or at least to 
have a definite location – as a believable object or agent within that space, and it would need 
to show some sign of being exposed to the environment in one way or another.  
 
If avatars are no more than elaborate cursors, agency in avatar-based games will be essentially 
no different from agency in any other type of computer game (– or from agency in any 
mouse-interfaced software, for that matter). Hence, Newman can conclude: 
 
In games like Tomb Raider or Super Mario, just as in Friedman’s Civilization, the 
primary-player may not see themselves as any one particular character on the screen, 
but rather as the sum of every force and influence that comprises the game. (Newman 
2002:11).  
 
While Ted Friedman’s pioneering analysis of SimCity (Maxis Software 1989) and Sid Meier’s 
Civilization (MicroProse 1991) may be applicable to any computer game on some level, as I 
will discuss in chapter 5, the principle of the avatar conflicts with the logic of management 
games. As I have argued elsewhere, generic differences within the diverse field of computer 
games need more attention and analysis34, and the avatarial prosthesis is a central generic 
marker in this respect; it is neither, I will argue, a ‘character on screen’, nor merely a cursor or 
a ‘complex’ of forces and influences, but an incarnated subject-position for the player within 
a fictional environment. 
 
This also implies that the concept of the avatar needs to emphasise, in contemporary 3D-
based games, the navigable camera as a fundamental aspect of the player’s embodiment 
within the gameworld. In Newman’s analysis, the camera-mediated viewpoint is considered 
relevant to ‘On-Line’ relationship “only in so far as it impacts upon the game”. He does not 
elaborate on what kind of ‘impact’ is relevant in this context; he refers to cases when the 
‘dynamic viewpoint’ is directly controllable to some extent, as in Super Mario 64 (Nintendo 
1996), but seems to consider this aspect as an exception to the rule. In any case he makes it 
very clear that the viewpoint – navigable or not – is not included as part of the ‘interface-level 
connection’ that mediates the vehicular embodiment of the player. It is the player’s On-Line 
relationship to the player-character that mediates agency and grounds the player’s sense of 
immersion and engagement with the gameworld, not the viewpoint: 
                                                 
34 See Klevjer (2005). 
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However, if we see first-hand participation as being derived from an interface-level 
control loop we can disentangle viewpoint from reported feelings of immersion, 
engagement and being-in-the-gameworld. (Newman 2002:6). 
 
This ‘disentangling’ of viewpoint from the interface-level control loop must necessarily 
exclude the entire category of first-person perspective games, in which the ‘viewpoint’ is also 
the player’s projected body in the game. It must also somehow imply that when we control 
player-characters in a game where the camera ‘tags along’, as it were, in some fashion, then 
whatever that camera does will be not part of ‘agency’. However, in Tomb Raider (Core 
Design 1996) or Super Mario 64 – or any other third-person 3D action adventure game – we 
do navigate the camera as well as our ‘character’ through the environments, and the particular 
configuration of the ‘control loop’ that is set up between player, camera and character is 
precisely what also configures the agency of the player in those games. In Newman’s model, 
the ‘impact’ of viewpoint on the interaction is recognised, but only as some sort of exception. 
As a general rule, he claims, viewpoint must be kept separate from agency or ‘capacity’, 
because “the degree of participative involvement and engagement with any specific game is 
not contingent upon the mode of representation”. (Newman 2002:7).  
 
My argument is that viewpoint cannot be dismissed as a ‘mode of representation’, and that 
emphasising the role of the camera in constructing a ‘being-in-the-gameworld’ has nothing to 
do with theoretical ‘visualism’, as Newman claims. The camera, whether controlled directly 
or tagging along – or anything in between – is a central mediator of player action in 
contemporary games, especially in the 3D action adventure. It mediates agency and 
subjectivity in its most basic sense: the ability to move, look and hear. 
The immersive fallacy? 
The discussion over the role of the avatar and avatar-player relationships in contemporary 
computer game theory is closely linked to the idea of ‘the immersive fallacy’, as formulated 
in Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman’s introduction to computer game- and computer game 
design theory Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals: 
 
The immersive fallacy is the idea that the pleasure of a media experience lies in its 
ability to sensually transport the participant into an illusory, simulated reality. 
According to the immersive fallacy, this reality is so complete that ideally the frame 
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falls away so that the player truly believes that he or she is part of an imaginary 
world”. (Salen and Zimmerman 2004:450-451). 
 
What Salen and Zimmerman here argue against is the myth of the Holodeck, the quest for 
complete immersion35. Drawing on Bateson’s theory of framing, as I have outlined in chapter 
2, they claim that the nature of play contradicts the idea that the computer game experience 
should be as immersive as possible in terms of its simulated reality. Play is typically 
characterised by a hyper-awareness of the paradox that is established through framing, and 
this awareness produces a double-consciousness (or ‘hybrid consciousness’) that situates the 
player at once inside and outside the frame of make-believe. “The metacommunicative state 
of mind”, Salen and Zimmerman argue, “is deeply intertwined with the unique pleasures and 
experiences of play” (2004:450).  
 
On one hand, the claim involved in this critique is that the Holodeck imperative, although 
valid in some respect and with certain types of games, is too strong and too dominant in 
contemporary design discourses, at the expense of the recognition of other types of 
engagement. The immersive fallacy ‘grossly overemphazises’ the pleasure of sensory illusion, 
and therefore “...misrepresents the diverse palette of experiences game offer” (2004:453). On 
the other hand, the notion of the ‘immersive fallacy’ also points to what Salen and 
Zimmerman see as a more fundamental misunderstanding of what play is about – or should be 
about – and it is here that they invoke Bateson’s notion of metacommunication and the 
paradox of play.  
 
In any game, players move constantly between cognitive frames, shifting from a deep 
immersion with a game’s representation to a deep immersion with the game’s strategic 
mechanisms to an acknowledgement of the space outside the magic circle. Devotees of 
the immersive fallacy tend to see this hybrid consciousness as a regrettable state of 
affairs that will only evolve to its true state of pure immersion when the technology 
arrives. Play tells us otherwise. The many-layered state of mind that occurs during play 
is something to be celebrated, not repressed—it is responsible for some of the unique 
pleasures that emerge from a game. (Salen and Zimmerman 2004:455).  
 
While we may agree with Salen and Zimmerman’s general argument that game designers 
should pay more attention to the ‘diverse palette’ of different types and modalities of 
                                                 
35 The Holodeck, which Janet Murray uses as the ultimate model of total immersion in Hamlet on the Holodeck 
(Murray 1997), is a perfect holographic reality simulator from the Star Trek series.  
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engagement in computer game play, there is also a theoretical assumption here about the ‘true 
nature’ of mimetic play – which underpins the general argument that “Play tells us 
otherwise”; that play is inherently anti-immersive. This assumption, I will argue, obscures the 
discussion of different modalities of immersion, and it also tends to cloud the analysis of 
player-avatar relationships. 
 
In Rules of Play, the assumption that play is by definition anti-immersive is based on a game-
centred reading of Bateson’s “A theory of Play and Fantasy” (Bateson 1972). However, the 
paradox of play can only be seen as ‘unique’ in so far as it accentuates and plays out the more 
general paradox of metacommunication, which is a paradox of abstraction, or representation 
(that is, any communication that goes beyond simple mood signals). Secondly, ‘the paradoxes 
of play’ that Bateson discusses in the article do not apply to games or even to what we usually 
consider as ‘play’ in particular, but to a broad category of make-believe, including ‘3D 
screens’, Hollywood films and therapeutic interaction – the latter being Bateson’s main focus 
of interest. Games are really not part of the picture at all, other than as a heuristic (and 
imperfect) model to make a point about the formal structure of framing in psychotherapy. 
This means that we cannot use Bateson as support for the thesis that ‘play itself’ contradicts 
the Holodeck imperative or the kind of immersion that we find in detective novels or Imax 
cinemas. The paradox of play, as a broad concept of the phenomenon of make-believe, is 
precisely about the kind of paradoxical pseudoreality and pseudoemotion that those types of 
experiences offer. The quest for total sensory immersion – whether it is a fallacy or not – does 
not aim for the frames to ‘fall away’, as Salen and Zimmerman assumes, but rather for the 
contrary; the technological wonders of immersion, from Victorian stereographs to theme park 
motion rides or ‘fully immersive’ Virtual Reality, are all about intensifying the paradox of 
mimesis, creating a hyper-awareness of technologically constructed artificiality.  
 
At the same time, Bateson’s main concern is more specific than this. For the purposes of 
psychotherapy (at least, it seems, for neurotic patients), he advocates the more complex 
variant of ‘Is this play?’ over the safer ‘This is Play’, as a method to improve the patient’s 
ability to manoeuvre and cope with the complex psychological paradox of how ‘as if’ relates 
to reality. However, Bateson never claims that this particular kind of ‘game’ is the default 
mode of how the paradox of play operates – or should operate – in most forms of make-
believe. The dimension of play that Salen and Zimmerman mainly addresses as lacking 
among the ‘devotees of the immersive fallacy’, and which is at odds with the immersive 
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imperative of the Holodeck, is the ‘hybrid consciousness’ of dual-frame orientation during 
play. This imperative highlights the pleasure (and competence) of loose and flexible 
positioning during mimetic play, emphasising what Salen and Zimmerman call “the many-
layered state of mind that occurs during play”. This kind of engagement is characterised by 
“...shifting from a deep immersion with a game’s representation to a deep immersion with the 
game’s strategic mechanisms to an acknowledgement of the space outside the magic circle”. 
However, dual-mode and frame-shifting play is not the only ‘metacommunicative state of 
mind’. According to Bateson, meta-communicative competence is at the heart of any make-
believe (– unless, as Bateson points out, one is either schizophrenic or neurotic). The paradox 
of play cannot be used as an argument against the immersive fallacy. 
 
I am not arguing here that Salen and Zimmerman’s attack on the ‘immersive fallacy’ has not 
got a point, or that computer games should emphasise immersive simulation over frame-
shifting playfulness. It is important to draw attention to, as Rules of Play does, the typically 
loose and frame-defying nature of people’s engagement with mimetic games and toys, which 
is different from the more rigid imperative of simulation that we are more familiar with from 
traditional media and spectacular attractions. The two are different types of fictional 
interaction, two types of make-believe, and it makes little sense to directly compare them in 
terms of which one is more engrossing or engaging in a general sense. We may argue over 
whether Half-Life 2 (Valve 2004) is more ‘immersive’ than Breakout (EC Interactive 
2005[1978]), or vice versa, but it would be very much a case of comparing apples and 
bananas. The debate over the Holodeck model is not about levels of engagement or how 
‘meaningful’ the experience is, but about different ways in which players are encouraged to 
position themselves in relation to the frames that define the ‘what is going on here’ of 
computer game experience. The relatively rigid positioning of Halo tends to produce 
‘engrossment’, yes, but so does Lemmings (DMA Design 1992). The difference is that they do 
it (or fail to do it) through different dynamics of framing. There is no ‘rule of play’ that 
excludes Full Total Immersion from taking its place among the traditions and variants of 
mimetic play. The Holodeck, as a concrete idea as well as a more general ideal, is about 
stabilising and intensifying the paradox of play, not abandoning it.  
Avatars: the 3-layer model 
The (legitimate) eagerness to counter the cultural force of the Holodeck myth, combined with 
an opposition to the techno-romantic rhetoric and ideology that drives the mainstream 
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industry, is part of the reason why the cursor theory of player-avatar relationships seems to 
pervade so much of computer game theory – in one form or another. The cursor model, as 
most explicitly advocated by Newman, is very much formulated as a down-to-earth 
opposition to the preoccupations with representational and sensory sophistication of 
contemporary game-spaces. In Rules of Play, although in a more nuanced fashion, the 
distinctly anti-immersive interpretation of the concept of framing is also linked to the analysis 
of player-avatar relationships. Borrowing from Gary Alan Fine’s study of tabletop role-
playing, which also utilises Bateson’s notion of framing36, Salen and Zimmerman suggest that 
the experience of computer game play can be described as a “three-fold framing of player 
consciousness – as character in a simulated world, as a player in a game, and as a person in a 
larger social setting...” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004:454). Fine’s 3-layer model is here 
advocated as an alternative to “the immersive fallacy’s ideal game”, according to which the 
player would “identify completely with the character” (2004:453). The alternative approach 
means that the significance of character-identification and illusionistic immersion is not 
rejected, but instead complimented by additional framings. The result is a model of avatar-
based interaction that echoes Juul’s and Newman’s dualism of rules-versus-representation, 
but which at the same time avoids the latter’s radically one-dimensional emphasis:  
 
A protagonist character is a persona through which a player exerts him or herself into 
an imaginary world; this relationship can be intense and emotionally ‘immersive’. 
However, at the very same time, the character is a tool, a puppet, an object for the 
player to manipulate according to the rules of the game. (Salen and Zimmerman 
2004:453).  
 
This could be seen as a ‘best of both worlds’ approach to avatar-based interaction in games: 
whereas the ‘protagonist character’ that we know from traditional media secures our 
relationship to the imaginary world, the playable avatar is a tool, a piece of equipment, which 
secures our relationship to the rules of the game. In “Animated game pieces. Avatars as roles, 
tools and props” (2005), Jonas Linderoth also uses this framework and develops it further 
within the analysis of children’s gaming practices. He suggests a triple-frame model for the 
player-avatar relationship that is similar to Salen and Zimmerman’s: 
                                                 
36 Fine draws here on Erving Goffman’s concept of framing, which draws directly on Bateson’s concept as 
outlined in chapter 3. See Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Goffman 1974). In 
social life, ‘frames’, according to Goffman, is that which organises individual’s understanding of what situations 
are about; it provides an interpretation of ‘what is going on’. Frames are ”..rendering what would otherwise be a 
meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful” (Goffman 1974:21). 
 70
 
1. A fictive character that you can pretend to be, a role. 
2. A piece of equipment, a tool which extends the player’s agency in the game activity. 
3. A part of the players setting, props which can be used as a part of the players 
presentation of self. (Linderoth 2005).  
 
Linderoth demonstrates that a theory of framing is productive in the analysis of player 
interaction, allowing us to see the flexible nature of players’ engagement with the fictional 
dimension of computer games. The 3-level model is helpful for making sense of the intensely 
frame-shifting and ‘messy’ way in which players typically interact with their avatars. At the 
same time, considered as a theory of avatar-player relations, it does not leave much room for a 
notion of embodiment that goes beyond the purely instrumental (avatar as tool). The fictional 
dimension is accounted for in layer 1, but as with Salen and Zimmerman, this account seems 
to draw entirely on notions of character identification that do not discriminate between 
cinematic, theatrical or avatarial ‘character’. As a consequence, we must assume, the kind of 
player-avatar relationship that is played out in racing games like for example Gran Turismo 
(Polyphony Digital 1998) would fall entirely outside the ‘inner frame’ of the fictional.  
 
Linderoth excludes everything that has to do with fiction and representation from layer 2 in 
this model. He points out that the ‘I’ of the player-avatar relationship (‘I need to find that 
key’, ‘I died’ etc) also “...occurs in other cases when our ability to act in a certain activity 
systems is mediated by a tool” (Linderoth 2005). This is a timely observation, which may 
serve a de-mystifying warning against assumptions of ‘decentred identity’ and so on, but it 
also supports the more general idea that computer game representation is mainly a question of 
visual appearances and therefore largely inconsequential to the real action of play. In this 
perspective, the non-instrumental dimension of the avatar may easily be seen as an optional 
extra, as “A fictive character that you can pretend to be”. If you choose to take on this 
identity, Salen and Zimmerman’s dual-frame or ‘hybrid’ orientation comes into play: you 
role-play your avatar, as it were, staying ‘in character’, but you also use it as a piece of 
equipment. 
 
Lisbeth Klastrup, in her analysis of multi-user virtual worlds, suggests a model of avatar-
based play that is different from the 3-layer model: 
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 “From a literary and possible world perspective, “games” (and other fictions) conjures 
up a fictional universe that we take as a reference point for the understanding of our 
actions within the world (killing a dragon is interpreted as the act of ‘killing a dragon”, 
not as the continuous clicking of the mouse on some darkly coloured pixels). Hence, 
what we do as avatars is not interpreted as events with real world “value” or reference, 
on the contrary, our actions are interpreted as meaningful within the given universe 
which, during the act of playing, serves as the actual world reference to us”. (Klastrup 
2003:102). 
 
Klastrup is drawing on Marie-Laure Ryan’s theory of recentring to explain how our actions 
become fictionally meaningful through avatars; when we act through the avatar, the 
gameworld is the ‘actual world reference’. There is a notable shift in emphasis here if we 
compare to Juul’s model of the ‘half-real; it is not the actions that project a fictional world 
(through interpretation), but it is rather the fictional actual world that makes our actions 
meaningful in the first place – ‘during the act of playing’. We could say that whereas Juul 
emphasises how interpretation (of the fictional significance) follows from or is ‘cued’ from 
action, Klastrup emphasises how action follows from interpretation. The ‘reference point’ of 
the fictional universe is not seen as an inner (and optional) frame of character identification or 
role-playing, but as a frame that is already given by the fact that we are acting through the 
avatar.  
The role of the computer 
Klastrup’s notion of the ‘actual world reference’, while not fleshed out as an explicit theory of 
avatar-based interaction, still provides a productive general model of avatarhood and fiction 
in computer games. The ‘best of both worlds’-approach is useful as far as it goes, but it needs 
to be complimented with a perspective that takes the specific nature of computer-simulated 
environments into account. Gary Allan Fine’s 3-layer model refers to tabletop role-playing, 
and is not developed with computer game avatars in mind. Hence his model will only be 
directly applicable to computer games to the extent that the computer-simulated player-avatar 
relationship is similar to any other game-based player-avatar relationship. My claim, as I will 
be arguing through chapter 4 and 5, is that the former is different from the latter in significant 
respects, and that this difference goes to the core of what we might mean with ‘embodiment’ 
in games.  
 
Salen and Zimmerman’s use of the 3-layer model, which consciously avoids drawing a line 
between simulation in computer games and simulation in games more generally, broadly 
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reflects how the role of the computer is conceptualised in the so-called ‘ludological’ tradition 
of computer game theory. Espen Aarseth and Jesper Juul are both keen to downplay the 
presumed ‘revolution’ of computerised play and computerised fictions as compared to games 
and simulations in general. In “Genre Trouble: Narrativism and the Art of Simulation”, 
Aarseth explains: 
 
It cannot be repeated often enough that the computer is not a medium, but a flexible 
material technology that will accommodate many different media. Hence, there is no 
“computer medium” with one set of fixed capabilities, nor is there “the medium of the 
computer game”. Games are, at best, a somewhat definable genre. (Aarseth 2004:46). 
 
Because games are medium-independent, Aarseth continues, they are also, in Juul’s 
terminology, ‘themable’: 
 
A game can be translated from board and dice, to a live role-play out in the woods, to 
numbers and letters on a screen, to a three-dimensional virtual world. From SpaceWar 
(1961) to Star Raiders (1979), Elite (1984), to X – Beyond the Frontier (1999), not 
much has happened in the rules and gameplay: the games have increasingly better 
graphics, but the theme and objectives remain the same. Rogue (1980) and Diablo are 
basically the same game (Aarseth 2004:50). 
 
Aarseth’s general argument is obviously correct; games are formal systems, and as such they 
are a medium-independent form. The formal ontology of games (the gameness of games) 
needs to be emphasised in discussions of game genre and game representation. On the other 
hand, interaction and play is not medium-independent, and as I will show in the next chapter, 
props matter in important ways. We may accept, for the sake of the argument, that the 
concrete examples referred to in the quote above do testify to a strong structural similarity 
across different technological platforms and levels of representational sophistication. 
Nevertheless, the games listed are all computer games, and it seems that Aarseth hesitates 
somewhat to include board games or live role-playing into a list that would exemplify 
‘basically the same game’. My argument is that the computer makes all the difference. Maybe 
‘not much has happened’ between Spacewar! and X – Beyond the Frontier, but from board 
and dice to three-dimensional virtual worlds there is a revolution. It does make sense to 
address the digital computer as a ‘flexible material technology’ in many contexts. However, 
this general observation does not address the central question of computer game 
representation, which does not concern the computer’s various capacities as a ‘universal 
 73
medium’, but has to do specifically with the role of computer as a simulating machine. Jesper 
Juul addresses this question more directly: 
 
The main difference between the computer game and its nonelectronic precursors is 
that computer games add automation and complexity—they can uphold and calculate 
game rules on their own, thereby allowing for richer game worlds; this also lets them 
keep pace. So computer games create more worlds, more real time, and more single 
player than nonelectronic games. (Juul 2004:140). 
 
In chapter 5, I will attempt to formulate an alternative to this approach. I will argue against 
the assumption that computer game worlds are merely larger, richer or more complex 
‘electronic’ variants of pre-digital game worlds, and discuss critically the idea the computer 
‘upholds’ or enforces rules. First, however, I will attempt to sketch out a general theory of the 
avatar, which is independent of the specificities of computerised and screen-based avatarhood, 
which complements the purely instrumental approach to avatarial embodiment, and which 
addresses the fictional significance of the avatar in relative independence from literary and 
cinematic notions of character, indentification and diegesis. I will begin by returning to 
Kendall L. Walton’s theory of props, fictional truths and fictional participation.  
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Chapter 4: The model and the avatar 
Mental and perceptual simulations 
What Mimesis as Make-Believe describes, Ryan concludes in a review of Walton’s book, is 
the ‘illusion mode’ of fiction, the experience of entering a virtual reality (Ryan 1995). This 
type of immersion is based on a principle of fictional subjectivity, according to which 
participants’ actions and thoughts generate fictional truths about themselves. Being prescribed 
to imagine a ‘world’ implies, first and foremost, that we are prescribed to imagine the 
meanings of our own specific experiences in relation to that world. In the case of literary 
fiction, this virtual reality is based on a mental re-centring, a mental simulation. This can be 
contrasted to perceptual simulations, which is what Walton calls ‘depictions’. Depiction, in 
Ryan’s words, is based on the “pretended presence of an environment of which the spectator 
is a member” (1995:366). 
 
Depictions, Walton explains, are essentially different from verbal props. What Mona Lisa 
offers is a ‘perceptual game of make-believe’. Our perceptual act of looking at the painting is 
a dynamic representation of ‘lookings’ as they typically take place outside the game. The 
process of looking at the painting imitates – in some respects – the process of looking at 
landscapes, houses and trees. The characteristic property of depictions is, according to 
Walton, that we can use the demonstrative within the game of make-believe: we can point and 
say ‘there’.  
 
The dominant games of our culture, those that we normally play with paintings when we are 
in galleries or city halls, do not permit, or at least strongly discourage, other fictional physical 
acts than the simple demonstrative. Perceptual and intellectual interaction is supposed to be of 
primary importance, preferably embedded in a layer of analytical and distanced meta-games, 
in which our role is to analyse and reflect on the terms of our own participation, and 
contemplate the various capacities of the prop to generate (or negate) fictional truths. 
Nevertheless, paintings, because they are perceptual fictions, have a distinct potential to 
expand our fictional subjectivity by making a wider range of embodied interactions fictionally 
relevant; if you for example throw rotten tomatoes at a portrait of Tony Blair it could be 
difficult to convince others that it really is only the painting of him that you dislike and not 
the prime minister himself.  
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Not all types of perceptual interaction with artworks can be considered as perceptual 
simulations. Most importantly, the majority of ‘readings’ of verbal representations can not. 
When I read a novel, the reading itself – the perceptual act of reading – is typically not made 
fictional, not being included as part of the game of make-believe. The book does not prescribe 
fictional truths based on how I relate to its materiality as an object; it is not a reflexive prop.  
 
A novel like Gulliver’s Travels would be an exception, Walton notes – as would be, I want to 
add, the experimental hypertext-novel. In both cases, the material text is precisely meant to be 
a reflexive prop. Gulliver’s Travels presents itself, fictionally, as a copy of the physician’s 
journal. This strategy gives a relatively modest and hardly very imposing form of perceptual 
simulation. The experimental hypertext, on the other hand, has a higher ambition. Here the 
often disruptive nature of the reading-process is included into the world of make-believe, and 
this process includes material as well as perceptual navigation. In this sense the hypertext 
novel is a true hybrid between the novel and the interactive computer simulation. It has taken 
the step from being a ‘simulation’ in a psychological or metaphorical sense (as ‘mental 
simulation’) into also becoming a perceptual simulation, a depiction.  
 
Jill Walker’s article Performing Fictions: Interaction and Depiction (2003[1991]) uses the 
notion of ‘depiction’ to conceptualise the general performative nature of computer-based 
fictions, including literary hypertexts as well as more media-rich and body-oriented art 
installations. Analysing Michel Joyce’s hypertext novel afternoon, she concludes that 
“…depiction in interactive works can be not only visual, auditory or conceptual, but can also 
occur in the links and in the act of interaction.” (2003[1991]:204) 37. 
 
Walton’s notion of depiction, as distinct from the ‘description’ of mental games of make-
believe, is highly relevant to the study of interactive fictions (or fictional interactions), as 
Walker demonstrates. However, it does not address the specific capacity of what Eco calls a 
‘functional representation’, a model. It is the model that makes our interaction meaningful 
beyond the realm of the predictable and the symbolic. 
 
                                                 
37 In addition to analysing the performative nature of computerised fiction, Walker’s article also provides a 
useful introduction to Walton’s theory of fiction more generally and to the notion of depiction in particular.  
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The model is what distinguishes a mental or a perceptual ‘simulation’ from a simulation 
proper. A simulation proper implements a clearly defined model. We could say, of course, 
that mental simulations also implement understandings or ‘models’ of how the world works, 
but these are not models that are defined or made explicit in any way. Because it is never clear 
exactly how they structure our participation in mental games of make-believe, they cannot act 
as dynamic props; they cannot accommodate our intentional agency within the world of the 
make-believe. This is precisely where Walton’s theory of props as ‘depictions’ is too 
restricted, I want to argue, for the analysis of computerised fictions. While it allows us to 
understand perceptual participation in terms of simulation and fictionality, it does not 
adequately help us to identify and describe fictional forms in which our ‘fictional selves’ are 
constructed primarily through intentional actions that produce objective and unpredictable 
results (unlike as when merely pointing at a picture). In model-based make-believe, the 
fictionally relevant results of our actions are determined by the fictional truths prescribed by 
the model. 
 
By emphasising the relationship between agency and the principle of the model, I want to 
expand Walton’s own conceptual framework to include embodied simulation as well as 
perceptual simulation. In the following I will attempt to clarify this idea, and show how the 
concept of the model is needed to distinguish between different principles that govern the 
constructions of fictional worlds. 
The prop as model  
Walton provides an alternative understanding of the autonomy of fictional worlds. He 
connects the practice of make-believe to an ontology of objective and shared truths, based not 
on subjective imaginations but on the prescriptive power of props. When we accept the 
invitation to participate in a game of make-believe and re-position ourselves as fictional 
subjects, imagination is externalised, manifested as a world for us to investigate and explore. 
The concepts of make-believe, prop, fictional truth and fictional subjectivity enable us to 
recognise and analyse the dimension of simulation in our engagement with representational 
art forms, and provides a comprehensive tool for analysing the distinctive properties of 
different types of representational technologies. Unlike what we find among play-theorists 
like Huizinga, Caillois or Bateson, Walton pays close attention to the role of the props within 
the magic circle, asking what kinds of interactions are allowed and encouraged as fictionally 
meaningful by different kinds of props. 
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Walton’s model does not address, however, the difference between on the one hand cognitive 
or perceptual modes of ‘simulation’, and on the other hand simulation in the more literal sense 
of the term: simulation through the implementation of models. His category of ‘depictions’ 
does not distinguish between props that are dynamically reflexive and props that are only 
perceptually reflexive. While the latter, I want to suggest, is merely a depiction, the former is 
also a model. A painting, when used as a depiction in a game of make-believe, is reflexive 
with respect to how it enables us to look at it, and how we are able to refer to and express this 
perceptual act through the use of demonstrative and through pointing or otherwise 
designating. A model, on the other hand, because it is a functional representation (the 
expression of a process in terms of a material or logical structure) is a prop that prescribes as 
fictional the changes that we effect in it.  
 
In a purely perceptual simulation, no part of the process that we are prescribed to imagine 
something about is modelled in advance. There are no pre-made structural descriptions which 
our perceptual activities are ‘implementing’ – other than, as mentioned above, in a highly 
generalises sense. In a proper simulation, by contrast, fictionally meaningful procedures are 
articulated as formal systems (mathematical or computational models) or as tangible objects 
(concrete models). As opposed to the underlying principles or ‘models’ of mental simulations, 
these models are external in relation to us as participants and can be interacted with as 
autonomous objects. Their fictional significance emerges from this interaction. The specific 
capacities of the model-prop give meaning to the imaginative actions of the participant, and 
the agency of the participant realises the imaginative function of the model.  
 
Whether a given representation is a model or merely a depiction will sometimes vary 
according to the rules of the specific game of make-believe in which the representation 
functions as a prop. As the example with the Blair-painting illustrates, a representation that is 
most commonly understood as a depiction can nevertheless be used as a model (making our 
embodied actions relevant within the game of make-believe), as long as we allow fictionally 
relevant process to be instantiated and articulated by the representation itself. If we are 
throwing tomatoes at the painting, and the resulting changes to the painting are allowed to 
prescribe imaginings reflexively, then we have an example of a simulation proper; a model-
based game of make-believe. The painting itself, realised via our agency, comes to represent 
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the process ‘Tony Blair is being thrown at’ – just like a teddy bear may represent, for 
example, ‘Teddy is being put to bed’ or ‘Teddy is being accidentally dropped’. 
 
Even if the difference between a model and a mere depiction is often in the eye of the 
beholder, as it were – dependent on what type of game of make-believe is being played – this 
does not mean that the objective properties are of less importance because of this flexibility. It 
is always the objective properties of the prop that enable it to function as a model. In the case 
of the Blair-painting, for example, it is evident that the tomato-game could not come about 
unless the painting itself is solid and ‘hittable’; the tomato may be crushed against the canvas 
and drip slowly across the surface. A hologram of Tony Blair clearly would not work, 
although it would work fine considered as a depiction.  
 
To conclude, a model, defined in terms of Walton’s theory of representation, is a dynamically 
reflexive prop. The principle of the model makes the changes that we effect in props 
fictionally relevant. As long as a prop is not allowed to function as a model, whereas the acts 
of the participant can be recognised as fictionally relevant, the changes that the participant 
effects in the prop can not. Leaving coffee stains on the pages of a novel, for example, usually 
acquires no meaning within the game of make-believe. As long as the book itself is not 
granted the status of a functional representation it does not matter to the fiction what we do 
with it38.  
Instrumental make-believe 
When a fictionally relevant process is functionally represented by a prop, independently from 
the participating subject, this enables the subject to act meaningfully on the prop from a 
position outside the game of make-believe. Whereas a model needs to be implemented as 
fiction via some form of agency, this agency itself does not necessarily have to be situated in 
a way that is fictionally meaningful. With reference to Ryan’s notion of ‘recentring’, we can 
say that this type of make-believe is a paradox: The autonomy and integrity of fiction is 
maintained even if we interact in ‘telescope’ mode, from a position outside the world of the 
make-believe (Ryan 2001:103). 
 
                                                 
38 A book can also be a model, depending on the rules of the game we are playing with it. Intentionally burning a 
book, for example, will usually imply that the material prop of the book is being treated as a metonymic 
substitute: a concretised model of the set of ideas that is conveyed by the written text that the book contains. 
 79
Instrumental agency retains for the participant a non-fictional subjectivity. Model-based 
instrumental agency is the kind of agency where make-believe is constituted only through the 
behaviours of the model (the dynamically reflexive prop) as those are affected by the player. 
While the results of the player’s actions will be fictionally meaningful, the actions themselves 
are not. Instrumental make-believe, considered as a modality of interaction, is not dependent 
on the principle of the model, but the model gives it a new significance. The objective and 
independent capacities of the model serve to consolidate and expand the possibility-space for 
meaningful instrumental interaction with fictional worlds.  
 
In its minimal form, instrumental interaction emerges simply from the rule-based nature of 
make-believe; from the fact that fiction is, as Walton points out, generative. The paradigmatic 
example would be the writing of fiction: the author’s relevant actions are constrained by the 
fictional truths generated by the game of make-believe (truths generated by rules and props), 
which dictate what can possibly happen next and what cannot, or which dictate, for example, 
how the beginning must be changed in order to accommodate the ending. However, the author 
is not, in Walton’s terminology, ‘participating’ in the game through his or her acts of writing; 
re-writing a tragic ending into a happy ending does not qualify as ‘saving’ the hero.  
 
This basic form of instrumental action acquires a whole new set of possibilities when rule-
based processes of make-believe are instantiated and externalised in dynamically reflexive 
props. Models follow their own ways, as it were, and the player (or author) does not have to 
understand how they work in order to be able to take meaningful action. When playing with a 
group of Lego men, for example, we can simply experiment freely, arranging them in 
different shapes and patterns (or even just throw them out on the floor), and then see what 
kind of fictional truths emerge from that. This kind of ‘testing out’ – doing something and 
then watch the results – could also be done, in a certain sense, by a novelist, but the novelist 
would be a lot more dependent on knowledge of the fictional process in order to have a 
chance of anything fairly consistent and meaningful to happen. In other words, the novelist 
would be much more dependent on the immersive mechanism of fictional participation, 
relying on imaginative recentring into the story that he or she writes. When this option is not 
available to the writer, as is for example in the case in collaboratively improvised ‘folding 
stories’, the fictional world is not likely to make much sense (unless, of course, the 
participants’ inputs are restricted by an abstract model of some sort).  
 
 80
In games of instrumental make-believe, fictional subject-positions are still be available – to 
writers as well as to Lego-players – only these are not defined in terms of agency, and not 
premised on the principle of the model. While agency always implies a subject-position (a 
subject that acts), the reverse is not true: a fictional subject-position does not necessarily 
require agency. In mental and perceptual ‘simulations’, the fictional subject-position of the 
participant is allowed to exist nowhere from the point of view of the fictional world – it is not 
being assigned any ‘acting instance’; no embodied status or presence.  
 
Instrumental and non-fictional agency is always an option when we play with toys, acting in 
parallel with or in various ways alternating with in-game modes of agency. The typical 
example, again, will be playing with Lego: While there will usually be – fictionally – 
someone piloting the Star Wars vehicles that I am building, the question as to ‘who’ is 
constructing those vehicles would hardly be considered as relevant within my game of make-
believe; the Millennium Falcon may be fictionally piloted by myself as Luke Skywalker, but 
is being constructed by no one, nowhere. Because toys generally encourage fictional as well 
as non-fictional positioning, there exists, we must assume, in most kinds of play a multitude 
of habits and strategies to negotiate various oscillations and parallelisms between 
‘incompatible’ subject-positions. 
 
A somewhat curious special case in this respect which should be mentioned here is the kind of 
imaginative game that offers clearly competing subject-positions: where a split between 
instrumental agency and fictional subject-position is not only allowed, but directly prescribed 
by the prop. Certain kinds of computerised fiction – notably the so-called ‘interactive movies’ 
– encourage that we re-position as fictional subjects (as when watching a movie) while at the 
same time restricting our agency to the instrumental level only39.  
 
Finally, there are games of make-believe – typically computer games, but also other types of 
computerised fiction – in which models demonstrate their own agency (that is, they are not 
just reflexive but active). This makes a particularly strong case for instrumental games of 
make-believe; the results of the player’ actions can be highly elaborate, complex and 
                                                 
39 For a discussion of the distinction between interactive movies and ‘movie games’ – the latter which do, unlike 
the former, give the player some kind of fictional subject-position from which to act within the world of the 
game – see Perron (2003). 
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unpredictable, yet perfectly consistent and meaningful. I will return to the question of 
computerised models in the chapter below.  
Gestural simulations 
I also want to suggest that we distinguish between simulation through the implementation of 
models and ‘simulation’ purely through the use of mimetic gestures. Unlike mental or 
perceptual make-believe, gestural make-believe is based solely on the movements and 
appearances of the participating subject. These games of make-believe are typically played to 
be watched, as in the theatre, for example, when one actor ‘kills’ the other with a sword 
stabbing gesture40. 
 
According to Umberto Eco in A Theory of Semiotics (Eco 1976), a mimetic gesture is a 
particular type of iconic sign, a ‘kinesic iconic sign’, which must be distinguished from a 
relationship of functional resemblance or ‘analogy of function’ (Eco 1976:209), as I referred 
to in chapter 2. A mimetic gesture does not need to include any model or ‘functional’ sign; on 
the stage, for example, actors may use a plastic sword of some sort, by they do not have to. 
On the other hand, it is clear that certain types of concrete models – notably, the broomstick 
that Eco uses as an example – cannot be implemented in a game of make-believe without 
depending on a gestural dimension; there is no way of using this kind of model without also 
performing a gestural simulation. Indeed Eco, because he is essentially concerned with signs, 
not with simulations, is only interested in the iconic aspect; he does not consider any ‘identity 
of function’ that would not create, as he says, ‘the impression of iconism’ (Eco 1976:209). 
For my purposes in this thesis, it is interesting to note, however, that certain kinds of 
‘functional’ representations, namely miniatures as well as many computer games, unlike 
hobby horses or plastic swords, do not in fact imply any iconic gestural dimension. 
 
In the same passage, Eco also points to another interesting type of gesture, which he refers to 
as ‘intrinsically coded acts’. These gestures are not, he points out, ‘directly iconic’; he uses 
the example of a boy who pretends to be shooting a pistol by moving the finger as if he were 
pressing a trigger, while closing his fist as if he were clutching the butt of the pistol. In this 
case, Eco argues, neither the gun nor the act of shooting is being imitated. Instead the gesture 
                                                 
40 The mimetic behaviour of the participants in a gestural simulation does not necessarily have to involve any 
actual movement; the participants might, for example, simulate skyscrapers or statues. Static positions will still 
qualify as gestural make-believe, made meaningful through the moving body’s capacity to not move. 
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is a ‘gestural sign-vehicle’ which denotes, through a metonymic relation, the act of someone 
firing a gun; the gun finger is used as a part that refers to a whole (1976:209-210). In chapter 
7 I will return to the role of these kinds of gestures in computer games. 
 
The more general point to be made here is that a gestural simulation, whether it also 
implements models or not, is not a model-based simulation. In gestural simulations, because 
they are usually performed as iconic signs, as acts of communication, any concrete models 
that are being used are not meant to generate unforeseen fictional truths, not meant to operate 
unpredictably, on their own accord. Any kind of prop, including words, bodily gestures or 
plastic swords, may of course generate fictional truths in ways that we cannot entirely control 
and predict in advance, but the point is that in model-based simulations, either in play or for 
other purposes (training, scientific research), it is precisely this capacity to generate truths 
independently of our knowledge or intentions that motivates their usage. When we use a 
plastic sword in a gestural simulation, whether on stage or in other settings and situations, the 
sword is not meant to actually have a say in what happens; we may accidentally drop the 
sword on the ground during the performance, but this possibility (which is always present) 
would not be part of our motivation for implementing the sword as a concrete model.  
 
In contrast, when we for example play with some kind of model gun in a proper (model-
based) simulation, the whole idea is that we are shooting at something. With certain kinds of 
model guns (which would not include, for example, pea guns), this make-believe would not 
dependent on any mimetic gestures at all. With proper simulations, unlike gestural 
simulations, we do not want to know in advance the fictional truths generated by our actions; 
when we simulate shooting at something, we also want to run the risk of missing.  
Fiction versus simulation? 
Does the study of mimetic play really need an ‘alternative’ and non-diegetic theoretical 
understanding of fiction? Would it not be far simpler and just as productive to acknowledge 
that a model-based simulation (a simulation proper) is neither fictional nor real; that it simply 
constitutes an ontological modality of its own, for which the concept of ‘fiction’ has no real 
value or would even be misleading?  
 
Espen Aarseth’s point of departure in his recent short paper “The Perception of Doors: Fiction 
vs Simulation in Games” (2005b) is similar to my own: we need to re-think our established 
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notions of fiction. As the title of the paper indicates, however, what he argues is that we 
should not re-define or expand it but rather reject it: 
 
In short, games are not fictions, but a different type of world, between fiction and our 
world: the virtual. There are also other worlds: dream worlds, thought experiments, 
religious perceptions, mirror worlds, etc. All these are different alternatives to our own 
world, and as different from fiction as they are from each other. (Aarseth 2005b:2).  
 
Aarseth here advocates a very different concept of ‘fiction’. But there are also important 
similarities. I agree with Aarseth that the principle of the model is the central difference 
between simulations and (other) fictions. A simulation, unlike for example a novel, is the 
implementation of a model. This model has objective properties and capacities that we 
explore, challenge and learn from when we engage with it in mimetic play. As noted above, 
when we simulate the shooting at something (– and, we might add, shooting with something), 
we also run the risk of missing. This is the point at which Walton’s theory of participation is 
lacking: he does not acknowledge model-based fictional participation as different in principle 
from purely mental and perceptual games of make-believe. According to Aarseth, the former 
constitutes the virtual, and should be understood in opposition to fiction rather than as one of 
its modalities.  
 
Literary fiction, according to Aarseth, is not to be confused with virtuality. The realm of the 
fictional is defined according to two main criteria. The primary definition apparently follows 
common sense: fiction exists in imagination, or as in Philip K. Dick’s phrasing (quoted by 
Aarseth): “Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away” (Aarseth 
2005b:1). Translated to Walton’s terminology, what this quote says is that fiction is that 
which is imagined. Reality is that which exists as something external to the subject, 
independently of our imaginations. Conversely: the fictional only exists in our imagination. In 
other words: if you do not imagine that there is a bear in the thicket, there is no bear in the 
thicket – only a stump. This definition of fiction excludes the idea that fictional worlds can be 
‘explored’ as something that is external and objective; something that doesn’t go away when 
you stop believing in it.  
 
Secondly, Aarseth’s ‘fiction’, as opposed to the ‘virtual’ of games, refers to the non-factual. 
This is a fairly common definition of ‘fiction’ in media and literary theory. ‘Factual’ does not 
here mean the same as ‘true’, but that which claims to be true, according to (broadly 
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speaking) social convention and the particular context. The factual is what takes an ‘assertive 
stance’, according to Carl Plantinga (1997:17): it asks to be judged as a statement about the 
world, a statement that can be true of false. This factual commitment is not always 
unambiguous or stable, but still works so that we in most cases are able to separate the factual 
from the non-factual in a given communicative context. Although not entirely clear from the 
brief theoretical argument in the paper41, we must assume that fiction as the non-factual is 
linked to the first premise, which states that fiction is that which is imagined. Fiction, then, 
according to Aarseth, makes no statement (about the external world) that could be true or 
false, because it is only meant to exist in imagination.  
 
As indicated in the title of the paper, Aarseth refers to the well-know phenomenon of painted-
on doors in computer game worlds to illustrate the difference between the virtual and the non-
factual (the ‘fictional’). These are doors which, unlike simulated doors, do not function as 
doors but are merely visual representations.  
 
Clearly, these two types of door are very different, and the first type is obviously 
fictional; it behaves like an unused door in a film, or a closed door in a painting. The 
game is not making a statement to the effect of “In Wartime Germany, most doors 
were fake, simply painted on.” So if the first type of door is fictional, what is the 
second type? Is it also fictional? If we conclude this, then we are clearly looking at two 
very different types of fiction, with only the first type being similar to fictional 
phenomena in all other media. (Aarseth 2005b:3).  
 
It is clear that, as Aarseth argues, the non-factual and the virtual are indeed two ‘very different 
types of fiction’. What is puzzling is that he seems to imply that fictional phenomena in ‘all 
other media’ really are about the non-factual; about propositions that are ‘not making a 
statement’. This is a radical position, because as we have seen, neither Walton nor Ryan (– 
nor, on a more general level, Pavel) sees fictional phenomena as being based on non-factual 
statements. On the contrary, they argue that fiction – any fiction – is about virtuality. In 
Aarseth’s argument, the problem with a theorist like Walton would not be that he is “dealing 
with fiction in literature or film” (2005b:1) but that Walton, like Ryan after him, places the 
rule-based realm of the virtual (the game of make-believe) at the heart of fiction. Fiction is 
that which makes us experience the imagined as actual; as something that is upheld by 
                                                 
41 It is not clear whether the Dick-definition should be taken as a statement about referentiality (truth value) or a 
statement about perceptual presence – in other words if he is talking about non-factuals or if he is talking about 
illusions – but it seems that Aarseth chooses the former. 
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consistent rules, which is independent of us and does not go away if we stop imagining it. 
This dimension of fictionality is lost if we merely, as we often do in everyday speech, take 
‘fiction’ to mean ‘non-factual’. 
 
If the question of fiction has to do with truth and authenticity, Aarseth is of course correct to 
argue that the virtual and the fictional are two different things. As he points out, differences 
with respect to how game worlds relate to the historical world must be separated from the 
question of virtuality. However: so is the case with all other fictions. While game fictions are 
indeed different from fictions in other media, this is not due to their virtuality. On the 
contrary, virtuality is precisely what they share with fictions in other media. Various 
imperatives of authenticity (or lack thereof) are important generic markers, but they are not 
fundamental to the basic mechanisms of fictional participation, neither in games nor in other 
media. 
 
The painted-on doors in Return to Castle Wolfenstein (Grey Matter 2001) do not belong to a 
different ontological realm than the simulated doors do. The problem with painted-on doors is 
simply that they create a contradiction in the rules of the mimetic game. Initially, through our 
visual participation with the game, we are led to understand that they are doors (which would 
behave like doors). However, as soon as we try to open them, we are told that they are not 
doors (because they do not behave like doors). What we are talking about is not an 
ontological split between the fictional and the non-fictional, but two different types of props; 
in order to avoid a contradiction in the rules of make-believe, the game asks us to not consider 
the painted-on door as a model, as a functional representation, even though this is what we as 
players would naturally assume. To the extent that we can accommodate this exception – 
something that is a lot easier to do if the two types of doors are also clearly distinguished in 
terms of visual appearance – there is no contradiction in the gameworld. When there is a 
contradiction (if we do not accept the modal shift), this is a contradiction in how we are asked 
to relate to the fictional world, not a contradiction between the fictional and the non-fictional.  
 
So both types of doors are equally virtual, and equally fictional. What we are dealing with are 
two different modes of fictional participation: the purely visual mode (which Walton would 
call ‘perceptual games of make-believe’) versus the model-based mode. Sometimes, in 
mimetic games, we need to oscillate between these two different modes in order to avoid that 
two conflicting sets of fictional truths are being constructed. The same principle would apply 
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to, for example, children playing with Legos or dolls; their fictions will consist of both 
functional and non-functional representations, but these modal variations do not in themselves 
necessitate any ontological acrobatics in between the fictional and the non-fictional42.  
 
While it is important to realise that computer game fictions are rooted in the principle of 
simulation, we should not therefore conclude that ‘fiction’ is something that goes on primarily 
in other media, and which is incidental to games. Doing so would be to throw the baby out 
with the bathwater. If we follow Aarseth’s theoretical strategy, the fictional dimension of 
games (including all the resonances from our engagements with literary and cinematic 
fictions) can be safely assigned to the realm of non-functional representations – that is: 
defined as a matter of narration and audio-visual appearance, and as detached from the 
dominant mechanisms of agency and subjectivity in computer games.  
 
Aarseth’s distinction between the virtual and the fictional serves to reproduce, I would argue, 
a separation between ‘immersion’ understood narrowly as literary immersion and ‘immersion’ 
understood as focussed engagement. According to this model, there are only two types of 
immersion and subject-positioning worth considering in computer game play: either we are 
talking about the ‘flow’ that captures the computer game player (which could be similar to 
climbing a wall, playing checkers or configuring a router)43, or we would be addressing a 
diegetic ‘reader’, as it were, who is being immersed in a similar fashion as in literature or 
film.  
 
My argument is that both types of ‘immersion’ – especially the latter – are unsatisfactory as 
models for describing fictional participation in computer games. Now, we may of course – as 
I have done in previous research44 – combine the two, attempting to account for the role of 
fiction in terms of how ‘gameplay’ versus ‘representation’ (or, alternatively, ‘storytelling’) 
interrelate and overlap in spite of their ‘ontological’ conflict. While this strategy may be 
productive in certain respects, there is also risk that the underlying theoretical binary will lead 
us to overlook the core mechanisms of imaginative play, while encouraging us to construct 
solutions to a lot of unnecessary problems.  
                                                 
42 As noted above, both children and adults are experts at ’oscillating’ between or fluently negotiating the 
ontological divide between the fictional and the actual. However, the point I am making is that these negotiations 
are not triggered by the juxtaposition of models and non-models.   
43 The notion of ’flow’ as I am using it here draws on Csikszentmihalyi (Csikszentmihalyi 2000[1975]) 
44 See Klevjer (2002). 
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For the purpose of analysing avatar-based computer games, the gameplay-versus-fiction 
framework is especially inadequate. In order to account for the role of the avatar in computer 
games, we need to acknowledge that simulation includes the role of the simulating subject as 
part of its definition. As Aarseth also points out, simulations typically become personal – 
“through experience” (2005b:4). However, according to Philip K. Dick, fiction cannot include 
embodied experience, as this experience is clearly independent of our own subjective 
imagination. This could be called the idealistic concept of fiction: fiction belongs to the realm 
of ideas and imaginings; it has nothing to do with the role of the avatar, because it has nothing 
to do with the world of the body in the first place.  
 
In contrast, concluding this chapter by returning to Mimesis as Make-Believe, the central 
insight we can draw from Walton’s theory is that the nature of fiction is generative. As long 
as a game of make-believe is agreed to – even if only a very simple one – the dynamic of 
props, rules and actors will construct an objective and shared reality of fictional truths. Once 
the wheels are in motion, once the cards are handed out, the fictional becomes an autonomous 
‘world’ which can no longer be controlled and directed at will by the imagination of its 
participants. In other words: fiction is out there, to be investigated and explored. 
The avatar  
An avatar is an instrument or mechanism that defines for the participant a fictional body and 
mediates fictional agency; it is an embodied incarnation of the acting subject. It is dependent 
on the principle of the model, and acts as a dynamically reflexive prop in relation to its 
environment. Its capabilities and restrictions are based on the objective properties of the 
model, and these capabilities and restrictions define the possibility-space of the player’s 
fictional agency within the game. The avatar therefore defines the boundaries of embodied 
make-believe.  
 
The notion of ‘agency’ that I am using here ties in with Janet Murray’s concept of ‘dramatic 
agency’, but is more specific45. Murray’s concept has nothing to do with fictional re-
orientation or fictional subject-positions; dramatic agency is secured by any kind of coherent 
                                                 
45 See Murray (2004). 
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and fictionally relevant responses to the user’s actions. By contrast, fictional agency is always 
‘incarnated’ in a body, always defined via the mediating principle of the avatar.  
 
It is important to emphasise here that avatars are not exclusive to computer games; avatar-
based play is a long tradition of mimetic play, in all likelihood as old as mimetic rituals, and 
probably older than drama or roleplaying. Typical examples of models that are being used as 
avatars would be toy trucks or Barbie dolls; in other words the kinds of ‘reflexive props’ that 
Walton also typically uses to illustrate his general theory of props and fictional truths – even 
if he is not concerned with distinguishing models from non-models, or privileged 
‘incarnations’ from other props. Avatars, I also want to emphasise, do not only belong to 
games that we are used to thinking about as games of make-believe. On the contrary, avatar-
based games tend to be ambiguous with respect to what kind of (and how much) fictional 
participation they encourage. The typical model in this respect would be a radio-controlled 
model plane, which enables us to take to the sky even if we are firmly grounded on earth.  
 
Finally, we should note that avatar-based play does not require us to stick to one, single avatar 
during the course of a game. The only requirement for vicarious embodiment to be unified 
and coherent, is that the avatars are comparable in certain respects; that they can be perceived 
as belonging to the same, temporary universe. When playing with toy trucks, for example, all 
the different types of vehicles can be considered as variations of the same basic type of avatar 
– as they are of roughly the same scale, and model the phenomenon of real cars according to 
roughly the same principles. A more overly designed example would be a Stiga table hockey 
game, in which the hockey-player figures are attached to rods that the player slides and rotates 
underneath the surface or ‘ice’. Here the player, from one point of view, changes avatar every 
two seconds (– or, in the case of skilled players, considerably faster), but we could still say 
that the entire game unfolds through the mediation of one, singular avatar-relationship.  
 
The particular kind of fictional world that is constituted via the avatar should neither be 
confused with a diegetic world, nor with the magic circle of agonistic play or with the abstract 
and formal ‘world’ of a game system. Embodied make-believe is premised upon an 
environment within which the participant can become an acting body. Mediated by the avatar, 
the environment becomes our tangible world, our habitat.  
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The avatar and the body 
Whereas Walton’s general notion of participation allows us to extend his conceptual 
framework to also describe the particular significance of fictional agency in mimetic play, his 
general perspective does not give a lot of pointers as to what the re-orientation of the subject 
might mean in terms of our body’s relationship to the fictional world of the game. Clearly, a 
Barbie doll and a model plane offer different kinds of embodiment, even if both can be said to 
mediate fictional agency.  
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (2002[1962]) presents a useful 
complimentary perspective to Walton in this respect. It is centrally concerned with the 
relationship between the body and the environment, and with the relationship between 
subjectivity, perception and embodied interaction. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the ‘embodied 
mind’ has yet not been much thought through with respect to the analysis of computer games 
aesthetics – at least not on the level of genre, applied to particular modalities of computer 
game perception and interaction. While the central ideas of his phenomenology serve to 
broaden the basic notion of the avatar as described in light of Walton’s theory of fiction, they 
can also help us see how different kinds of avatars structure interaction and make-believe in 
different ways.  
 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty re-interprets his earlier ideas around the 
psychological concept of ‘gestalt’ in light of the influences from Husserl’s and Heidegger’s 
phenomenology. The central concept in this phenomenological re-orientation is the concept of 
intentionality; the ‘alreadyness’ that marks out Husserl’s phenomenological subject as 
different from the idealised, rational and detached ‘mind’ that is at the heart of the 
epistemological systems of Descartes, Hume and Kant. For Husserl and Heidegger, the 
subject is something that by definition is already in the world; it is already directed or 
‘intended’ towards a world that appears as meaningful. There is no subjectivity outside or 
prior to what Heidegger calls the Dasein or the ‘Being-in-the-world’; that is, there is no 
‘thinking being’ that can be able to reflect on itself directly, as a pure ‘subject’ that stands 
before an ‘object’. Because we as beings are already in-the-world, the world is a priori given 
as meaningful to us, ‘always already’ before we are conscious of this meaning, and before it 
may occur to us to reflect on this meaning. The Dasein is by definition a being in relation to 
and by virtue of something that is external to itself.  
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Merleau-Ponty adopts and re-interprets this idea, however emphasising that the Dasein is a 
particular kind of embodied being-in-the-world. In other words: the subject is not a mind that 
‘has’ a body (– as an object), but is constituted as a subject by virtue of being a body-in-the-
world in the first place. The body is both object (we can relate to it as an object) and subject, 
because embodied and perceptual existence is the a priori condition for there to be any 
meaningful relationship to the world. This implies that ‘being’ (the question of ontology) 
cannot be separated from doing, from perception and action. The subject is not, as Descartes 
asserted, a ‘cogito’ or ‘I think’, but rather an ‘I can’ – a body-subject (Merleau-Ponty 
2002[1962]:159). The way we perceive the world and our position in it is grounded in the 
phenomenology of the body, which is ‘our general medium for having a world’ 
(2002[1962]:169). 
 
One of the reasons why avatar-based games appeal to us is precisely because the principle of 
the avatar is grounded in, and plays with, the general phenomenology of the body. It is the 
mediation of embodied agency that makes us relate to the avatar intuitively as an ‘I can’, and 
which enables us to experience a simulated environment as something that we can inhabit; a 
‘world’ that we belong to. When playing make-believe through the mediation of avatars, there 
is no need to explain engagement and immersion in terms of mechanisms of ‘identification’ or 
similar kinds of bonding between the player and the (sometimes humanoid) avatars. We do 
not identify with the avatar; we generally ‘identify’ with other people’s actions, not with our 
own.  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of ‘habit’ is a particularly useful point of departure for the analysis of 
avatar-based perception and interaction: 
 
If habit is neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, what then is it? It is 
knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and 
cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort. The subject knows where the 
letters are on the typewriter as we know where one of our limbs is, through a 
knowledge bred of a familiarity which does not give us a position in objective space 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002[1962]:166). 
 
In broad terms: ‘habit’ refers to how perception works, and is a result of the embodied 
subject’s efforts to come to grips with its environment. Perceptions are not something that is 
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‘picked up’ by our sensory apparatus to be ‘decoded’ into meaning; perception is a knowledge 
that we acquire as part of our efforts to grasp and find our place in the world.  
 
Habit describes what the psychologist James J. Gibson later has called ‘affordances’; 
phenomena in the world are being perceived by the ‘I can’ as possible ways of interacting and 
doing46. To Gibson, ‘affordance’ does not merely describe the conscious act of recognising 
possibilities of successful interaction (as when, for example, a familiar-looking door handle 
will indicate to us that the door can be opened), but describes a basic condition for there to be 
any meaningful visual perceptions at all.  
 
The perceiving of an affordance is not a process of perceiving a value-free physical 
object to which meaning is somewhat added in a way no one has been able to agree 
upon; it is a process of perceiving a value-rich ecological object. Any substance, any 
surface, any layout has some affordance for benefit or injury to someone. Physics may 
be value-free, but ecology is not.” (Gibson 1986[1979]:140).  
 
Gibson’s ‘ecological’ approach is a way of grounding perception in the intentionality of an 
organism which “always already” inhabits its environment. The world does not appear to us 
as raw sensory data which then have to be ‘clothed with meaning’ (1986[1979]:140) in an act 
of interpretation or abstraction. To an organism that inhabits an environment, a meaningful 
world appears as an ecology projected around that organism – as affordances which “seem to 
be perceived directly because they are perceived directly” (1986[1979]:140).  
 
With particular relevance to the realm of play and games, Hubert L. Dreyfus emphasises how 
the notion of affordance provides a fundament for a theory of learning, calling attention to the 
embodied mechanisms of skillful coping, mastery and success. Dreyfus pays particular 
attention to what Merleau-Ponty calls the ‘maximum grip’; the mastery, the predictability of 
interaction and the balance that the body-subject always strives to achieve in relation to the 
environments it inhabits. 
 
One is no doubt consciously motivated to acquire a skill like tennis, but one does not 
try consciously to discriminate more and more subtle tennis situations and pair them 
                                                 
46 Donald Norman has popularised ’affordance’ into the field of HCI, although in a more commonsensical 
version, as a mechanism not of perception but of conscious recognition, referring to "...the perceived and actual 
properties of the thing, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly 
be used” (Norman 1988:9).  
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with more and more subtle responses. All one can say is that in order to improve one’s 
skill one must be involved, and get a lot of practice. The body takes over and does the 
rest outside the range of consciousness. This capacity is for Merleau-Ponty a further 
manifestation of the body’s tendency to acquire a maximum grip on the world. 
(Dreyfus 1996:7). 
 
Following Dreyfus, we can see sporting and gaming as privileged kinds of activities that 
manifest how embodied subjects come to grips with their particular environments. An 
interesting paragraph in Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work The Structure of Behaviour (1965) 
describes the way in which the body of a competent player ‘becomes one with’ its 
environment in a game of football. The football field is, Merleau-Ponty writes – 
  
…pervaded with lines of force (the 'yard lines'; those which demarcate the penalty 
area) and articulated in sectors (for example, the 'openings' between the adversaries) 
which call for a certain mode of action and which initiate and guide the action as if the 
player were unaware of it. The field itself is not given to him, but present as the 
immanent term of his practical intentions; the player becomes one with it and feels the 
direction of the goal, for example just as immediately as the vertical and horizontal 
planes of his own body (…) As a result, there is a process whereby simultaneously the 
body-subject constitutes the field, whilst the field constitutes the practical 
consciousness of the body-subject. (Merleau-Ponty 1965:168). 
 
The football player, in other words, can be seen as a temporary ‘body-subject’ that is being 
established within the situation of the game. This situation is in important respects similar to 
the situation of avatar-based play. Take the example of the Stiga table-hockey game above: 
Getting into the ‘flow’ is a matter of entering into a new domain or ‘practical consciousness’ 
of playing the game, of entering into a communion with a technologically articulated 
environment.  
 
However, if we look at the environment of the game as a whole, it is clear that the mechanism 
of the hockey-figure and the rod has a privileged role in relation to our acting body, mediating 
our agency within the environment of the game. It is a privileged ‘value-rich’ object within 
the ecology of the playing field, which cannot be compared to any corresponding element in a 
game of real hockey. On a real hockey ice, neither the puck nor the stick or any other 
ecological object stands in a similar kind of relationship to the player. If we compare the two 
environments, the miniature hockey player would correspond instead to the player himself – 
not as an ecological object but an extension of the ecological subject, that is: as both object 
and subject, like the body that it extends from.  
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In the phenomenological sense, then, the avatar should be understood as a prosthetic  
extension of the body-in-the-world, as illustrated by Merleau-Ponty through the example of 
the typewriter in the quote above. For the player, it is through this perceptual extension that 
the rest of the game-relevant environment falls into place. Like a typewriter, the avatar 
integrates with the body and sets up a new space of affordances, a new bodily space 
(2002[1962]:167). ‘Bodily space’ describes space as it exists for (or by) the body-subject; it is 
constituted as ‘environment’ by virtue of being meaningful to bodily effort. Like a new limb 
or a prosthesis, the avatar has the capacity to transform bodily space; it transforms the space 
of potential action for the ‘I can’, and integrates with the body as a perceptual habit. In other 
words, when we learn to use tools or other kinds of extensions to our body, we start 
perceiving our environment differently. When the body-subject changes through the 
appropriation of a prosthetic extension, the environment that it ‘projects around itself’ also 
changes. Different kinds of bodies constitute different kinds of bodily spaces.  
 
The example of a radio-controlled model car may serve to illustrate this point. When getting 
into the ‘habit’ of navigating the environment via the extension of the model (a habit that will 
usually require a lot of practice to acquire), we start perceiving the textures of the ground 
differently; our perception is being ‘re-wired’ to make us aware of every little bump or other 
tiny formation that might present a potential hurdle to our vehicle. Moreover, this sensitivity 
to otherwise ignored details of small sand and rock topography will not disappear in an 
instance once we stop playing and loose our prosthesis. Like a phantom limb, the sticks of the 
controller and wheels of the model car will still be there as an imprint on our faculties, calling 
attention to a microworld of bumps and obstacles that is no longer relevant to the efforts of 
the now ‘castrated’ body. Similarly, a table-hockey player is always going make sure that his 
mid-striker is pulled back to the back end of its sliding slot, ready to be slammed forward 
when there is an opportunity. When the striker is out of position, the habituated player will 
automatically pull the rod quickly back to its default position. The operation becomes second 
nature, just like when a video photographer pulls the zoom all the way down to adjust the 
focus, even if his eyes tell him that everything seems ok; the ‘photographer-body’ knows 
when a view is potentially out of focus, just like the table-hockey player will know in a split-
second if the mid-striker is pulled back or not. This is “knowledge in the hands”, the 
knowledge of the extended body.  
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A prosthetic extension is dependent, in one way or another, on real-time control. The more an 
avatar takes on behaviours that reflect either its own agency or which emerge as passive 
responses to forces and agents in the environment, the less it functions as a prosthesis to the 
body-subject, and the more its status as an avatar is being weakened. In table-hockey, the 
movements and actions of the figures are under my hands’ direct and continuous control. This 
hands-on and real-time control can be distinguished from what you find in a similar-sized 
game like pinball, in which the metal ball is on its own once it has left the plunger. This metal 
ball obviously stands in a privileged relationship to the player, as its behaviours and final 
destiny decides the player’s score, but this kind of (game-defined) relationship is not covered 
by the notion of the perceptual extension. Non-extensions of this type may occupy a 
privileged position also in games of make-believe (which, I would argue, pinball is not), 
typically in the form of a vehicle of some sort, but then they are not avatars; they do not 
articulate the player’s embodied agency in the environment of the game. Examples would be 
a non-controllable but motorised toy-truck let loose on the kitchen floor, or a plastic toy-
bobsleigh finding its way (or not) down the slope that we have prepared for it. The avatar, in 
contrast, is a prosthetic extension of agency and perception, not an independent agent. 
 
On the other hand: does this mean that all extensions, from hammers and typewriters to tennis 
rackets and croquet mallets, should be considered as avatars? No. The avatar is not merely an 
extension; it is also model, mediating fictional agency and forming the basis of a sub-category 
within the tradition of mimetic play. Because the avatar is a model, avatar-based play can be 
distinguished from traditions that are rooted in gestural simulations; the principle of the avatar 
should neither be confused with role-playing, nor with drama, which are forms that do not 
rely on the principle of the prosthetic extension. 
 
An avatar is an extension that is also a model. The environment of table hockey models, in 
some respects, the environment of real hockey, and the playing of table hockey simulates (– 
again, in certain respects) the playing of hockey. Table hockey is a miniature, modelling that 
which is full-size. Without the principle of the model, extensions do not become avatars, and 
there will be no ‘props’ whose behaviours prescribe fictional truths. Real hockey involves 
bodily extensions (skates and sticks), but does not simulate anything. A corresponding small-
sized example would be – as mentioned above – pinball, in which neither the metal ball, the 
flippers nor the general environment of the game is typically thought of as a simulation, nor 
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as a miniature that models something bigger. The plunger and the flippers that we control are 
extensions of our body, but as tools, not as avatars.  
 
While the tool is an instrumental extension, the avatar is a reflexive extension. We can say – 
following Merleau-Ponty and Gibson – that it ‘inhabits’ an environment because it belongs to 
it and lives in it. The avatar is not just acting upon, but also being acted upon and affected by; 
it is submitted to and exposed to its environment. In contrast, tools do not belong to the 
environment; what we are interested in is their capacity to alter the environment, not their 
capacity to become altered by it. This makes natural sense, because the role of the tool is not 
to mediate for the player a fictional subject-position within the environment. While any 
alteration of the avatar reflects and confirms the player’s participation in a make-believe 
ecology, any significant impact caused by the environment on a tool will be either irrelevant 
or unwanted. Unless the hammer is taking part in some kind of make-believe, there is no 
reason for it to be willingly affected by the nail.  
 
Similarly, it would not make any sense to let the plunge and the paddles in pinball become 
exposed to and affected by their environment – unless we choose to consider this environment 
in some sense as a simulated environment (a miniature). As long as a pinball game is just a 
pinball game, the plunger and the paddles do not mediate any kind of fictional agency on 
behalf of the player. The perceptual extension of table-hockey games, in contrast – a small 
figure that we would be hard pressed not to take as a model of a hockey player – has the 
capacity to project around itself a fictional world, in which case the player relates to the ‘tool’ 
not just as an extension but also as a subject; as a vicarious body, an avatar. The unpredictable 
destiny of the small plastic figures then becomes part of the game of make-believe; we may 
for example complain that our players have become ‘injured’ when they are knocked over – a 
not uncommon accident in those types of games, especially if the set is old and worn. 
 
Because the avatar is an extension that is also a model, it is submitted to its environment in a 
way that the phenomenological concepts of extension and tool-use do not account for. In 
computer games, the concept of the tool may capture the functions of a mouse cursor, but not 
the ‘functions’ of Mario in Super Mario 64 (Nintendo 1996), who definitely belongs to his 
environment in all sorts of possible ways. Most importantly – and representing the ultimate 
symbol of ‘avatarhood’: Mario can ‘die’, thereby erasing or ejecting the player’s fictional 
presence from the environment.  
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In computer games, the role of the avatar is accentuated, expanded an elaborated to such an 
extent that traditional avatars almost seem like ‘proto-avatars’ in comparison. The action 
adventure format, in particular, presents a paradigmatic model of what avatarhood is 
essentially about, as the avatar is acutely submitted to a distinctly hostile and dangerous 
environment. In the action adventure, nobody is going to mistake the avatar for a mere 
extension or a tool, simply because the task of staying alive would be (in most cases) the 
principal challenge that the avatar faces. 
 
Which brings us to the final function of the avatar that needs to be pointed out: unlike an 
instrumental extension (a tool), the avatar does not expose our actual bodies to the 
environment; it only exposes itself, as a vicarious body. In contrast, a walking stick, a tennis 
racket or a car extends the functioning of the body directly and sets up a new bodily space 
which could potentially hurt it. Perceptual tools do extend and transform the ‘incarnated 
mind’ of the body, but they do not themselves mimic the position and destiny of an incarnated 
mind. In contrast, the avatar – say, for example, a radio-controlled model plane – has the 
capacity to project around itself its own bodily space. Therefore, while it does mediate the 
agency and perceptions of the body (and as such functions as an extension), it does not 
subject the actual body to the aerial ecology that it mediates. This is a different kind of ‘tool’ 
than what is described by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty; the whole point of engaging with an 
avatarial extension is that it is subjected to and resides in its environment on behalf of the 
player.  
 
In avatar-based play, the environment is perceived via the vicarious body of the avatar, 
through which “Any substance, any surface, any layout has some affordance for benefit or 
injury”. (Gibson 1986[1979]:140). The principle of the avatar offers a playful and exploratory 
mode of being-in-the-world; it temporarily transforms our situation on the level of perception 
and action, allowing us to try out and struggle with new kinds of bodies and bodily spaces. 
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Chapter 5: The simulator 
A general theory of the avatar cannot be directly applied to the domain of computer games. 
Computer game environments are algorithmic systems as well as formal game systems. The 
latter dimension is illustrated also by the example of table hockey as used above: what 
happens to the ‘avatars’ on the field does not make much difference unless it has some 
significance within the rule-system that defines what the game is about; therefore, if one of 
those miniature figures is accidentally knocked over, it takes a fair bit of added make-believe 
to make it into something more than merely an unfortunate break in the game). Moreover, the 
majority of computer games are screen-based media, which means that the avatar needs to 
‘translate’, as it were, between the world of our bodies and a world of moving images. These 
questions will be addressed in this and the following chapter. 
 
A computer simulation, according to the general definition outlined in chapter 2, is an 
implementation of a model which is not performed by a human participant, but by computers: 
the computer (or several computers) runs a simulation. Depending on the context, 
‘simulation’ can also have more specific meanings, which I would argue are compatible with 
the general definition even if they have a different emphasis. In scientific, industrial and 
educational contexts, ‘computer simulation’ typically refers the activity of modelling for 
computer simulations. Roger D. Smith provides a concise and domain-independent definition 
of this concept: 
 
Simulation is the process of designing a model of a real or imagined system and 
conducting experiments with that model. The purpose of simulation experiments is to 
understand the behavior of the system or evaluate strategies for the operation of the 
system.” (Smith 1999:2). 
 
This definition does not necessarily exclude entertainment simulations, even if its emphasis is 
on modelling and simulation as an experimental and cognitive-analytical tool. Computer 
game theorist Gonzalo Frasca presents a similar, but broader definition when he says that 
simulation is “the modelling of a dynamic system through another system” (Frasca 
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2004:86).47 This definition also refers primarily to the activity of constructing, implementing, 
manipulating and re-working formal systems.  
 
However, in everyday language, ‘a simulation’ may also refer to what could be more 
precisely called a simulator: a simulating system considered as a self-contained machine; a 
machine that simulates. The concept of the simulator is most commonly associated with 
entertainment or training. It also captures, I want to suggest, the central fiction-making 
capacities of computer games, as these are manifested through software and hardware. 
Whereas non-computerised game systems are often also ‘functional representations’ or 
models, which can be implemented by players who take the role of ‘simulators’ (agents who 
perform a simulation), computer games are both models and simulators.  
 
We can of course imagine many kinds of simulating machines that are not necessarily 
computers; a familiar example would be motion simulators, which essentially depend on 
video/film and various mechanical devices that are being synchronised with the images. 
Computer game simulators, however, are cybernetic machines; cybernetic simulators. The 
cybernetic simulator’s essential capability is the automated implementation of algorithmic 
models. It is a procedural machine, a machine that can simulate processes all on its own – 
provided those processes are interpreted through abstract models that the machine is able to 
compute.  
 
This is how Ted Friedman describes the cybernetic relationship between the computer and the 
player: 
 
What makes interaction with computers so powerfully absorbing – for better and worse 
– is the way computers can transform the exchange between reader and text into a 
feedback loop. Every response you make provokes a reaction from the computer, 
which leads to a new response, and so on, as the loop from the screen to your eyes to 
your fingers on the keyboard to the computer to the screen becomes a single cybernetic 
circuit. (Friedman 2002). 
 
This notion of the cybernetic feedback loop or circuit has been theoretically formative within 
the emerging field of computer game studies48. The conceptualisation of computer games as 
                                                 
47 For the original version of Frasca’s use of the term, see Video Games of the Oppressed: Video Games as a 
Means for Critical Thinking and Debate (Frasca 2001), where Frasca investigates how computer simulations can 
work as tools for role-playing with oppressive structures and mechanisms in society. 
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cybernetic systems, introduced by Aarseth’s concept of the ‘cybertext’ (1997), captures the 
dialogical relationship between the player and the computer, a relationship in which the player 
is struggling to get the upper hand in a continuous exchange (or ‘loop’) of information and 
control49.  
Second-order simulations 
A fully automated computer simulation only needs a set of initial conditions that defines for it 
a point of departure. Once kicked off, such a simulation works as a closed cybernetic 
feedback loop, a self-controlling mechanism that is running in dialogue with itself.. The open 
or ‘interactive’ computer simulation, by contrast, requires the user to stay in the loop, as part 
of the machinery of simulation50. Together the user and the machine are bound together in a 
cybernetic dialogue, as reciprocal agents in a self-organising and self-controlling system. 
 
However, there are two ways of staying in the loop; two different ideal models that define the 
role and nature of the user’s (or in our case: the player’s ) participation with the process of 
simulation. These two ideal models describe how the player is positioned in relation to the 
activity of simulation, and define the modality of interaction that is available to the player.  
 
In the standard mode of interactive computer simulation, the user participates as an equal 
partner in, or is in charge of, the process of simulation; the computer programme is a tool, an 
instrumental piece of technology that allows the player to perform simulations that otherwise 
would not be possible, or which would be significantly more laborious or impractical. The 
user (the scientist, the engineer, the student, the player) operates, manages and experiments 
with the process of simulation through observing results, varying input data, altering or 
tweaking the algorithmic models, and re-working underlying assumptions. The process of 
simulation is transparent, either because the programme is designed with a special-purpose 
interface that allows and facilitates transparency, or because the user is allowed to (and able 
to) change or modify the programme directly.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
48 See Lahti (2003), Kücklich (2002), Dovey and Kennedy (2006), and Giddings (2006). 
49 The principle of the feedback loop as part of a new discipline of ’cybernetics’ was established by Norbert 
Wiener in Cybernetics, or control and communication in the animal and machine (Wiener 1948). 
50 The notion of the ‘interactive’ simulation only makes sense in relation to a computerised simulation. All 
simulations are, by definition, ‘interactive’ (someone is simulating something), but because the computer has the 
unique ability to perform its own simulation, we often use the term ‘interactive’ when we refer to a computer 
simulation that includes a human participant in the loop even if it does not need to.  
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In contrast, in the non-transparent or second-order mode of interactive computer simulation, 
the user relates to the process of simulation only via the output that the simulation produces – 
with no access to the operations that produce this information. The user enters into a dialogue 
with the non-transparent simulator according to the (often highly restricted) form and 
conventions that the programme dictates. The user is continuously influencing on how the 
process unfolds, but only indirectly, via the results as they are presented by the software and 
hardware. In the non-transparent computer simulation, the first-order simulation is 
transformed into an autonomous environment for the user to act within and affect upon. 
 
A typical non-transparent computer simulation would be Joseph Weizenbaum’s famous 
programme Eliza from 196451, a text-based chatterbot that simulates the responses of the 
stereotypical psychotherapist. Even if Eliza follows a set of fairly simple rules – she is 
basically responding to every input from the ‘patient’ with questions like “why do you say 
that x” or “tell me more about x” – , the simulation can still be convincing enough for the user 
to imagine that he or she is participating in a conversation with a psychotherapist. The user 
can only type text as input, and the programme can accommodate only a limited range of 
verbal inputs without making nonsensical responses.  
 
In we are playing with Eliza, the computer takes the role of the simulator, by implementing 
the formal dynamic model that defines the behaviours of the stereotypical psychotherapist. 
This simulator is a mediator between the player and the ‘rules’ of Eliza; it accepts input from 
the player and feeds it back into the model, while keeping this model hidden from the 
‘patient’. From the point of view of the player, the actual workings of the model can not be 
accessed or observed, only inferred; after playing for a while, the player may figure it out; the 
player may decipher the code.  
 
However, if the player is not given access to the rule-governed process that defines the 
simulation, in what sense can we still say that he or she still is performing or ‘running’ a 
simulation? How can a player implement rules without knowing them? The answer is that the 
player is engaging in a second-order process of simulation; this simulation implements the 
first-order simulation – the simulation that the simulator performs – as a model. The second-
                                                 
51 Eliza is currently available for consultation at http://www-ai.ijs.si/eliza/eliza.html 
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order simulation, performed by the user, implements the first-order simulation as a second-
order dynamic model (a model of a model).  
 
A good example of a second-order playable model would be Sony’s robot dog Aibo, the 
cybernetic toy. Aibo is a functional representation which is itself already an implementation of 
an abstract model. Together, Aibo and the player form a second-order cybernetic system. The 
central difference between Aibo and computer games is that the former is neither a game nor a 
world, but a toy – a distinction I will return to below. Still, most computer games can also be 
described as second-order models; the first-order simulation that the computer performs is 
made dependent on the second-order simulation that the computer and the user perform in 
dialogue. If the user gives no input, the first-order simulation will go idle, repeat itself 
endlessly, or simply just stop. 
The loop of communion 
As I noted above, the idea that computer game play is a cybernetic loop between the player 
and the game, as proposed by Aarseth (1997) and Friedman (2002), has been influential in 
contemporary new media and computer game theory52. This is how Friedman describes the 
experience of playing SimCity (Maxis Software 1989):  
 
It's very hard to describe what it feels like when you're "lost" inside a computer game, 
precisely because at that moment your sense of self has been fundamentally 
transformed. Flowing through a continuous series of decisions made almost 
automatically, hardly aware of the passage of time, you form a symbiotic circuit with 
the computer, a version of the cyborgian consciousness described by Donna Haraway 
in her influential "Manifesto for Cyborgs". The computer comes to feel like an organic 
extension of your consciousness, and you may feel like an extension of the computer 
itself. (Friedman 2002:5). 
 
The use of the phenomenological idea of ‘organic extension’ has similarities with my analysis 
of the avatarial relationship above, but with one central difference: Friedman’s ‘complete 
communion’ of absorbing experience, which is offered to the competent player (2002:4), is a 
communion with the computer, not with the avatar, and certainly not with a fictional world. 
While the notion of ‘cyborgian consciousness’ is linked to the specificity of the management- 
                                                 
52 This theoretical model also connects game theory to a broader strand of cultural theory that is centred around 
notions of cyborgian or ‘posthuman’ forms of interaction, identity and politics (Haraway 1991; Hayles 1999). 
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and strategy game genre, his account also echoes Sherry Turkle’s classical study of arcade 
game players from the early eighties:  
 
People who have never played video games often think that success at them is like 
winning at a Las Vegas–style “one-arm bandit”; people who have played one game 
and given up acknowledge that they require “hand–eye coordination,” often adding 
that this is something that children, but not they, possess. But success at video games 
involves much more. Working out your game strategy involves a process of 
deciphering the logic of the game, of understanding the intent of the game’s designer, 
of achieving a “meeting of the minds” with the program. The video games reflect the 
computer within—in their animated graphics, in the rhythm they impose, in the kind of 
strategic thinking that they require. This "computational specificity" becomes clear 
when you contrast the games with their "grandparent," pinball. (Turkle 1984:68).  
 
Although describing two different genres of computer game play, both Friedman and Turkle 
describe a mode of experience according to which the player gets to merge with the logic of 
the computer, in a ‘meeting of minds’ between the player and the programme. Both are 
classical accounts of what computer gaming is about, and they capture the role of the 
computer in game play (the ‘computational specificity’) with a precision and analytical power 
that is lacking from more general accounts of digital media. At the same time, I would argue 
that both accounts still reflect very particular – although central – paradigms of gaming 
experience. When taking a broader range of genres into account, these paradigms only cover 
part of the picture, especially if we look at avatar-based games.  
The system simulator 
Friedman’s ‘cyborgian consciousness’ and Turkle’s ‘deciphering’ articulate a particular kind 
of ‘symbiotic’ relationship that emerge from computer game play, accounting for how players 
(through hard learning and struggle) get into the cybernetic loop of mastery and control. 
Unlike the avatarial extension or prosthesis as described above, this relationship is all about 
getting into the guts of the machine, into ‘the computer within’, in order to be able to know it, 
to control it, to think like it, to become one with it in play. At the same time, SimCity and 
arcade games are also very different from each other; one is slow-burning and intellectual, the 
other frantic and tactical-visceral. While the former ‘logic’ is the logic of system dynamics, 
which invites the player to manage the parameters of change, the latter is all about pace, 
repetition and rhythm; in general, arcade action games are more about pattern than structure, 
emphasising variation over a theme rather than how a system evolves over time.  
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Also, we should note that only Friedman’s account addresses directly the dimension of 
simulation. His focus is on the capacities of the system simulator, and on how it invites 
players to get under the hood of the on-screen simulation; the system simulator, in order to be 
mastered and conquered, requires the competent player to get at the constructedness of the 
simulated world, in a process of ‘demystification’:  
 
In fact, I would argue that computer games reveal their own constructedness to a much 
greater extent than more traditional texts. Pournelle asks that designers open up their 
programs, so that gamers can "know what the inner relationships are." But this is 
exactly what the process of computer game playing reveals. Learning and winning (or, 
in the case of a non-competitive "software toy," "reaching one's goals at") a computer 
game is a process of demystification: one succeeds by discovering how the software is 
put together. (Friedman 2002:3). 
 
This description has similarities with what I referred to above as the standard or ‘transparent’ 
mode of computer simulation. Rather than engaging with the computer simulation as a 
second-order model only, the player is taking the position of the computer, identifying with 
the simulator itself, and is in this way relating directly to the procedures that govern the 
actions of the simulator. From this emerges a reflexive cybernetic feedback loop; the player 
becomes hyper-aware of the computerised specificity of the simulation, and the player’s mind 
is able to tune in to the workings of the underlying formal structure. The competent player of 
SimCity inhabits – in a phenomenological sense – the ecology of an abstract environment. 
Getting into the flow of playing the system simulator means becoming a system simulator. 
Being in the loop is to play the system. Civilization or SimCity – the strategy game genre and 
the simulation game genre – are paradigmatic models for this kind of play. The latter is also 
often called ‘sim games’ or management games.  
 
Friedman’s model of computer game play, more generally, implies a notion of computer 
game representation and computer game space that could be seen as the antithesis to the 
avatar-based approach that I have outlined in the chapter above. Considered as a model-based 
or ‘procedural’ representation, the simulated world of SimCity does represent (some aspect of) 
the real world, but more importantly: the miniature buildings, roads and parks also represent 
the system itself, the inner workings of the machine, and it is this ‘inner reality’ that the 
player has to grasp if he or she wants to get into the flow of the game. Consequently, when 
the player engages fluently in a transparent and ‘demystifying’ cybernetic feedback loop, the 
screen-simulated space of SimCity takes the role of an interface to the real workings of the 
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game. The player does not use the machine in order to play with some domain in the world, 
but uses instead this domain – as an interface metaphor – to play with the machine and the 
programme. From the point of view of the player, the simulated environment that is 
represented on the screen may still be seen as a functional representation of something in the 
world, but only indirectly; only via the abstract model that it implements.  
The ‘world’ of the game 
Based on the principle of the second-order cybernetic model – the model that also performs a 
simulation – the simulator is able to produce a ‘worldness’ that sets it apart from other 
technologies of play and gaming. This worldness works against the deciphering imperative of 
system-oriented play. Marie-Laure Ryan’s brief discussion of contemporary games in 
Narrative as Virtual Reality may serve as a cue to what kind of worldness we are talking 
about: 
 
In an abstract sense, of course, most if not all games create a “game world”, or self-
enclosed playing space, and the passion that the player brings to the game may be 
regarded as immersion in this game-world. But I would like to draw a distinction 
between “world” as a set of rules and tokens, and “world” as imaginary space, 
furnished with individuated objects. The pieces of a chess game may be labelled king, 
queen, bishop or knight, but chess players do not relate to them as fictional persons, 
nor do they imagine a royal court, a castle, an army, and a war between rival 
kingdoms. (Ryan 2001:307).  
 
The fact that one does not normally engage with the fictional worlds of board games in the 
same way that one engages with the fictional world of Tomb Raider (Core Design 1996) or 
Unreal (Digital Extremes/Epic 1998), however, is not primarily due to the immersive power 
of “the sensorial representation of the gameworld”, which is the dimension that Ryan chooses 
to emphasise (2001:308). The core difference between a world of ‘rules and tokens’ and a 
world of ‘individuated objects’ – which is a very central distinction – does not mainly have to 
do with the level of abstraction as such, understood as the complexity and richness of 
computer game imagery. The heart of the matter, I will argue, is the computer’s capacity to 
implement formal models for us, so that we do not have to. As players, we are not asked to 
engage directly with the level of instructions, as we would have to do in a mimetic board 
game, where we would be required to do all the first-order simulation ourselves. Nor does a 
second-order model necessarily need to reveal the non-ambiguous and consistent game rules 
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that govern it, and which could be deciphered and internalized by a ‘demystifying’ player as a 
world of rules and tokens.  
3 principles of realistic agency 
In contemporary computer games, the prime strategy for securing non-transparency and 
worldness (although not the only one available) is restrictive embodiment through the avatar. 
This embodiment is dependent on the simulator’s capacity to simulate realistic agency. I want 
to suggest that realistic agency in simulated environments is premised on 3 general principles: 
integration, reification and concretisation. 
 
The two different activities of simulation and game-play can only be seen as parallel in so far 
as they embody the process of integration, which means that the rules of the game melt with 
or are colonised by the rules that define possible actions, events and behaviours in a simulated 
world. This process is not the exclusive domain of computer simulations or computer games; 
colonisation is a principle at the level of instructions, and is therefore not dependent on a 
particular technology of implementation. Any game that also wants to be a simulation needs 
some level of integration. Chess is a simulation to the extent that some of the rules of the 
game can also make sense considered as principles of simulated warfare; we may note, for 
example, that pawns can only move forward and are not allowed to retreat.  
 
Role-playing games, as well as war games and similar types of formalised simulations, are the 
paradigmatic form of non-computerised integration. In his paper “Word and code: code as 
world” (2003), Daniel Pargman accurately sums up how role-playing integration between 
game rules and world rules works – in a synthesis of formalised fiction that may seem 
peculiar and exotic to an outsider:  
 
The characteristics of different types of creatures, such as elves, dwarfs, dragons, ogres 
etc. are explicated, and their game-related behaviors and effects are laid out in great 
detail. The same is true for armor, weapons, magic spells and potions. The same is true 
for character traits and professions. And mental health. And equipment. And divine 
intervention. And so on. It is exactly such expositions – collected in thick rulebooks – 
which one gets hold of when a roleplaying game is bought. What is bought is a ”game 
system” i.e. an operationalized system for how a (fantasy) world works in detail. 
(Pargman 2003:2).  
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Pargman’s notion of ‘code as world’ describes the unique nature of the worlds of role-playing 
games as opposed to literary or cinematic worlds. Through the principle of integration, role-
playing worlds become world-systems, which are highly complex yet ‘logical and 
controllable’ (Pargman 2003:1).  
 
Reification is the kind of implementation that makes a computer simulation non-transparent. 
It is the principle by which the cybernetic simulator turns instructions into regularities, and 
abstract models into concrete models. This is possible because the simulator automates the 
execution of algorithmic instructions and keeps them hidden from the player. While the 
algorithms of the programme code are instructions from the point of view of the digital 
machine (which executes them), from the point of view of the human player they are simply a 
set of regularities, a cluster of (hopefully) consistent responses and behaviours. In a non-
automated interactive simulation, by contrast, the player’s interaction must follow the 
procedures as stated by the instructions of the system, without the mediation of a simulating 
machine. The procedures and behaviours that follow from instruction-based play can of 
course hold various degrees of realism in terms of how they relate to events and phenomena 
in the real world. However the interaction itself, the mode of interaction between the user and 
the system, will not be realistic in any sense.  
 
By implementing a set of formal rules as a dynamic simulation of automated behaviours and 
appearances, the simulator puts flesh and bones on abstract models, potentially disguising 
their true origin and inner structure; the concrete Aibo implements the abstract Aibo. In 
computer games, instructions are reified as non-transparent objects and processes, which enter 
into relationships with other objects and processes in an autonomous and responsive 
environment, whose properties and behaviours embody ‘rules’ only in a metaphorical or 
heuristic sense.  
 
Robots like Aibo also illustrate the simulator’s capacity to simulate independent and 
autonomous agency, taking the position of an intentional subject or ‘other’ in relation to the 
player. This agency is rooted in the automated implementation of algorithmic procedures, 
whose quintessential generic form is if-then. Simulated agency adds an important dimension 
of realistic agency to our relationship with computer-generated environments: there are other 
intentional behaviours than our own. When playing a singleplayer computer game, there is 
someone who acts in relation to the player, a partner and opponent who is typically 
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instantiated and ‘localised’ in various simulated agents and forces of the environment, but 
who may also – in different forms and to different extents – penetrate or animate the 
simulated world as a whole, which is a dimension I will return to in chapter 6. What I want to 
emphasise here is that simulated others – especially the kind of simulated agents that populate 
computer game worlds – are premised on a certain extent of reification and non-transparency. 
As humans, we do not have direct access to the operations or governing ‘rules’ of other 
independently deliberating minds. We can only know the intentions, preferences and 
strategies of other subjects through their actions, through interpretation.  
 
The principle of reification is specific to the domain of simulation; it applies only to game 
rules that are integrated with or ‘colonised’ by a simulated system. A game system that does 
not model anything cannot be reified, only automated. This distinguishes reification from the 
computer’s capacity to enforce or uphold the rules of a game. For example, in a racing game, 
the computer may force the player to follow a rule: the player/driver must stop when the time 
is up. This rule is not integrated with the rules that describe the properties of the simulated 
environment; no part of the simulation indicates that the vehicle should magically stop 
functioning after a set number of minutes and seconds, but such are the rules of the game, and 
the computer upholds them as unavoidable and non-negotiable absolutes. This rule is an 
explicit game-rule, an instruction, which is enforced by the computer much like a referee 
enforces the rules of football. In the case of sport games, the rules that state when a ball is out 
of bounds are admittedly more ‘integrated’ in the sense that they form part of a simulated 
game-space, but their central defining feature, with respect to reification, is nevertheless that 
they are explicit about their status as game rules. Automated sport game rules, just like the 
non-integrated rules that may cut your fuel when your time is up in a racing game, are not 
laws or properties, but ‘regularities’ that retain and speak openly of their conventionality and 
contingency as game rules.  
 
Computerised chess illustrates a different kind of non-reified automated rules. When two 
participants play against each other, the computer enforces a set of rules that are also, in some 
respect, integrated, describing a military battle. However, the high level of abstraction inhibits 
reification by keeping the game rules unavoidably und unambiguously transparent, and by 
relying on the rule-governed behaviours of tokens rather than objects or agents to which we 
could ascribe believable properties. The simulation that is performed by the computer does 
not do anything that the simulation performed by the players in non-computerised chess 
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cannot do. Because the automation of the computer in this case is essentially superfluous to 
the game as well as to the simulation (although convenient and efficient), computerised chess 
is most accurately called just that: a computerised game, not a computer game, incapable of 
mediating the process of reification.  
 
In a similar fashion, although in far more elaborate and complex ways, computer role-playing 
games mitigate the principle of reification by keeping the rule-sets (which are often inherited 
from pen and paper versions) visible. This principle or ethos of anti-reification could be seen 
as a defining imperative of the role-playing game genre: the imperative to keep the world-
system transparent; to keep the computer as a modest ‘computer’ in the original meaning of 
the term, doing the maths for you, and upholding the rules. We can therefore consider role-
playing games like Planescape Torment (Black Isles Studios 1999) or Neverwinter Nights 
(Bioware 2002) as hybrids: part computer game, part computerised game – or alternatively: 
part computer simulation, part computerised simulation.  
 
The principle of concretisation has to do with the function of concrete models within game 
systems. It points to a distinction which is either ignored or not given much importance in 
formalist game theory. Whereas pre-digital games typically use concrete models as tokens, a 
computer game typically uses concrete models as playthings. This means, for example, that 
computer games are well suited to simulated sport games like football or Formula One racing.  
 
Seen from the point of view of the game system, a plaything is a found object (Juul 2005:67). 
A found object, in this perspective, is a game component that generates procedures of play 
through its own properties as an object, by virtue of its consistency and regularity of 
appearance and behaviour. For example, a football that does not have the correct shape and 
consistence, or a Ken doll that lacks his head, would seriously change (and potentially ruin) 
the activity of play. A token, in contrast, only needs to have (or to retain) very basic physical 
properties. 
 
Sport and other physical games generally include both formal rules and playthings. In certain 
types of physical games, these playthings may also function as models, as mimetic toys, but 
this is generally the exception to the rule. An example that comes to mind is paintball, either 
as can it be observed in leisure centres, or as the televised sport where serious competitors 
dress up in military camo gear and shoot paint-splashing pellets at each other. However, as a 
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general rule, mimetic toys –playthings used as models – generally tend to compete with or 
displace formal rule-sets rather than accommodate to them; we may engage in formally 
structured games with our Legos or our paper dolls, but their capacities as playthings tend to 
discourage it.  
 
Board games, on the other hand, typically use concrete models as central components within 
the game system, but then those models are not (in ordinary types of play) treated as 
playthings or found objects. The properties of the miniature motorcycle model that we move 
around the board in Monopoly are not important in the same way that the properties of a 
football are important. The properties of the motorcycle matter only in terms of how they 
enable it to function as a token: the small figure has concrete mass, it is of proper scale; it 
cannot be in two different places at the same time. Given that such minimum requirements are 
met, the role and function of a token, by definition, is described by the formal instructions of 
the game system. These rules cannot operate if they are not understood and implemented by a 
player. 
 
In contrast, if we are playing with a miniature vehicle as a toy – that is, outside the boundaries 
of any formal game system – its specific properties will be crucial in defining how we are 
able to play and what the playing means to us; playing with a wooden toy truck with painted-
on wheels and playing with a radio-controlled plastic wonder are two different things (in spite 
of what our parents might want us to believe). In Monopoly, it does not matter if the little 
vehicle has painted-on wheels, or whether it represents a motorcycle or a sandwich or a cow. 
A token is by definition themable: it can take on any kind of appearance and still perform the 
same function within the rules of the game. The behaviours that can be ascribed to the 
properties of the motorcycle figure itself can never claim authority over the instructions that 
govern the activity of the game; if the miniature accidentally slides out of its assigned position 
or is knocked over, this behaviour is irrelevant to the state of the game. The properties of a 
token do not have the authority to generate unforeseeable actions and events within the game 
system. A plaything, on the other hand, like gravity or the human body, is a found object, 
which is interesting precisely by virtue of its capacity to ‘instruct’ or generate procedures of 
play.  
 
A token can never have the same fictional significance as a plaything, because unlike a 
plaything, it cannot function as a model; as players we do not allow it to generate fictional 
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actions and events by virtue of its properties as a functional representation. It may of course 
be used as a prop in a game of make-believe, but only in terms of its properties as a visual 
representation rather than as a functional representation – that is: in terms of its potential as a 
depiction, generating what Walton calls a visual (or perceptual) game of make-believe. Unlike 
the fictions generated by of mimetic playthings, therefore, the fictional dimension of board 
games is an add-on, a depictive overlay to the rule-governed procedures of play.  
 
Computer game environments, unlike the gaming environments of Risk, Monopoly or pen 
and paper role-playing games, are all about the playthings. However, because these playable 
or ‘found’ environments are able to integrate the rules of the game, they do not compete with 
the requirements of formal game systems, as mimetic playthings usually do. This is a unique 
and revolutionary capability of computer games: they use concrete models to colonise the 
rules of play, and they can do so because those concrete models are implementations of 
dynamic abstract models; they are the result of reification. The simulated worlds of pen and 
paper role-playing games, in contrast, also colonise game rules, but not it via concrete models 
(– if they use concrete models, these are assigned the function of tokens). In computer games, 
the properties of the concrete, playable and generative toy are able to absorb and concretise 
the workings of the game system. The principle of concretisation, consequently, may also 
serve to distinguish computer games from computerised games: the latter emphasise the 
importance of tokens over playthings.  
 
The principles of integration, reification and concretisation – the latter being a combination of 
the former two – explain how the simulator is able to offer a relationship to a simulated 
system that mimics our relationship to the real world. Realistic agency is when you do not 
have to perform the simulation by following a set of instructions, and when the behaviours of 
agents, objects and processes in the environment can be ascribed to their own properties and 
capabilities rather than to formal procedures that are external to them. In computer game 
environments, this kind of realistic agency is often combined with and balanced by game 
rules that are not concretised – either because they are transparent and non-reified (as in a 
role-playing game), or because they were never integrated with the simulation in the first 
place (as when a timer cuts you off in a racing game).  
 
So the simulated environments of computer games are ‘worlds’ not only because they can 
trigger our imaginations, or because they constitute a rule-based and self-contained ‘magic 
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circle’ of meaningful activity, or because they may be sensorially immersive, but also, and 
more importantly, because they are world-like in terms of our mode of interacting with them. 
Unlike non-computerised systems – whether these are simulations, game systems, or a 
combination of the two – we can interact with computer-simulated environments in a way that 
is analogous to how we interact with the world outside the simulation.  
 
Finally, it is useful to point out the distinction between realistic agency, which is a particular 
property of computer-simulated environments, and the notion of functional realism, which has 
been suggested by Geoff King in his analysis of Full Spectrum Warrior (Pandemic Studios 
2004), an hybridised action/strategy game that is marketed as a realistic and authentic military 
entertainment simulator. The functional realism of this game, King says, operates at the level 
of military tactics; compared to other military-style shooters, the manner in which the player 
is forced to perform the basic tasks in Full Spectrum Warrior – the game’s ‘core mechanics’ – 
corresponds more closely (or, we could add, less badly) to the way professional soldiers are 
actually trained to do combat in those kinds of environments (King 2005). This type of 
realism, I will suggest, does not primarily address the world-like responses of simulated 
environments, but a (presumed) homology at the structural level, a functional homology that 
can be expressed in entirely abstract terms, that is, in terms of the rules that govern the 
possible actions of the player. Functional realism is therefore separate from realistic agency. 
As noted above, any simulation – for example a pen and paper simulation or a board game – 
can be measured and found realistic in terms of how its rules correspond to the perceived 
patterns and regularities of the particular domain that it simulates. Conversely, a computer 
game that offers a high degree of realistic agency and ‘worldness’ – say, for example, Black 
(Criterion 2006) – may not score very high in terms of functional realism.  
Environments versus automatons  
As noted above, mimetic toys do not generally mix well with formal game systems, as their 
capacity for generating procedures of play competes with and easily disrupts the authority of 
the rules. In contrast, computer games are concrete models and formal systems – or more 
accurately: formal systems as concrete models. This makes them more similar to intelligent 
toys and robots – to cybernetic automatons – than they are to paper dolls or Lego men. A 
cybernetic automaton, like Aibo, implements a formal structure that defines its dynamic 
responses and behaviours as a concrete model. Because Aibo is a second-order model, we 
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may, in certain respects, interact with it in ways that are analogous to how we would interact 
with a (slightly confused) puppy. 
 
Whereas automatons do have the capacity to integrate game rules, however, we should note 
that in terms of fictional participation, they engage us as agents rather than as worlds. The 
difference between cybernetic automatons and cybernetic worlds can be described via Kendall 
Walton’s notion of the ‘work world’. Certain kinds of props – we may refer to them as 
‘world-props’ rather than merely as props – generate a world of their own, and they do so in 
an exclusive sense; they cannot enter into a world of make-believe as one prop among others, 
because they are not reflexive with respect to their environment. A world-prop is a self-
contained prop, a game of make-believe incarnated as a prop.  
 
Typically, as in the case of paintings, books or films, world-props are meant to be used in 
perceptual games of make-believe rather than in model-based games of make-believe; we do 
not normally use them as dynamically reflexive props – props that makes fictional the 
changes that we effect in them. To the extent that it is possible to appropriate a novel or a 
painted portrait as a model – say, by burning the novel or throwing rotten eggs on the portrait 
– we are stepping out of their work-worlds in order to engage in a different game of make-
believe, and so they are no longer world-props. Because neither novels nor portraits model 
environments, the model and the work world become incompatible; if we emphasise the 
model, we loose the work world, and vice versa.  
 
On the other hand, this conditional incompatibility may also give us a flexible but yet 
reasonably precise definition of what a simulated environment is: a simulated environment – 
any simulated environment – is a model that is also a world-prop. While some simulated 
environments are built on abstract models, like card and dice simulation games, others rely on 
concrete models, like film sets or other kinds of mock-up streets, buildings or towns. A 
computer-simulated environment is in a way a combination of those two types of 
environments. Because it relies on reified algorithmic models, it is both informational and 
concrete at the same time.  
 
The concept of the world-prop also serves to differentiate between two ideal types of 
cybernetic fiction, two types of props that are both informational and concrete. Whereas the 
cybernetic automaton, when used in games of make-believe, communicates with and 
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‘fictionalises’ its environments, the cybernetic world (or ‘work world’) offers instead a self-
contained and sovereign simulated environment.  
 
We may assume that cybernetic worlds are simply a product of screen-based simulations, and 
that the boundary of the screen constitutes the boundary of the fictional world. However, 
while this is often the case, it is not necessarily so. Some computer-simulated environments 
combine screen-projected and physical props. Flight simulators, with their elaborate full-size 
cockpit models, would be a typical example. Conversely, automatons may also be screen-
based in different ways. Eliza, to illustrate, in spite of being screen-based, lends itself well to 
being appropriated as an automaton. Let us say that we are playing along in a game of make-
believe, according to which there is an Eliza the psychotherapist typing to us from some other 
terminal, or magically residing within the computer, or whatever setup will make sense to us 
according to the situation. In principle, considered as a concrete model, the Eliza programme 
is then reflexive with respect to the physical environment that the player uses for the game of 
make-believe. The boundary of this fictionalised environment is not incarnated by or clearly 
defined by the prop itself; the screen or the keyboard may be a part of the environment, but 
what about the chair? The desk? In this case, the boundaries of fictionally relevant space are 
not made explicit or clear (– indeed, addressing or questioning them in the first place could be 
seen as nonsensical) because the Eliza programme is being used as an automaton. 
 
Following a similar principle, screen-based computer games may, to a greater or lesser extent, 
draw on the model of the automaton in the way they appeal to the player’s fictional 
participation. Examples would be Nintendogs (Nintendo 2005) and similar types of 
Tamagochi-inspired games, in which the player interacts with virtual pets as if they were a 
part of his or her everyday space and everyday life. Some games break out of their self-
contained worldness primarily by absorbing (or invading) the player’s world in a temporal 
more than a spatial sense. In Animal Crossing (Nintendo 2004), the events of a persistent 
simulated environment follow in sync with days and seasons in real time, defining the game-
space a parallel place just as much as a separate world.  
 
Unlike Eliza and Nintendogs, many computer games are self-contained cybernetic fictions; 
they are unambiguously ‘work worlds’. This implies, as I will return to in chapter 7, that they 
are related to the screen-projected work-worlds of film and animation in a way that 
automatons, even screen-based ones, are not. However, in film and animation, the ontological 
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boundary of fiction – the ‘fourth wall’ that defines the fictional world – is usually closely 
associated with the boundary of the recounted, which is the boundary of a diegetic 
storyworld. In computer game work worlds, on the other hand, this diegetic dimension (in so 
far as there is one) is subordinated to the here-and-now of mimetic play. This means that 
computer game fiction, in principle, can more easily extend beyond the boundary of the 
screen, just like it does when playing with Eliza. Therefore, in computer games, the difference 
between an automaton and a self-contained environment is not necessarily clear-cut or 
unambiguous.  
 
Computer game worlds are also, just like the automaton, self-operating intelligent machines. 
System simulators like Sim City or The Sims, as discussed above, are in one sense more 
similar to automatons than other kinds of games, because they are engaged with from the 
outside, as small totalities or organisms, as cybernetic toys. However, because they are world-
props rather than agents, our fictional participation with them is different. Rather than re-
positioning us in a game of make-believe, as the automaton does, they are more comparable 
to construction toys like Lego, with which we, as noted in chapter 3, typically participate 
through instrumental agency rather than fictional agency. In terms of our fictional 
participation, then, they are self-contained rather than dialogical. A system simulator does not 
generate fictional truths about its dialogue with the player, as Eliza or Aibo does, but it 
generates fictional truths about itself, about the state of its world as a self-contained entity. 
This is why the system simulator lends itself especially well to the ‘process of 
demystification’ that Friedman talks about. The dialogue between the player and the machine 
produces a fictional world, but that dialogue itself is not part of the world that it produces. We 
may still, though, engage in fictional participation from inside this self-contained world, but 
this participation will need to operate on the level of mental make-believe.  
Computer game worldness 
To sum up: Sherry Turkle and Ted Friedman describe in what way the notion of ‘worldness’ 
in computer games is a paradox; part of the pleasure is to play with this worldness itself, to 
get under the hood, to indulge in the paradox of the world-system. However, while this kind 
of ‘communion’ between the player and the system reflects, on the one hand, a general appeal 
that is specific to computerised media, the cultivation of this mode of interaction is also 
highly dependent on generic conventions. At the same time, the paradox itself is rooted in the 
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computer’s capacity as a simulating machine, a simulator, which facilitates realistic, world-
like agency. It is this realism that is the more important specificity of computer games.  
 
Realistic agency takes fictionality beyond the status of the representational ‘theme’ or 
overlay, and beyond the metaphorical ‘world’ of rules and tokens. This fictionality is rooted 
in the same basic premise of pretence or virtuality that carries fictional worlds in other media, 
but it draws on the generative power of concrete – or more to the point: concretised – models 
rather than the generative power of depictions or verbal props. Through the power of the 
simulator to execute and reify formal models, computer games, like other computer 
simulations, give players the ability to interact in a world-like manner with fictional objects. 
Computer games are playthings, and as such they are comparable to toys and cybernetic 
automatons. Yet most computer games are self-contained worlds rather than dialogical agents; 
as simulated environments, they are both work worlds and concrete models.  
 
Finally, it must be emphasised that the worlds of computer games are a special kind of self-
contained simulated environments; they are, uncompromisingly, games as well as worlds. The 
computer game simulation integrates and concretises the explicit game rules that govern the 
actions of the player. The world of mimetic playthings merges with the game rules that 
govern our actions – not as a ‘special case’ but by default. In computer games, game rules are 
colonised by fiction.  
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Chapter 6: The computer game avatar 
In chapter 4, I gave an outline of a general theory of the avatar, and of avatar-based play, 
without situating the concept specifically in relation to computer games. The central idea is 
that the avatar combines the principle of the perceptual prosthesis with the principles of 
fictional agency and fictional embodiment. In chapter 5, I moved on to a discussion of 
computer-simulated environments, what role they play in computer games, and in what way 
we can say that computer game spaces are also computer game worlds rather than just 
systems or automatons. In this chapter, building on the general theory of the avatar and of 
computer game ‘worldness’, I will look at the more specific characteristics of the computer 
game avatar, and discuss how avatar-based games relate to other categories of games.  
Character 
First of all, when we move from toy trucks or dolls to screen-based simulations, it is 
important to emphasise that the notion of the avatar, as noted in chapter 3, is distinct from the 
notion of playable character. ‘Character’, as I will define it here, is a general category that 
applies equally to novels or films as well as to drama or computer games. By definition, a 
character is an independent subject, someone who can act, and who can be related to as a 
human person or some sort of animated being with goals and intentions. As players, we may 
in a certain sense be able to act, think and feel ‘vicariously’, as it were, via the acts of a 
character, but as I argued in chapter 3 this is a relationship of identification, not a prosthetic 
extension of agency and perception. More specifically, the notion of ‘character’ is typically 
(although not always) associated with a subject that acts and thinks within a diegetic world. In 
other words, the primary function of character has to do with narrative; when we play with 
characters, we play with a story.  
 
My point is not that character is unimportant to games or unimportant to avatar-based 
computer game play, but that there is, for analytical purposes, a lot to gain from keeping 
‘character’ and ‘avatar’ distinct. In the present study, my main concern is with avatars, not 
characters, even if the two are often closely associated in the games that we play. In avatar-
based games, characters (often more than one) are usually appropriated a part of an avatarial 
relationship, as a playable character or ‘avatar-character’, through which the avatar’s actions 
are expressed within the fictional world. However, this dimension is not necessary to avatarial 
embodiment; some avatars are manifested in the fictional world as vehicles (space ships, 
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racing cars) rather than as humans, humanoids or other kinds of animated subjects. As 
avatars, these are significant in terms of what kind of fictional embodiment and fictional 
participation they enable, but they are not characters, and we do not need a theory of character 
– nor of narrative – to account for how they engage us in play.  
 
As an alternative to the established conceptualisations of ‘playable character’, and drawing on 
the notion of fictional embodiment that I suggested in chapter 4, I will suggest that the notion 
of avatar-based play in computer games can be defined along two central dimensions: 
tangibility and miniatureness. These two dimensions can be drawn up in a simple model, 
illustrating the relationship between four generic categories of computer game ‘worldness’ 
and computer game play.  
Tangible (information) spaces 
Most computer game simulations rely on screen-projected moving images53. This is because 
of the unique way in which moving images are able to realise and express the principles of 
realistic agency in simulated environments. First, the informational output of the formal 
system must somehow translate into something than can be related to in interesting ways as 
concrete models. This could be done, of course, through various kinds of robotics, but screen-
projected synthetic images with sound and physical interfaces are infinitely richer, more 
flexible and comprehensive in scope than robotic environments or installations. This is 
especially so if the simulation exploits the principle of embodiment through the avatar. 
Secondly, screen-projected moving images connect computer game environments to the 
projected environments of other image-based media, and to cultural conventions and 
perceptual habits developed through drawing, animation and film. As I will be discussing in 
chapter 8, contemporary games rely heavily on the habits developed by the cinematic camera.  
 
Spacewar! (Russel/Graetz/Wiitanen 2006[1962]) was enabled by a new type of technology, 
which put the user in direct contact with the computer via a display screen, and made the 
computer playable. The screen-based computer give birth to a new technology of mimetic 
play because it could draw, and draw so fast it could animate shapes and figures while you 
                                                 
53 It should be noted that a computer game does not necessarily have to include screen-projected spaces. 
Location-based or ’mixed reality’ games must be considered as only partly screen-based (as a dominant part of 
the visual field of interaction would be the physical environment rather than the screen-projected environment). 
We could also imagine singleplayer computer games that use a similar kind of setup, or which relied on printed 
output, or – in the more advanced category: that rely on robotic installations.  
 118
were looking. Spacewar! demonstrated that one could instruct the PDP-1 mini computer to 
draw and animate with light on a CRT display, and then interact with these images in real-
time, while the programme was running, either via toggle switches on the console typewriter, 
or – even better – via dedicated control boxes that were custom-built by members of MIT’s 
Tech Model Railroad Club54.  
 
Spacewar! was a computer simulation, and a formal model of a real-world physical system 
governed its behaviour. Implemented by the PDP-1, the information output from the 
simulation was translated into moving lights that depicted spaceships, stars and missiles. This 
reifying metamorphosis was essential to the playability and appeal of the game. Sets of 
written instructions did not return data as numbers and words, but as dynamic, responsive and 
recognisable patterns of light on a screen, which behaved like real-world objects in outer 
space could possibly do. One did not need to know anything about computers or simulations 
to understand it, have fun with it, and master it. The output that was produced by the ongoing 
simulation did not reach the player in the shape of coded information. Neither did the player 
need to define his or her input as coded information – verbally or otherwise.  
 
Through direct and embodied interaction, the concrete models of the simulated environment – 
even if those models were little more than simple shapes of light – became tangible models. 
‘Tangibility’ in this context does not refer to that which can be physically touched and felt 
(although this dimension may also be implemented in various ways), but that which can be 
interacted with in a manner that simulates physical interaction. Indirect or informational 
manipulation, on the other hand, is when we control or influence elements in the environment 
through symbolic action, via language or other means of information that explain and 
designate behaviours and actions. This category includes point-and-click interfaces, which 
enable the player to provide quick and accurate information by pointing and designating. In 
contrast, the player of Spacewar! uses the toggle switches to thrust, turn and trigger (or fire 
off) the objects on the screen, as if he or she were directly manipulating these objects via a 
physical connection55.  
 
                                                 
54 See Graetz (2006). 
55 A Java applet version of Spacewar! is (at the time of writing) available to play at 
http://lcs.www.media.mit.edu/groups/el/projects/spacewar/ 
 119
In the years after Spacewar!, a series of other games for mainframe computers followed that 
have influenced significantly the generic conventions of computer games as they appear 
today, but which relied entirely on text and numbers rather than tangible interaction. 
Hammurabi (Rick Merril/David Ahl 2006[1969]), Hunt the Wumpus (Gregory Yob 
2006[1973]), and Adventure (Will Crowther/Don Woods 2006[1976]) all offer a basic form of 
realistic agency; they meet us as worlds of rule-colonising playthings rather than as formally 
defined worlds of rules and tokens. This realism applies even if, in actual practice, the formal 
rules that drive a simulation like Hammurabi may be easily ‘deciphered’ because of its 
relative simplicity (depending on the competence of the user). The tangibility of games like 
Spacewar!, on the other hand, goes beyond the basic principles of realistic agency. At the 
same time, more elaborate avatar-based games depend on information-interfaced and 
symbolic interaction in addition to tangible relationships; in the classic action adventure The 
Legend of Zelda (Nintendo 2004[1986]), the player picks items or weapons by selecting from 
an inventory. 
 
‘Tangibility’ as I use it here would overlap with the concept of ‘direct manipulation’ as used 
in the field of Human Computer Interaction. However, my emphasis is on the simulation of a 
direct physical relationship rather than trying to account for in systematic terms how this 
directness is constructed from the point of view of interface design56. Tangible information 
spaces simulate the feel of touching, even if we cannot actually touch. This feel is not 
dependent on tactile feedback, but is implied by the experience of tangible interaction. Image-
generated tangibility, moreover, is infinitely expressive and flexible; simulated objects have 
the capacity to come alive in all kinds of predictable or unpredictable ways when we touch 
them. Therefore, simulated physicality can be very different from anything we could 
experience in the real world. The following account from game designers and artists Kyle 
Gabler, Kyle Gray, Matt Kucic and Shalin Shodhan may illustrate this point: 
 
 “Juice” was our wet little term for constant and bountiful user feedback. A juicy game 
element will bounce and wiggle and squirt and make a little noise when you touch it. A 
juicy game feels alive and responds to everything you do – tons of cascading action 
and response for minimal user input. (Gabler et al. 2005). 
                                                 
56 The term ’direct manipulation’, as introduced in HCI by Ben Schneiderman (1982), does not explain 
directness in terms of simulation, opting instead for more descriptive terms like continuous representation and 
instant response. Brenda Laurel, in spite of her alternative and ‘dramatic’ approach, adopts a similar model of 
‘directness’, emphasising the “tight coupling of kinesthetic input and visual response” (Laurel 1993:21). 
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Tangibility accentuates the integrity of concrete models, and solidifies the reified as a 
perceptual habit. Tangible environments are therefore no longer visual presentations of 
‘output data’ from the process of simulation. In Spacewar!, the ‘visualisation’ is the 
simulation. And to the extent that the game rules are integrated with the algorithmic 
procedures that drive the simulation, the tangible moving lights on the precision CRT display 
are the game.  
Miniature worlds 
As noted in the previous chapter, system simulators like SimCity or The Sims are based on 
instrumental agency rather than fictional and avatar-based agency. Borrowing from the 
terminology of Seymour Papert (1980) and Chaim Gingold (2003), we may call these 
environments ‘microworlds’ or miniature worlds. A microworld is a hybrid between a world 
and a toy. It provides macroscopic overview, and is approached as a totality. Because 
microworlds are autonomous and intelligent systems that have independent agency, 
instrumental make-believe thrives and expands; in order to author fictionally interesting 
scenarios, we do not have to understand exactly how the world is put together or how it 
works. Nor do we have to implement the effects of our (more or less) experimental actions 
ourselves.  
 
In his pioneering study Mindstorms: Children, Computers and Powerful Ideas (Papert 1980), 
Seymour Papert suggests a computer-simulated physics microworld as an ‘incubator’ for 
teaching Newtonian physics to children. Microworlds, he argues, enable practice-based and 
hands-on learning even if that which is to be learned may be complex and abstract (like 
mathematics). This is a learning process that operates via what Papert calls a ‘syntonic’ 
representation of knowledge. Syntonicity is a relationship of knowledge-transfer in two 
directions: our knowledge of the world (– of our body, of our intentional self, of our culture) 
helps us understand the relationships of some new phenomenon or system, and this 
phenomenon or system will in turn increase our understanding of ourselves and our position 
in the world. Through syntonic relationships, we are able to learn by projecting ourselves into 
situations rather than by trying to appropriate directly a set of formal rules. Computers are 
perfect for this kind of learning because they allow us to design special-purpose microworlds 
for learning, through which we can simulate and test out situations, mechanisms and 
relationships. The learner’s goal may be to grasp the precise meaning and significance of 
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formal rules and abstract relationships, but the learning approach is indirect, utilising the 
concretising power of the computer – utilising, we might say, the power of cybernetic 
playthings.  
 
Chaim Gingold’s thesis Miniature Gardens & Magic Crayons: Games, Spaces & Worlds 
(2003) analyses the aesthetic of computer games as miniature and playable worlds. Gingold 
draws on Paper’s theory of syntonicity and the microworld, as well as the work and ideas of 
game designers Shigeru Miyamoto and Will Wright. Paradigmatic examples of ‘miniature 
gardens’, according to Gingold, are SimCity, Super Mario Bros. and The Sims (Maxis 
Software 2000). Gingold also describes the design for a prototype called Comic Book 
Dollhouse. This software is a ‘magic crayon’; an authoring software for building and playing 
with story-based microworlds.  
 
Miniature Gardens & Magic Crayons is an important contribution to our understanding of 
make-believe and fictional participation in computer games. This is how Gingold describes 
the principle of the miniature garden: 
 
A miniature garden, like a snow globe, model train set, or fish tank, is complete; 
nothing is missing, and nothing can be taken away. Clear boundaries (spatial and non-
spatial), overviews, and a consistent level of abstraction work hand in hand to make 
the miniature world believable, complete, and tractable for both the author and player. 
Miniatureness makes a garden intelligible in the mind of the player, and emotionally 
safe in his heart. Miniature scale, clear boundaries, and inner life help players to wrap 
their heads, hands, and hearts around a world. (Gingold 2003:7-8).  
 
The miniature garden, in other words, is not merely a collection of toys, but a self-contained 
and complete universe, which is imbued with the ‘inner life’ of independent agency. At the 
same time, there are safe and stable ontological boundaries between the miniature world and 
the real world of the player. The miniature garden is an object, a graspable microworld. What 
I have referred to as ‘realistic agency’ is for Gingold something that follows from a set of 
syntonic relationships. The behaviours and responses of the miniature environment resonate 
with the player’s experience from the actual world and makes possible the ‘bidirectional 
transference of knowledge’ (2003:26); our experience of the actual world helps us get our 
head around the miniature world, and interaction with the miniature world can teach us things 
about the real world.  
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The miniature garden provides the overview that enables and encourages the player to grasp 
the world as a structured whole, as a fish tank, a separate organism. The most elementary 
form of overview is omniscient visual perspective of SimCity, but other functions that provide 
a sense of wholeness and totality can also perform a similar function, according to Gingold. 
This sense of wholeness makes the miniature garden malleable and playable. Its ‘ludic 
playability’ is explained by Gingold in terms of possible worlds theory: 
 
Digital worlds are procedural, which means that they can exist in a variety of states. 
The procedural description of a digital world defines a landscape of possible worlds: 
multiple world states and their relationships to one another. A digital world’s 
dynamics, defined by its makers, gives rise to a possible worlds landscape that is 
traversed by players. (2003:72). 
 
This account presents, we should note, a distinctly systemic and information-oriented 
conceptualisation of game space, emphasising the diversification of possible worlds as the 
fundament of ludic playability. The player is located in the world in the epistemic sense, 
through a basic restriction on information access. Because there is no random access to 
possible world states (2003:78), the player must ‘traverse’ through different states of the 
world-system. It is this situatedness or re-location in terms of knowledge and action that 
distinguishes a microworld from merely a set of expressive tools like for example a paint 
programme. The task of a miniature world designer is to create a restricted but interesting and 
playable possibility-space of different global configurations (2003:68).  
 
In the miniature garden, fictional recentring is not embodied and restricted but mental and 
flexible. ‘When playing SimCity”, Gingold says, “I mentally insert myself into my city’s 
streets and look up and around at the surrounding buildings.” (2003:25). So whereas agency is 
global and instrumental, there is still room for mental simulations that take the point of view 
of the local and the situated. This re-positioning is not perceptual in any sense; Gingold is not 
actually ‘looking up’ at the surrounding buildings. There is, in this form of imaginative make-
believe, a playful split between agency and subject-positioning. As a player, you are given 
realistic agency from a position outside the fictional world, while at the same time being able 
to mentally insert yourself into this world.  
 
Gingold also gives Super Mario Bros. a central role his analysis, even if this game is an action 
adventure rather than a management-oriented ‘god game’ game like The Sims. The Japanese 
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garden metaphor is borrowed from Mario’s creator Shigeru Miyamoto. Gingold also includes, 
although with some reservations, Super Mario 64 – a pioneering game of the 3D era – as an 
example of a miniature garden. His analysis emphasises the macroscopic and miniature aspect 
of both games rather than focussing on the role and status of the player-avatar relationship. In 
this way, he draws attention the playful miniatureness of Mario’s world. Gingold’s analysis 
illustrates that the notion of the miniature worlds does not exclude avatar-based play. Still, I 
would argue that the player’s vicarious embodiment through Mario does make the microworld 
less micro, and the macroscopic more situated. From the point of view of the avatar, the 
magic garden is full size. In this sense, a game like SimCity must be categorised as a more 
radical variant of the miniature, because it does not provide any entry point for situated 
fictional embodiment within the world of the game.  
 
In terms of fictional participation, the syntonic learning process of SimCity also has a type of 
appeal, I would argue, that action adventures like Super Mario Bros. do not have in the same 
way. SimCity teaches the player to manage and understand the parameters of a complex rule-
based system, but it also teaches the player to think about the real world in terms of systems 
that can be manipulated and managed. This is not just a powerful learning tool but also a 
powerful fiction, as well as a persistent fantasy in our culture. System simulators enable us to 
play with the world as if it was a machine, as if it was a toy, entirely under our command.  
 
As for Super Mario 64, Gingold finds this iteration of the series somewhat less successful as a 
miniature than the 2D games. This makes natural sense, I would argue, given the more 
restricted situatedness that the player is given in a three-dimensional world – in spite of the 
many tricks and devices that, admittedly, provide a different sense of overview and 
graspability than in, say, Tomb Raider. I would go further than Gingold, however, and argue 
that Super Mario 64 is not primarily to be considered as a miniature at all, or at least it is 
relatively weak in this aspect as compared to The Sims, or – even more so – as compared to 
SimCity. If, as I will be arguing in the next chapter, a navigable point of view is adopted as an 
integrated part of the avatarial relationship, the distinct logic and appeal of the miniature is 
rejected. The more general point I want to make here is that whereas miniature worlds 
accommodate the principle of the avatar – in a particular variant – miniatureness is also a 
strong moderating and balancing factor with respect to avatar-based play. Radical miniatures, 
like SimCity, have no place for the avatar.  
 
 124
In the following I will look more closely at the distinguishing characteristics of the screen-
based computer game avatar, based on the more general principles laid out in chapter 4, and 
defined in relation to the notions of tangibility and miniatureness.  
The screen-based avatar 
In screen-based computer-simulated environments, avatarhood is produced from the 
appropriation or incorporation of tangible relationships. Unlike a playable character, which 
can be controlled in a number of indirect ways, including via point-and-click designations, the 
avatarial relationship is by definition a tangible and real-time relationship. Like a mouse 
cursor, the avatar enables us to make direct and continuous movements across the divide of 
the screen. The phenomenological appropriation of this relationship as a prosthetic extension 
of the player’s own body-subject is described in detail by jazz pianist, sociologist and 
philosopher David Sudnow in Pilgrim of the Microworld (1983), where he painstakingly 
records how he – after hundreds of hours of training – learned to become a master of the 
arcade game Breakout (EC Interactive 2005[1978]). According to Sudnow, the link or ‘wire’ 
that connects our hand to the responsive image of a paddle – or, we might add, to a cursor – 
works like an ‘electro-umbilical hookup’, producing a “mysterious transformation” of our 
movements (Sudnow 1983:23).  
 
There’s that space over there, this one over here, and we traverse the wired gap with 
motions that make us nonetheless feel in a balanced extending touch with things. 
(Sudnow 1983:37).  
 
Sudnow, who is analysing his own learning process armed with Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception, discovers that Breakout can be learned, and can be embodied 
as second nature, in spite of the alienation he experiences in the early stages of the learning 
process, and in spite of all the unproductive strategies and sidetracks he is led to explore. This 
process of incorporation, he says – drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of bodily space – 
changes the player’s relationship to the objects on the screen.  
 
When a paddle or a bat is incorporated by the body, becoming a continuation of 
ourselves into and through which we realize and aim in a certain direction, such 
implements lose all existence as things in the world with the sorts of dimensions you 
measure on rulers. They become incorporated within a system of bodily spaces that 
can never be spoken of in the objective terms with which we speak of objects outside 
ourselves (Sudnow 1983:122).  
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Sudnow’s phenomenological account addresses a process of learning and ‘incorporation’ that 
is equally central to the development of a competent player-avatar relationship. Through the 
avatar, as a privileged locus of the process of perceptual habituation, the images on the screen 
as well as the physical interface between the player and the controller interface all become a 
part of the player’s own extended self. When disciplined by this real-time ‘hookup’, the 
player’s bodily skills, mediated through the hardware interface, have become part of a new 
perceptual regime. Physical movements – moving fingers across the keyboard, pressing 
buttons on the controller, moving the analogue sticks in microscopic increments – are 
seamlessly integrated with the audio-visual perception of the screen-projected space of the 
game. We may say that the player has become temporally ‘re-wired’; the body-subject learns 
to perceive and act as the avatar, directly into projected space, via the invisible hardware 
interface of screen, speakers and control devices. 
 
In avatar-based computer games, therefore, there is little room for what I have referred to in 
chapter 4 as gestural make-believe. In order to play the game competently, the player must 
learn to act intuitively within the space of the simulated environment, via the affordances of 
the avatar. This imperative implies that any movement or action that does not emerge from 
the ‘electro-umbilical’ symbiosis between the body and the avatar becomes irrelevant within 
the work-world of the game. So unless there are some kind of alternative ‘channels’, as it 
were, that would allow fictional participation outside and independently of the avatarial 
relation, mimetic gestures – or the lack thereof – become irrelevant. In avatar-based fiction, 
the avatar captures or colonises the body of the player, via the principle of the perceptual 
prosthesis. Independently of the avatar, there is no space for fictional participation.  
 
This colonising of the player’s body through the avatarial hookup – which in most cases 
implies that any movement apart from those of the hands (or merely the fingers) and eyes are 
left out of the perceptual loop – distinguishes fictional participation in avatar-based computer 
games from role-playing or dramatic performance. Because the actions of the player only 
become meaningful within the perceptual domain of the player-avatar umbilical relationship, 
the movements of the player’s physical interaction with the hardware interface are in principle 
arbitrary; gestures do not in any way need to mimic or correspond to the movements and 
actions that are simulated through the embodiment of the avatar. The act of pressing a blue 
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button on the game controller has no relation to the simulated act of swinging a heavy bronze 
sword, but the two merge together perceptually nonetheless.  
 
As we know, many computer games do require, or encourage, physical movements that 
imitate, to a greater or lesser extent, the actions that are performed in the screen-projected 
fictional world. To a certain extent, this gestural dimension may be integrated, and made 
second nature, as part of the player-avatar relationship. However, as a general rule, such 
integration requires gestures to be either metonymic – as ‘intrinsically coded acts’ – or, 
alternatively, they must be part of controlling some sort of replica machinery. A full Golf 
Launchpad peripheral, for example, would hardly qualify for either of those categories; when 
the player is playing a golf game by actually swinging a golf club (‘Use your own clubs!’), 
there is no need for any avatar. Metonymic gestures, on the other hand – like the ‘trigger 
finger’ that pulls the shoulder buttons on a console controller interface – because they relate 
to the avatar’s actions as a (small) part in relation to a whole57, do not compete with or 
undermine the authority of the avatar. Neither do interfaces that replicate the controls of 
machines and vehicles, like, typically, steering wheels and pedals, or the fully encapsulating 
‘cockpit’ in Star Wars (Atari 1983); like standard controllers, those kinds of hardware 
interfaces discipline the player through a small set of restricted and well-defined movements, 
and their role is to mediate a vicarious embodiment – some sort of vehicle – within the 
screen-projected simulated environment. Elaborate vehicle-based interfaces are mostly found 
in arcade games, but there are also similar devices available as peripherals for home consoles, 
like, for example, seats with wheel and pedals, for the racing connoisseur. 
The instrument 
On the other hand, we should note that Sudnow’s analysis above is not concerned with the 
avatar. Sudnow’s prosthesis is hooked up with what goes on across the surface of the screen, 
not with the paddle as such, seen in isolation. The ‘avatar’ in Sudnow’s analysis is the game 
space as a whole, and the perceptual extension to be incorporated is the game itself. In fact, 
Sudnow argues, Breakout is not really a game at all in the ordinary sense of the term; it is an 
instrument, merely disguising itself as a game58. As other instruments, Breakout does not need 
to follow any other logic than its own – and it doesn’t. The simulation of physical properties 
                                                 
57 Strictly speaking, the more correct rhetorical trope to describe this relationship would be a ’synecdoche’ rather 
than ‘metonomy’, but I choose here to consider the former as a specific variant of the latter. ‘Metonymic’ also 
has a slightly better ring than ‘synecdochic’. 
58 Sudnow (1983:103). 
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is a far step from what a novice would expect; instead the behaviour of the ball and bricks 
follow seemingly irregular and ad-hoc patterns. Nevertheless, Sudnow discovers that the 
game can be learned; it can be incorporated into his bodily space the way an instrument can. 
Learning to play Breakout, Sudnow finds, is to integrate into one’s perceptual apparatus a 
new and seemingly alien kind of being.  
 
It’s as if instead of truly incorporating the events on the screen within the framework 
of the body’s natural way of moving and caring, the action on the screen must 
incorporate me, reducing or elevating me to some ideal plane of synaptic being 
through which the programmed coincidences will take place. (Sudnow 1983:138).  
 
Sudnow’s account of becoming a ‘synaptic being’ strikes a chord with Turkle’s analysis as 
quoted in the previous chapter, where she describes how ‘the rhythm they impose’ facilitate a 
meeting of minds between the player and the computer. Both Sudnow’s and Turkle’s player-
body is being incorporated by the game – and rather violently so – instead of incorporating it 
into some pre-existing habitual disposition. This way of appropriating a tangible relationship 
resonates with Friedman’s (non-tangible) ‘cyborg consciousness’. On the other hand, 
Sudnow’s ‘computer within’ is not a predictable system to be ‘deciphered’ intellectually, but 
an instrument to be conquered, through persistent repetition and rehearsal. Breakout is an 
intelligent but uncooperative cybernetic jam partner, an erratic automaton that is willing to 
join the dance only if you invest the time (and stubborn effort) to integrate its alien logic as an 
eccentric perceptual habit.  
 
The instrument does not primarily require the kind of ‘syntonic’ learning that Papert and 
Gingold emphasise. While tangible interactions combine well with syntonic processes on a 
general level, their appropriation as prosthetic relationships adds a dimension of learning that 
must be described as something other than syntonic. The player’s appropriation of a tangible 
relationship becomes an end in itself; the goal is to establish a habit, to incorporate the 
relationship as second nature59. The eccentric stubbornness of Breakout, because it does not 
                                                 
59 The point is here not to argue that information-based interaction must operate on the level of the syntonic – but 
that tangible interaction, by definition, is different from syntonicity (including the ‘body-syntonic’) because it 
has the appropriation of an extended embodied self as a basic premise. Friedman’s notion of the computer as an 
‘extension of the self’ does point to a mode of competent flow in which the systemic and information-interfaced 
morphs into some kind of intuitive machine, which could be seen as less cognitive and more of a ‘communion’ 
than Papert’s syntonic learning (although I am not convinced the distinction would hold). However, this 
’cyborgian’ variant of the systemic orientation, no matter how mystical in its transparent immediacy, will in any 
case operate on a different level of understanding than, say, getting the hang of Mario’s jumps and acrobatics.  
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yield without a fight, serves to accentuate this distinction between syntonic learning and the 
incorporation of tangible relations. Papert’s syntonic learning, including the variant that he 
labels the ‘body syntonic’, would be precisely what Sudnow refers to in terms of ‘objects 
outside ourselves’; we learn about other bodies by putting ourselves in their place – by 
simulating or ‘trying on’, as it were, the situation as it appears from their point of view. 
Tangible relations may be included as a part of this learning process, but they do not in 
themselves carry or imply any imperative of heuristic or ‘empathetic’ projection. On the 
contrary, to the extent that they are appropriated as autotelic perceptual extensions, they do 
have the capacity to disturb or get in the way of syntonic learning and syntonic play.  
 
Arcade games like Breakout or Centipede (EC Interactive 2005[1980]) appeal strongly to the 
prosthetic mode of competency and learning. While they simulate, in some fundamental 
respects, a physical space, their main appeal – and challenge – to the competent player lies 
elsewhere: in the hypnotic mastery of an instrument. The instrument, I will suggest, like 
Gingold’s miniature, is a general model of computer gaming, a total metaphor, a candidate for 
a unifying concept that highlights what the gaming situation is all about.  
 
It is clear that playing an instrument, like playing a game (or playing a system), is not 
typically a mimetic practice; neither instruments nor game systems are inherently models – 
though they can be (as would be the case with a video game guitar peripheral or a role-
playing ruleset). This implies that the notion of ‘fictional world’ becomes, in many cases, 
irrelevant or misleading as a description of what is going on in the dialogue between the 
computer and the player. Many computer games and game modes encourage the player to 
‘take them on’ as pure extensions, and are therefore more akin to instruments than they are to 
any form of mimetic practice. On today’s market, the ‘instrument game’ is being cultivated by 
the rhythm-action game genre, which has re-invented and revitalised the arcade twitch-game 
tradition; games like Dancing Stage MegaMix (Konami 2003) are all about incorporating into 
your body – through repetition and discipline – that which is resistant and alien. 
 
On the other hand, while all computer games obviously offers resistance of some sort – and 
the majority of them also demand some degree of bodily appropriation (including games that 
mainly emphasise menu-based interaction) – a lot of games do not encourage any rhythm-
imposing or instrument-like relationship to any significant extent. At the same time, many 
games that primarily emphasise other modalities of interaction, notably the contemporary 
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action adventure genre, often also include the dynamics of Sudnow’s ‘microworld’ to a 
certain extent, either as dedicated sequences or mini-games within the larger game (the so-
called ‘boss fights’ in particular), or as a dimension of interaction that results from the 
generally repetitive and rhythmic patterns of the action. In the action adventure, this 
generalised ‘rhythm-action’ aspect of game play is something that may emerge from repeated 
(and competent) play, but which is typically undermined or at least severely weakened by the 
complexity and unpredictability of contemporary physics simulation and artificial intelligence 
routines. Traditional First Person Shooters like Doom or Quake (id Software 1996), or the 
Timesplitters series (Free Radical Design 2000) for the Playstation 2, clearly have this 
rhythmic and dance-like quality built into their mechanics. In Timesplitters, this form of play 
is also explicitly and officially encouraged and rewarded through speed-run game modes and 
score-based ‘challenges’.  
 
As noted, a microworld is a hybrid between a toy and a world. However, with respect to the 
dimension of tangibility, we can conclude from the above that microworlds differ; whereas 
some require the player to take them on as perceptual extensions, others rely entirely on 
symbolic interaction. System simulators, including The Sims, belong to the latter category. 
System simulators lack the perceptual extension or prosthesis that is at the heart of the 
avatarial relationship. They do, as Friedman argues, offer an ‘extension’ of the player’s 
consciousness – and in this respect the miniature can be compared to Sudnow’s instrument – 
but this relationship is something that grows out of a sustained (and highly focussed) process 
of cognitive and systems-oriented learning; because the learning process is based on symbolic 
rather than tangible interaction, there is no way you can reach the intuitive ‘symbiosis’ with 
the computer other than via the route of intellectual and strategic analysis and planning.  
 
Sudnow’s variant of the microworld, in contrast, is all about perceptual extension. What this 
kind of world lacks is not tangibility but fictionality. It may utilise privileged mediators of 
agency (the falling block, the paddle), but these mediating loci of player action are avatars 
only in a weak sense; they do not have the capacity to become significant as models, 
projecting around themselves an environment to inhabit. The instrument is tangible as a 
whole; there is no ‘avatar’ against a ‘world’ – only the instrument, only the focussed and 
unified field of the electro-umbilical hookup itself. 
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We may also note that the notion of the avatar, unlike the instrument, implies a relative 
independence between embodied competence and world-competence. You can be a bad 
player and still be completely in tune with or re-wired by the avatarial prosthesis. When 
playing GoldenEye 007 (Rare 1997), you may be in perfect intuitive command of the avatar, 
but still have no idea what you are doing, and be nowhere near a ‘meeting of minds’ in 
relation to the game as a whole. Conversely, you could have an expert understanding of the 
goals, resources and tactics involved, but the basic configurations of the avatarial relationship 
(or the basic configurations of your own body) may nevertheless be working against you.  
The avatar revisited 
Let me sum up, based on what I have established so far, the central characteristics that define 
the computer game avatar. Sudnow’s analysis throws light on how, in computer games, 
tangible information spaces may become appropriated by players as second nature. Avatarial 
embodiment depends on this process – and this struggle – of appropriation and incorporation. 
Through the avatarial prosthesis, the player acts into a fictional world even if the physical 
movements are arbitrary (or merely metonymic) considered as gestures. At the same time, the 
hypnotic unity of games like Breakout is distinct from the vicarious embodiment of avatar-
based play. Admittedly, the humble paddle on the screen may also be seen as a privileged 
mediator in some sense (even if Sudnow does not emphasise this relationship specifically), 
but this ‘avatar’ has extremely limited capacities – all the player can do is adjust it left and 
right. More importantly: avatarhood, as a general principle of mimetic play, goes beyond the 
principle of the perceptual prosthesis, as I argued in chapter 4. The avatar is not a cursor or a 
mere instrument, but gives the player a meaningful embodied presence and agency within the 
screen-projected environment of the game. Because it is a model – a dynamically reflexive 
prop – the avatar is not just significant because of what it can do, but because of what happens 
to it. It is this vicarious body, this re-oriented subject-position, that establishes what we may 
call – following Bateson – the ‘framing’ of the fictional world for the player. Through the 
avatar, instrumental agency is replaced with fictional agency and fictional destiny; the player 
is incarnated as a fictional body-subject who belongs to and is exposed to the environment 
that it inhabits. The paddle in Breakout, or the falling block in Tetris, are able to perform this 
function only in a very weak sense; they mediate agency, but they hardly incarnate agency as 
embodied subjects that reside and act in a fictional world. They are more like buttons or 
tangents on an instrument than they are agents in an environment.  
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The screen-based avatar, like any avatar, is a perceptual extension, which is premised on a 
basic principle of tangibility. At the same time, the avatar is also a model, capable of 
generating fictional truths about what happens to it. The spaceships in Spacewar! were the 
world’s first screen-based avatars: privileged embodiments of the player’s capacity and 
destiny in a fictional world. Like Shigeru Miyamoto’ Mario, they provided alternative 
embodiment within a world of images, and connected screen-projected realistic agency to a 
broader tradition of avatar-based play. 
 
Breakout and Tetris illustrate that, even if miniature worlds do accommodate avatars, 
miniatureness as a principle puts strong limitations on avatarial embodiment; miniatureness 
demands the incorporation of the game space as a whole, as a structured totality, and it 
encourages instrumental participation over fictional re-positioning. The system-oriented play 
of SimCity or Civilization, as well as the instrument-oriented play of Breakout, are both rooted 
in the principle of the miniature world or the microworld.  
 
At the same time, whether they are tangibles or not, and whether they are miniatures or not, 
computer game worlds express, each in their different way, the paradoxical integration of 
realistic agency and rule-governed possibility spaces; they are systems that have been 
concretised as worlds. The avatar provides a unique entry point for fictional participation with 
these kinds of worlds. This entry-point is non-instrumental and non-systemic in nature; the 
avatar locks the player into a definite place or situation in the world of the game, incarnated in 
a body, and this body carries a motivation and a destiny. The ultimate significance of this 
vicarious body, this ‘hardwired’ situation, lies in fact that the avatar can die. When the avatar 
stops incarnating, when it ceases to exist, the world dies with it. In avatar-based games, the 
world revolves around the avatar, without which there would be no world.  
Four genres of the singleplayer computer game 
The relationship between the dimensions of tangibility and miniatureness in singleplayer 
computer games can be illustrated in the following model: 
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of Time ICO
Lego Star 
Wars
 
 
 
The horizontal axis indicates degrees of avatarhood in terms of subject-positioning; from the 
instrumental agency of microworlds to the fictional agency of inhabitable worlds. The vertical 
axis indicates degrees of avatarhood in terms of embodied interaction; from the indirect 
interaction of symbolic interfaces to the direct interaction of tangible interfaces.  
 
The four corners of the model emerge as ideal types in relation to which specific gameworlds 
can be positioned. These ideal types would correspond to what Tzvetan Todorov calls 
‘theoretical genres’ – generic categories that are deducted or ‘calculated’ from the assumption 
that miniatureness and tangibility are central aspects that structure our participation with 
simulated worlds. As Todorov states: “There are a certain number of genres not because more 
have not been observed, but because the principle of the system imposes that number” 
(Todorov 1975:14).  
 
Super Mario Bros., as noted above, illustrates that the difference between a world and a 
microworld is not a sharp one, but must instead be seen as a continuum between two poles. In 
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the next chapter, I will discuss in more detail the mechanisms of perceptual positioning that 
distinguish between Donkey Kong, Super Mario Bros. and Tomb Raider. The main point here 
is that stronger avatarial relationships move games further to the right on the horizontal axis; 
Pac-Man is stronger than the falling block in Tetris, but weaker than Mario in Super Mario 
Bros.  
 
The fourth ideal type, the hypermedia world, which I have not discussed so far, relies entirely 
on symbolic interaction, but is not a microworld. The player navigates a world of texts and 
depictions, which is often constructed through the combination of several different media 
forms (text, images, video, sound, music, animation). These hypermedia worlds are 
sometimes referred to as ‘multimedia’, ‘interactive multimedia’, ‘interactive fiction’ and so 
on. In the context of the model, the ‘hyper-‘ of hypermedia refers to any navigable database of 
interlinked pieces of information, even of the simplest kind. Text-adventures like Zork 
(Infocom 2005[1981]) would be the ‘purest’ example of hypermedia worlds; worlds that are 
presented exclusively through verbal presentation, unlike worlds constructed through images 
and sounds, are by definition non-tangible. The hypermedia category would also include, 
however, although in slightly more ambiguous ways, graphics-based role-playing games and 
adventure games that rely primarily on symbolic interaction while giving the player a strong 
subjective point of view within the world of the game. This combination can be found in 
traditional first-person role-playing games like Wizardry (Sir-tech Software 1981), The 
Bard’s Tale (Interplay Productions 1987), or Dungeon Master (FTL Games 1989[1987]), and 
in first-person interactive slide show puzzles like Myst (Cyan Worlds 1993) or Berlin 
Connection (Eku interactive 1999). 
 
Fictional participation with hypermedia-based computer game world, even if entirely 
symbolically mediated, is still not ‘reading’ as one would read a novel, but a simulation, 
which is premised on the principle of the model. Moreover, hypermedia-based games may 
also give fictional agency through a controllable character, who mediates for the player a 
situated and restricted relationship to a larger world that is to be traversed and explored. 
Traditional adventure- and role-playing games fall into this category, even if they do not 
present their worlds from a first-person perspective; this includes the classic text- or point-
and-click adventures from Sierra and LucasArts – like King’s Quest (Sierra On-Line 1984) 
and The Secret of Monkey Island (Lucasfilm Games 1990) – a tradition that still provides a 
general formula for many adventure-based games.  
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Fictional agency in hypermedia environments, even if premised on a minimum of model-
based simulation and realistic agency, lack tangibility. In point-and-click interaction, only the 
relationship to the mouse and the cursor must be learned in a perceptual sense, not the 
relationship to the playable character. The mouse-based interface itself performs the function 
of a perceptual prosthesis, enabling intuitive and efficient symbolic interaction (pointing, 
selecting, designating).  
 
As a commercial genre, first-person role playing games like Dungeon Master, or first-person 
slideshows like Myst, have been marginalised by the 3D capabilities of increasingly faster 
computers, just like the text adventure was marginalised by the introduction of graphics-based 
simulated environments. This means that the top-right corner of the model is considerably less 
populated today than it used to be. Non-tangible player-character relationships are hard to find 
in combination with a strong perceptual re-location of the player. Also, we could argue that 
The Bard’s Tale and Dungeon Master were in one sense heading towards avatarial tangibility 
all along – that is, towards games like Ultima Underworld (Origin 1992) or The Elder Scrolls 
III: Morrowind (Bethesda Softworks 2002) – but were limited by the lack of computer power 
at the time. This is also why I have placed them below Zork in the model; there are elements 
that point beyond the hypertextual world of words and images, approaching instead a 
navigable point of view that is fluent and tangible. The pure text adventure, therefore, ends up 
in a relatively unique position; it is purely symbolic and maximally re-centred. 
 
In other words, there is a certain kind of co-dependence between the two axes that the model 
hides: in graphics-based environments, if there is a strong re-positioning through a subjective 
point of view, there is also a certain gravity of tangibility and embodiment that kicks in, 
which works against the distinctive worldness of a hypermedia landscape. This is not an 
unavoidable law or regularity, but a dominant cultural and technological convention. On the 
other hand, as I will be discussing in chapters 7 and 8, this convention does have some 
support in phenomenological habit, in so far as a situated point of view addresses our sense of 
embodied agency more directly than a detached point of view.  
 
As the model illustrates, tangibility is a matter of degree; the puzzle-based adventure Grim 
Fandango (LucasArts 1998) is placed below The Secret of Monkey Island, because there is a 
prosthetic extension set up through the real-time control of the playable character Manny 
 135
Calavera. At the same time, this avatarial relationship is less significant than it is in the action 
adventure The Legend of Zelda (Nintendo 2004[1986]), where the avatar is more responsive 
and flexible, is routinely under direct threat by enemies, and must engage in battle with them. 
This does not mean, however, that the player’s relationship to the character (and the story) in 
Grim Fandango is necessarily ‘weaker’ or less central to the experience; on the contrary, one 
could argue that partly because of the weaker avatarial relation, there is room for a stronger 
player-character connection on a different level.  
 
In point-and-click interaction, the distinction between designating and directly controlling the 
movements of the playable character is not clear-cut, and the former is not necessarily less 
demanding on eye-hand coordination and motoric skills than the latter. In principle, however, 
we can distinguish real-time control – which simulates a physically tangible relationship – 
from merely real-time interaction, which refers to actions that the player must perform in real 
time, in order to control the unfolding actions of the avatar. A clear example of real-time 
interaction that is not real-time control would be the elaborate button-pressing sequences that 
are implemented in Resident Evil 4 (Capcom 2005b) and Fahrenheit (Quantic Dream 2005). 
These sequences are performed in real-time, are heavily action-oriented and demand fast eye-
hand coordination, but are still disconnected from any ‘umbilical hookup’ to the playable 
character.  
 
Another type of avatarial ‘bypass’ is found in the mouse-based and action-oriented role-
playing game Diablo (Blizzard 1996), which requires fast – and tactically chosen – clicking to 
defeat enemies. However, as compared to Resident Evil 4’s button-pushing sequences, action-
roleplaying interaction is more ambiguous in its relation to the principle of the avatarial 
prosthesis. Although the player uses the mouse cursor to literally select and designate where 
the playable character moves and where and how it attacks (and in this sense, relying on 
symbolical interaction), the speed of the real-time interaction, at least for reasonably 
competent players, still gives a feel that approaches a tangible relationship. This ambiguity is 
strengthened by the fact that the player can actually use the mouse to pull the playable 
character along in a fluent motion (by keeping the mouse button pressed down) rather than 
directing the character to locations by clicking on them. Moreover, this slightly ‘improvised’ 
avatarial prosthesis is also strengthened along the horizontal dimension of the model above, 
through a navigable isometric frame of view that also approaches a tangible relationship.  
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Still, the semi point-and-click interaction of Diablo – along with its particular appeal – seems 
to become a thing of the past among singleplayer adventure and role-playing games; the next 
game in the Diablo series will in all likelihood go ‘full avatarial’ by adopting a standard real-
time controlled character-and-3D-camera configuration. This type of avatar will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  
 
Certain types of non-avatar-based singleplayer games do not plot into the two-dimensional 
continuum. While the avatar (weak or strong) is the primary model for interacting with 
screen-projected tangible worlds, there are other alternatives, which abandon the notion of the 
avatar altogether, and therefore do not relate to the category of avatar-based play along the 
two dimensions of tangibility and miniatureness. In the Orisinal game Milk the Cow (Ferry 
Halim 2000) and similar kinds of browser-based games, the cursor itself is the prosthesis 
through with the player can poke and prod at tangible objects that appear on-screen. In a 
similar fashion, touch-screen technology allows the player to bypass the avatar entirely by 
touching the screen, either directly or via a simple extension (a stylus), to simulate tangibility 
with the environment.  
 
Finally, Virtual Reality installations can also be seen as an alternative to the avatarial 
approach; their aim is to escape the screen altogether and to push beyond avatarhood. Still, 
Mario demonstrates the advantages of vicarious embodiment over cursor-poking, touch-
screen or VR interfaces: there is hardly any limit to what your body can be and what it can do 
(and how it can grow), or to the number of ways in which your body can be threatened, 
rejected and destroyed. It is this kind of malleable embodiment that avatar-based computer 
game fiction is all about.  
The gameworld and the contest 
In the final part of this chapter, I will draw attention to the ludic dimension of the body of the 
avatar, and attempt to give some more context to the relationship between the avatar and the 
systemic nature of games. As explained in the previous chapter, computer game environments 
integrate the explicit rules of a game system, through the principle of concretisation. This 
means that the structuring imperatives of the game system become translated or ‘absorbed’, as 
it were, into a world of playthings. It is this playable or ludic world that the avatar ‘projects 
around itself’. Different kinds of bodies constitute different kinds of bodily spaces, and the 
body of the computer game avatar constitutes, by definition, a gameworld.  
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A gameworld is what Chaim Gingold (2003) calls a ‘possibility space’: the sum or the ‘space’ 
of the possible states of the world as a system. The possible variations in game state define for 
the player a space of possible actions and outcomes. Gingold distinguishes between three 
main dimensions of a possibility space: size (how many things the player can do), domain 
(what types of things the player can do), and, finally, density – how many states of the system 
that are interesting (2003:69). Gingold is primarily concerned with how to design possibility 
spaces for game making and story making authoring tools or ‘magic crayons’, but the concept 
of density may also be applied to avatar-based fictional worlds: a gameworld is more than 
merely a simulated environment and a fictional world; it is also made intelligible to the player 
as a possibility space, via the vicarious body of the avatar. A gameworld is, in Gingold’s 
terms, “dense with interesting results” (2003:70). The avatar embodies this possibility space, 
giving the player a point of entry for fictional participation that is situated and non-systemic.  
 
Brenda Laurel’s concept of dramatic human-computer interaction (Laurel 1993) provides a 
conceptual parallel to the notion of the gameworld. Dramatic interaction between humans and 
computers, Laurel says, hides the formal structures that define and uphold it. Like in the 
theatre, when dramatic action unfolds, the stage is all there is (1993:17). And like staged 
performances, human-computer interaction needs to have a dramatic plot; it must be carefully 
orchestrated and engineered according to the laws of drama, so that it can be experienced as a 
satisfying whole, with a beginning, a middle and an end. Dramatic action has a certain shape 
(a satisfying dramatic curve), and an internal structure of dramatic relationships and events. 
The theatre stage, according to Laurel, is the ultimate paradigm for interaction design. 
 
The individual incidents that make up Hamlet—Hamlet fights with Laertes, for 
instance—are only meaningful insofar as they are woven into the action of the mimetic 
whole. The form of a play is manifest in the pattern created by the arrangement of 
incidents within the whole action (Laurel 1993:63).  
 
As a principle for structuring make-believe, and as a metaphor for defining worldness, 
Laurel’s ‘whole action’ reflects the Shakespearian model: all the world is a stage. A concrete 
realisation of Laurel’s theatrical metaphor is the interactive one-act domestic drama Façade 
(Procedural Arts 2005). The simulation of Façade is primarily governed by the rules of a 
dramatic plot; it is a ‘dramatic machine’, which simulates a participatory dramatic process, 
and a landscape of developing relationships. Nevertheless, it is typically categorised as game 
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(although a very different kind of game), by its ‘players’ as well as by the media. This makes 
a lot of sense; gameworlds are also governed by a formal structure that gives dramatic 
significance to the player’s actions, only this structure is based on the model of the contest, 
not the theatrical stage. From the point of view of the avatar, all the world is a contest.  
 
Laurel’s notion of a ‘mimetic whole’ resonates with Salen and Zimmerman’s definition of 
meaningful play: 
 
...[Meaningful play] requires that the relationship between action and outcome is 
integrated into the larger context of the game. This means that an action a player takes 
no only has immediate significance in the game, but also affects the play experience at 
a later point in the game. Chess is a deep and meaningful game because the delicate 
opening moves directly result in the complex trajectories of the middle game—and the 
middle game grows into the spare and powerful encounters of the end game. Any 
action taken at one moment will affect possible actions at later moments. (Salen and 
Zimmerman 2004:35).  
 
A gameworld is structured as a ‘whole action’ according to the principle of meaningful play, 
and, we could add, some gameworlds are more ‘meaningful’ in this respect than others. Salen 
and Zimmerman’s description illustrates that meaningful play also implies a dramatic 
unfolding of events, a dramatic contest, which emerges from the objective conflict that is 
defined by the properties of the game system.  
 
In the article “From Game-Story to Cyberdrama” (Murray 2004), Janet Murray argues that the 
contest and the puzzle represent a structural similarity between storytelling, drama and games. 
 
Furthermore, games and stories have in common two important structures, and so 
resemble one another whenever they emphasise these structures. The first structure is 
the contest, the meeting of opponents in pursuit of mutually exclusive aims. This is a 
structure of human experience, of course, from parenting to courtship to war, and as a 
cognitive structure it may have evolved as a survival mechanism in the original 
struggle of predator and prey in the primeval world. Games take this form, enacting 
this core experience; stories dramatize and narrate this experience. (...) The second 
structure is the puzzle, which can also be seen as a contest between the reader/player 
and the author/game-designer”. (Murray 2004:2). 
 
This broad notion of the contest highlights the similarity and the overlap between the systems-
oriented concept ‘meaningful play’ and the narrower Aristotelian model of dramatic action 
and dramatic plot that governs interaction in Façade. In the example of Chess above, a 
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conflict-drama unfolds between the players, but this contest is not, we must assume, projected 
into the simulated world of kings and pawns to any significant extent. In singleplayer games, 
this dramatic contest is set up between the player and the game system itself; this means that 
there is also, as Murray says, a contest between the player and the designer60.  
 
However, the principle of the avatar changes, on the level of perception and embodiment, 
what Bateson would call the ‘framing’ of this contest. The avatar re-frames and re-centres the 
dramatic contest, taking the ‘spare and powerful encounters’ into a vicarious world. Salen and 
Zimmerman’s ‘meaningful play’ is thereby transformed into an ontological principle, which 
penetrates and gives sense to the world that the avatar projects around itself. As players, then, 
we become contestants both actually and vicariously; through the embodied incarnation of the 
avatar, these two dimensions blend and mix. In other words, the ‘recentring’ or re-framing of 
the player’s subject-position is a performed recentring. In avatar-based play, the ‘ontological 
fusion’ between the actual and the fictional is a fusion of contests, a dramatic fusion61.  
 
This also means that Murray’s trope of the puzzle becomes less central to avatar-based play 
than the broader concept of the contest – the “meeting of opponents in pursuit of mutually 
exclusive aims”. It is the contest that grounds the world of the avatar, not the puzzle. 
Consequently, avatar-based puzzle-solving needs to be embedded within a larger contest in 
order to have significance within a gameworld; if there is no larger contest, it makes little 
sense to approach the puzzle through vicarious embodiment, as an avatar. 
 
The game-based notion of the dramatic contest is a parallel to, and therefore also competes 
with, the Aristotelian model of dramatic interaction and dramatic plot; the dramatic contest 
and the dramatic plot are, from the point of view of the avatar, different ontological principles 
that seek to define what the world is about, and what ultimately motivates action. In this 
respect, the two are not compatible, although they may be combined and balanced in relation 
to each other in various ways. Typically, singleplayer action adventure games furnish their 
gameworlds with local sequences of scripted dramatic interaction, which are subordinated to 
                                                 
60 It may be added here that there is also a contest between single players, either in immediately social contexts, 
or in a more generalised form, in the sense that players always, directly (in terms of scores, numbers and 
statistics) or indirectly, compete against other players who are playing the same game. 
61 The concept of ‘ontological fusion’ between the fictional and the actual refers here to Tomas Pavel’s Fictional 
Worlds (1986), which is a central influence behind Marie-Laure Ryan’s theory of ‘re-centring’. My use of the 
concept here takes a cue from Jill Walker’s “Performing Fictions: Interaction and depiction” (Walker 2003), 
which I discussed briefly in chapter 3. 
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and do not compete with the contest on a larger level62. On a larger level, the gameworld does 
not need to simulate a ‘world’ that responds and develops according to the laws of a dramatic 
plot. Gameworlds are in one sense ‘drama simulators’ like Façade, but they are committed to 
a different kind of drama, with a different kind of rules. In Metroid Prime (Retro Studios 
2003), for example, no interpersonal relationships are addressed and developed, and the only 
conflict (and love affair) that is being played out is the relationship between the avatar and the 
environment. This journey of conquest and exploration, in all its complexity and detail, needs 
no dramatic plot.  
 
If we link the concept of the gameworld to the broader notions of play and fiction that I 
addressed in chapter 2, the gameworld unifies agon and mimesis in a way that has similarities 
with the ancient religious ceremonies and rituals that Huizinga talks about in Homo Ludens 
(1955[1950]). The dramatic contest is, if we follow Roger Caillois, a highly un-modern and 
highly uncivilised form of play. Caillois’ perspective also finds some support in the 
sociological study of sport. In From Ritual to Record. The Nature of Modern Sports (1978), 
Allen Guttmann discusses how the contests of archaic and ancient cultures, which were an 
integrated part of religious rites and ritualistic practices, have been replaced by the secularised 
and rationalised phenomenon of modern sport. As the title says, Guttmann draws particular 
attention to the aspect of quantification; a defining characteristic of modern sport, he argues, 
is the quest for, and the obsession with, records. In a similar vein, Norbert Elias and Eric 
Dunning, in Quest for Excitement. Sport and Leisure in the Civilising Process (Elias and 
Dunning 1986), also emphasise the way in which the process of modernisation has civilised 
and formalised the contest. In this perspective, avatar-based computer game worlds can be 
seen as offering a space for dramatic yet serious contest that has been closed down or 
marginalised by modern games and competitions. 
Avatarial learning and role playing 
The different ways in which the fictional and the actual contest is being merged or fused 
through avatar-based play is a topic that requires more detailed study. What I want to point 
out here is that the fusion or re-framing of the avatar implies that the process of learning and 
                                                 
62 The principles and mechanisms of dramatic scripting in the action adventure genre is a topic that would need a 
separate study, which goes beyond the scope of the present work. Half-Life 2 is a good example of a game that 
infuses the gameworld with strong elements of ‘stage-based’ dramatic interaction – especially in the opening and 
ending sequences. These elements of ‘interactive drama’ are mostly crafted into dedicated sections that 
intersperse the contest at regular intervals throughout the game. 
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the performance of skills are being re-framed or re-centred. In a gameworld, the player’s 
actions are motivated in the situation of the avatar, and the player’s actual skills are expressed 
and measured in terms of the skills of the avatar. Through the structuring of the avatarial 
prosthesis, this fusion typically follows a rule of radical transformation and amplification. 
Relatively unimpressive actual skills may translate into the most spectacular manoeuvres in 
the fictional world; for example, knowing how to synchronise a few button presses with a 
simple movement of the analogue stick means knowing how to defeat multiple enemies in an 
acrobatic and gracious way.  
 
At the same time, the actual learning process of the player maps onto the learning process of 
the avatar as this develops in relation to the challenges that the avatar needs to overcome. The 
avatar embodies, therefore, what we could call a ‘progressive mapping’ between an actual 
learning process and a fictional learning process. When the player has learned to time the 
jumps correctly, the avatar has learned to traverse the dangerous pits. When the player fails to 
perform, the avatar fails to perform; when the player improves, the avatar improves. The 
avatar embodies a motivation and a learning experience that pulls together the actual and the 
fictional.  
 
Avatarial fusion between actual and fictional skills, and between actual and fictional learning, 
distinguishes avatar-based interaction from role playing. Role playing, both considered as a 
genre (RPG) and as an element that can be added to avatar-based games more generally, is 
characterised by the way in which the character’s ‘skills’ as well as the character’s ‘learning’ 
is separated from rather than fused with actual skills and actual learning. Upgrading your 
‘skill’ in a role playing game like Planescape Torment, or in an avatar-based game that 
includes some role playing element – which most games do in some form of another – does 
not have anything to do with your actual skills as a player; it is the playable character that 
typically ‘learns’ or ‘improves’ a skill. This de-coupling of the fictional and the actual, which 
distinguishes role playing from avatar-based play, may create ambiguities or even conflicts 
when the two combine. In the FPS role playing hybrid Deus Ex (Ion Storm 2000), if the 
shooting skills of JC Denton are not developed, the player cannot be sure to actually hit what 
the crosshair is aiming at, even at point-blank range. When the two collide, role playing skill 
triumphs the skills of the avatar. 
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Equally, in role playing, the concept of ‘learning’ is linked to the character, not the avatar. In 
terms of the player-avatar relationship, the significance of character learning does not lie in 
character development itself, but in how this character development might also re-configure 
the actual properties and potential capabilities of the avatar – which it usually does, although 
typically in incremental steps. In most avatar-based games, even if not a defining feature of 
the form, the avatar is continually expandable with new capabilities as the player progresses, 
and the player is given some choice in how to prioritise between different types of 
capabilities63. Such dynamic configurations and amplifications, whether they are role-played 
as a character’s ‘learning’ or not, like any property of the avatar, are not learned in the 
avatarial sense until they are actually learned and incorporated by the player, via the 
prosthetic extension. In terms of vicarious embodiment, therefore, the ‘learning’ of a new skill 
is not in principle any different from picking up a new gun – except, in most cases, a skill-
capability will be more permanent and less flexible than a gun-capability.  
 
Role playing emphasises character and narrative, and does not need any avatar. Nor does 
avatar-based play need role-playing. Avatars may be configurable and expandable throughout 
the game, but this dynamic aspect is often flexible as well as externalised in relation to 
character and narrative; weapons, items and equipment can be utilised and managed freely as 
they are collected through the course of the game, and they do not integrate with character 
development. In action-RPG hybrids, especially in games that do not rely on point and click 
interaction, like Fable (Lionhead Studios 2004) or Deus Ex, role playing and avatar-based 
play combine in elaborate ways. In other games, like The Legend of Zelda series, Jet Force 
Gemini (Rare 1999) or Beyond Good & Evil (Ubisoft Montpellier Studios 2003), role playing 
elements are more modestly implemented but still contribute significantly to the dynamics of 
avatar development. When combined with avatar-based play, role playing accentuates and 
elaborates the dynamic and configurable capabilities of the avatar, and integrates this aspect 
with character and narrative in more detailed and complex ways than what would otherwise 
be the case. Seen in isolation, however, as noted in chapter 5, role playing is a form of play – 
and form of fiction – that is independent from realistic agency; it is essentially concerned with 
character as expressed through numbers and statistics, as a configurable and playable system, 
not as a reified body that can be incorporated as second nature.  
                                                 
63 ICO is an interesting example in this respect. The avatar in ICO is given virtually no expanded capabilities 
during the game, and there are no role playing elements that allow the player to configure and prioritise between 
different types of capabilities. 
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The role playing aspect is not reflected in the model above, which only deals with 
miniatureness and tangibility. If implemented in the model, we could imagine role playing as 
a third dimension, which reflects a concern with character and narrative independently of the 
principle of realistic agency that underpins the other two dimensions. As the placement of 
Fable in the model illustrates, character-based play does not exclude avatar-based play along 
the dimensions of tangibility and miniatureness. However it does add a new dimension and a 
different focus, which is concerned with exploring the possibility space of the game system 
more directly, freed from the implications of vicarious embodiment.  
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Chapter 7: 2D/3D 
In the previous chapter I have discussed the basic characteristics of avatarial embodiment, and 
how avatar-based games are different from instruments, system simulators, hypermedia and 
role playing games. Avatarial embodiment is premised on a combination of prosthetic 
tangibility and fictional re-positioning, and it turns the game space into a gameworld.  
 
In this chapter I will look at how avatar-based 3D differs from avatar-based 2D, and what this 
means for the notion of miniatureness. The emphasis will not be on the characteristics of 
three-dimensional graphics as such, but on the particular type of re-positioning that is made 
possible by the navigable point of view. This includes considering the major types of avatarial 
configurations that we find in 3D computer games, as well as the role and status of different 
kinds of hardware interfaces. My aim is not to debate if three-dimensional game spaces are 
better or richer than two-dimensional game spaces, but to point out some of the central 
differences in how they structure fictional participation. With the introduction of the 3D 
avatar, new kinds of spaces and experiences are opened up, while others are closed down or 
marginalised.  
The extended avatar 
Mario’s world in Donkey Kong is a two-dimensional world, and a boxed-in world; what goes 
on in the world is what goes on within the frame of the screen. As an avatar, Mario extends 
our reach into, and inhabits, a flat world. If we say that this world is not really flat – just like 
the world of classical Disney films is not literally meant to be flat – this would be correct only 
in a metaphorical sense; as soon as we start doing something, through Mario, the metaphor 
breaks down, and we discover that the actual fictional world is flat. Part of the attraction of 
Mario’s world, which we get to embody through the avatarial relation, is precisely its lack of 
the third dimension, its playable flatness. 
 
The flat world of Donkey Kong is not a universe into which we are invited to project 
ourselves or jump into. On the contrary, the world is a framed surface, and this surface 
belongs squarely to the here-and-now of the actual playing space. 2D game fictions do not 
alter the spatial relationship between me as a player and my environments any more than a 
Monopoly board or a pinball machine does. There is a fictional world, but this world is 
constituted by my relation to a flat surface in front of me, and contained within my actual 
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space, as any other delimited sub-space would be (a desk, a whiteboard). Within my actual 
playing space, the boxed-in world of Donkey Kong relates to my body as a playable object. 
The cybernetic feedback loop between me and this framed sub-space demands my total 
attention and maximum effort, and is therefore potentially captivating. To the extent that I 
manage to conquer the machine, and allows the machine to conquer me, so that we together 
get into a seamless flow of focussed interaction, the relationship could best be described as 
some sort of trance, as hypnosis.  
 
The world of the 2D avatar, therefore, is comparable to the ‘world’ of the instrument, as 
described by David Sudnow in Pilgrim of the Microworld. The instrument, considered as an 
ideal type of play, has no avatar, no entry point for fictional participation. In Breakout as well 
as in Pac-Man, because of their relatively weak avatarial extensions (the latter admittedly 
stronger than the former), the player is playing with rather than within the microworld of the 
game. Playing with (and against) the cybernetic instrument is in a certain sense a system-
oriented activity, only it is not system-oriented in the same way that you would play SimCity. 
When challenging the instrument, your primary aim as a player is to incorporate and embody 
a pattern, or a dance, if you will. This process of appropriation, whether in old-school twitch 
games or in contemporary rhythm-action games, is focussed around your own body rather 
than a vicarious one.  
 
While the avatar in Donkey Kong, like any avatar, does offer you a vicarious body through 
which your perception is altered or re-wired, the avatar itself does not incarnate a perceiving 
body-subject. As a perceptual prosthesis, it re-orients, but never re-positions the body-subject 
of the player. Through the mediation of Mario we are to a certain extent encouraged to re-
centre, to imagine ourselves as a subject within the world of the game, but this imagining is 
based on the mere extension and displacement of our locus of agency, via a puppet, to which 
any fictional subjectivity must be ascribed through mental simulation. In a phenomenological 
sense, the meaningful actions that we perform when playing with (or through) Mario are 
performed from outside the space that Mario inhabits; it is from this outside position – 
looking onto the magic surface in front of us – that we are able to see and hear what we are 
doing. Consequently, we cannot act as Mario other than through our imaginative re-
positioning, through which it is possible for us to pretend that the ‘I’ that acts is a different 
one from the ‘I’ that perceives. Through mental simulation, we can disregard our own 
perceptual subject-position, and pretend that the miniature is not a miniature. This suspension 
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of disbelief is produced through imaginative projection, riding on the back of the prosthetic 
agency that the avatarial puppet affords.  
 
However, as we know, because computer games absorb us in a flow of meaningful action, 
there will usually not be much (or any) room for this kind of make-believe. Under normal 
circumstances, the game space will demand that we relate to it as a miniature; we will not be 
inclined, for example, to explain our failure to jump a barrel by referring to the fact that Mario 
was turned the other way and could not see it coming; this response is of course possible, but 
it is not the kind of fictional participation that 2D avatars encourage. Mario is our proxy, our 
privileged plaything and extender of agency into a miniature world, and it is this remote 
relationship that grounds our participation with a fictional world. I will suggest that Mario is 
an objective or extended avatar – an avatar that we relate to, in a phenomenological sense, as 
an object among other objects.  
The subjective avatar 
In contrast, the 3D avatar, I want to suggest, is also a subjective avatar. The subjective avatar 
appropriates a navigable point of view as an apparatus of prosthetic perception, giving the 
player not just an extended fictional body, but also a re-centred perceptual subject-position.  
 
The introduction of three-dimensional spaces in computer games during the early- and mid-
nineties, and the significance of the navigable point of view, has so far not been much 
analysed in the field of computer game studies. One notable exception is Martti Lahti’s article 
As We Become Machines: Corporealized Pleasures in Video Games (2003), which 
emphasises how the ‘prosthetic vision’ of 3D computer games has changed how players relate 
to computer game worlds. Lahti’s conceptualisation of the player-avatar relationship is very 
different from the approach of Juul, Newman or Salen & Zimmerman; his concern is with the 
corporeality of player participation rather than with the functional or narrative significance 
(or lack of significance) of the avatar within the game structure. “Much of the development of 
video games”, he argues, “has been driven by a desire for a corporeal immersion with 
technology, a will to envelop the player in technology and the environment of the game 
space” (Lahti 2003:159). Drawing on Erkki Huhtamo’s analysis of the motion simulator 
capsule, which I will return to in chapter 8, Lahti observes how the screen itself has come to 
take the role as a prosthetic extension of the capacities of our body: 
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Thus, video game history is characterized by a significant shift in perspective relations 
between the player and the field of play, from the vertical omniscience of the God’s-
eye-view, through a ground-level, third-person perspective along the horizontal axis, to 
a fully subjective perspective where character and player are unified into a first-person 
movement through the virtual space. One effect of this unification is the creation of a 
stronger experiential homology between the fictional world of the game and the real 
world, where virtual space begins to seem continuous with the player’s space rather 
than sharply delimited by the frame of the monitor as I have been arguing. Our sense 
of movement and relation to the screen has thus similarly changed. 3-D games (for 
example Doom or Quake) brought with them a sense of limitless space opening behind 
the screen. (Lahti 2003:161). 
 
I will follow up Lahti’s perspective, although with a shift of emphasis from corporeality to 
avatarhood, drawing on the notion of avatarial embodiment that I have outlined in the 
previous chapters. The navigable point of view establishes a perceptual simulation of 
continuous space; it makes us believe that we act through or into the screen, and that our own 
body moves within the simulated environment. This sense of continuity and self-movement is 
the central difference between the 2D and 3D avatar.  
 
In phenomenological terms, whereas any perceptual extension does reorganise or ‘rewire’ our 
bodily space so that we start perceiving our environment differently, the 3D avatarial 
prosthesis also ‘superimposes’ a vicarious body onto the body-subject itself, setting up not 
just a different, but an alternate bodily space. This new primary space, as Lahti observes, is 
premised on an ‘experiential homology’ – a continuity between the space of the actual body-
subject and the screen-projected space of the simulated body-subject. As in photography, 
cinema and perspectival painting, the frame of the screen can be perceptually related to as a 
transparent window rather than as the framed surface of a moving image. In the next chapter, 
I will return to the question of how the game-based and avatar-based variant of this particular 
visual regime compares to perspectival images in other media. What I want to address here is 
what this transparency means to the computer game avatar, and the various ways in which the 
relationship between transparent subjectivity and objective embodiment can be configured.  
 
The primary aim of the subjective avatar is not, as Lahti seems to suggest, to unify player and 
character – which would be specific to the first-person perspective – but more generally to 
unify perception and action. The prosthetic point of view gives the player a simulated body-
subject rather than an extended proxy or magic hand; it simulates (some important aspect of) 
the player’s own natural perception. In a phenomenological sense, unlike Mario in Donkey 
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Kong (or the paddle in Breakout), the navigable point of view is not merely an object among 
other objects. In his analysis of natural perception, Merleau-Ponty’s emphasises the non-
objective (or transcendental) status of the moving body-subject:  
 
I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, examine them, walk round 
them, but my body itself is a thing which I do not observe: in order to be able to do so, 
I should need the use of a second body which itself would be unobservable (Merleau-
Ponty 2002[1962]:104). 
 
The prosthetic point of view simulates this moving body-subject, and it forces us to perceive 
and act from a vicarious point of view. At the same time, for this prosthesis to become a 
vicarious body, it also needs to present itself extensionally, as that which we can relate to as 
an object among other objects in the fictional world (as when, in natural perception, we are 
studying our own hand, for example). An avatarial point of view, in other words, is more than 
merely a navigable or a prosthetic point of view; it implies some kind of objective presence in 
the simulated environment. Any subjective avatar includes, in one way or another, an 
objective presence, an extended avatar.  
 
The subjective avatar of computer games simulates self-motion64, and it simulates our body’s 
dual nature as both body-subject and objective body. Unlike a purely objective avatar, the 
subjective avatar can never be, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, ‘completely constituted’ as an 
object, in so far that it is “that by which there are objects” (Merleau-Ponty 2002[1962]:105). 
Subjective avatars simulate natural embodiment in the sense that they unify perception and 
action. When the player appropriates the prosthetic point of view, moving and perceiving 
come together in one vicarious body. The avatarial point of view navigates the world, looking 
(and listening) for opportunities and dangers, investigating objects, peeking around corners, 
scanning the horizon. Vicarious action follows from vicarious perception, and vice versa; the 
‘I’ that acts is the ‘I’ that perceives. In contrast, while the extended avatar in Donkey Kong 
does offer the player a vicarious subject-position, it does not enable the player to perceptually 
inhabit a screen-mediated synthetic world. 
 
                                                 
64 This aspect of visual simulation is referred to, in more technical terms, as vection. See Chapter 8 for more on 
this concept. For an explanation of the concept of vection, see Prothero (1998). Prothero’s study is mainly 
concerned with the relationship between vection and motion sickness or ‘simulator sickness’ in simulated 3D 
environments. 
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It must be emphasised that the avatarial point of view is not dependent on a first-person 
perspective. In computer games, the relationship between prosthetic perception and the 
extended avatar may be articulated or configured in a number of ways. In most cases, the 
point is not to simulate the ‘configuration’ of our real bodies, but to simulate the configuration 
of some kind of body – some kind of vicarious embodiment that resonates with the dual nature 
of our natural body in a fairly stable and predictable (and hence playable) fashion. In Super 
Mario 64 (Nintendo 1996) and Tomb Raider (Core Design 1996), which are early and genre-
defining games of the 3D action adventure, the navigable point of view works most of the 
time as a computer-controlled ‘follow-cam’ that keeps the extended avatar in view. It is as if 
the camera and the extended avatar are hooked up to each other with an invisible string, and 
the player is pulling the camera along via the extended avatar. At the same time, the player 
also has the opportunity to control the point of view directly in an alternate ‘look around’ 
mode. In neither case can the camera be detached from its umbilical connection to the 
extended avatar. We may call this a dual-locus configuration – or ‘nunchako’ configuration – 
of the avatar. The dual-locus avatar allows the prosthetic point of view to be controlled either 
directly or indirectly, via the extended avatar. Following Merleau-Ponty, we could say that the 
camera takes the role of the ‘second body which would itself be unobservable’. This body 
receives its objective presence mainly from the extended avatar, who carries most of the 
burden, as it were, of objective embodiment. The competent player pulls (or pushes) the 
tangible ‘second body’ along, via the direct control of Mario, who is, in a sense, wearing his 
eyes on a string. 
 
Acknowledging the role of the avatarial camera in computer games implies that the fictional 
status of screen overlays – menu interfaces, health bars, weapons and inventory information, 
mission indicators, maps, and so on – does not need to be seen as a potential limitation or a 
challenge to fictional participation and subjective re-centring. An avatarial point of view will 
always have a minimal objective extension or presence within the world that it mediates – 
even when it is not integrated or ‘corporealized’ as a first-person perspective, and even if we 
consider it independently of its ‘hookup’ to and extended avatar like Mario or Lara Croft; it 
moves in space the way objects do (it does not cut through time and space like a film camera), 
and it has a minimum of solidity (it cannot move through windows, for example). Information 
and interface overlays or ‘HUDs’ (Heads Up Display), or any other signs (blood spills, 
raindrops) that draw attention to the screen itself as surface and action-space rather than as 
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merely a transparent view, serve to confirm and articulate the objective presence of the 
avatarial point of view.  
 
In light of Walton’s theory of fictional participation, any 3D navigable point of view would 
have the potential to realise this objective status, because any fictionally transparent ‘window’ 
is always going to have – as a matter of fictional truth – a reverse side, as it were, a fictional 
screen that faces towards fictional space just like the actual screen faces towards actual space. 
In computer games, unlike in conventional narrative cinema, this fictional screen is indirectly 
recognised through the objective status of the avatarial point of view. When, for example, in 
the third-person adventure Kameo: Elements of Power (Rare 2005), the screen gets visibly 
splattered with green troll blood, this does not challenge any fourth wall or ‘transgress’ any 
boundaries of fictional space, because the avatarial point of view was never banned from the 
fictional world in the first place. Similarly, drawing attention to the surface of the screen 
through information overlays does not in itself challenge or undermine the constitution of the 
3D avatar and the avatar’s gameworld.  
 
The notion of the subjective avatar is to a certain extent a matter of degree, and is not 
exclusive to three-dimensional spaces. Two-dimensional environments may also provide a 
travelling, fluent and indirectly controllable frame of view, even if the angle of perspective is 
fixed. This does provide a minimum sense of subjective positioning and subjective self-
motion in relation to a simulated environment. The earliest variant is the side-scrolling space 
shooter, pioneered by the arcade classic Defender (Williams 1980), although the simplicity 
and relative emptiness of the environment (as well as the suspended weightlessness of the 
avatar) makes the simulation of horizontal movement ambiguous. In comparison, the side-
scrolling frame of view in Super Mario Bros. (Nintendo 2004[1985]) is more unambiguously 
scrolling across a landscape, and this subjective horizontal movement gives a sense of travel 
and adventure that is lacking in the earlier Donkey Kong or Mario Bros. (Nintendo 1983). In 
Super Mario Bros., the world is no longer framed or boxed-in as in a traditional arcade game, 
but extends beyond the boundaries of a navigable frame of view; Mario goes travelling, 
across a scrolling panorama65. 
                                                 
65 Super Mario Bros did not pioneer the side-scrolling platforming format. This was introduced by the ‘Tarzan-
game’ Pitfall! for the Atari 2600 in 1982. Moreover, the side-scrolling frame of view in Super Mario Bros. has a 
significant limitation which reduces the possibilities of exploration and adventure: the frame cannot move 
backwards.  
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The top-down variant of the navigable frame of view, as found The Legend of Zelda: A Link 
to the Past (Nintendo 2003[1991]) – the third game in the Legend of Zelda series – goes one 
step further towards a subjective player-avatar relationship in computer games. A Link to the 
Past allows the player to actually navigate the frame of view rather than just pushing or 
‘scrolling’ it on a predetermined track as in Super Mario Bros. and similar platform 
adventures. The player explores the world in different directions through navigating, as it 
were, a proto-version of the 3D ‘nunchako’ avatar66. 
 
With the navigable frame of view we can, in a limited sense, in Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, 
“observe external objects with my body” by visually scanning or panning the environment in 
different directions via the extended avatar. Still, the world that is constituted in this way is 
two-dimensional; the more we move and act, the more securely do we establish the world as 
flat, as a ‘world map’. 2D navigable frame of view does not attempt to simulate the re-
location of the body-subject, and does not establish spatial continuity between play-space and 
fictional space.  
 
The isometric perspective, as found in role-playing games like Baldur’s Gate (Bioware 1998) 
or Planescape: Torment (Black Isles Studios 1999), as well as in real-time strategy titles like 
the Warcraft series (Blizzard 1994), goes one step further towards a fully subjective point of 
view. The navigable isometric point of view reveals a three-dimensional topography, while 
keeping a withdrawn and fixed-angle birds-eye perspective that is perfect for tactical and 
strategic play – and which requires less processing power than navigable 3D. However, 
because the player can not use the frame of view to navigate three-dimensional space (nothing 
can ever be ‘behind’ the frame of view), the potential spatial continuity between the player’s 
space and the projected space is blocked. Instead the player relates to the simulated 
                                                 
66 The scrolling top-down frame of view is also a standard format in 2D action shooters and racing games, 
although, as with Defender, these are much more ambiguous (and less adventurous) with respect to movement or 
travel. The navigable frame of view in A Link to the Past must also be distinguished from the static frame of 
view in the first game in the series, The Legend of Zelda, which is more similar to the traditional grid-structured 
screen transitions that we find in avatar-based games from Adventure (Warren Robinett 1980) to Prince of 
Persia (Brøderbund Software 1990). The difference these games The Legend of Zelda is that the latter switches 
from one screen to the next in a kind of ‘wipe’ transition, which creates a stronger continuity between the 
screens. Metroid (Nintendo 2005[1986]) – Nintendo’s third genre-defining action adventure besides Super Mario 
Bros. and The Legend of Zelda – combines grid-structured screen transitions with a sideways scrolling frame of 
view within (or across) each screen. Zelda II: The Adventure of Link (Nintendo 2004[1987]) strayed from the 
Zelda series’ top-down formula, with action and combat sections taking place in a side-scrolling platformer 
format. The Legend of Zelda series went 3D with The Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time (Nintendo 1998). 
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environment as some sort of (topographic) map, a semi-miniature that will always be 
perceptually positioned as a sub-space in front of the player. 
 
In Tomb Raider or GoldenEye 007 (Rare 1997), through the visual simulation of movement 
through continuous space, the 3D avatar captures the player’s body in a way that can not be 
imagined otherwise; ultimately, the unbalance between simulated bodily space and actual 
bodily space may make the player sick. For most players, only first-person perspective avatars 
(First Person Shooters as well as others) do actually have the potential to induce motion 
sickness. This is due to the avatar’s extra narrow field of vision, combined with the flexibility 
and speed with which the player is required to navigate the point of view. In principle, third-
person games carry the same potential, as do any games or other 3D-applications with a 
navigable camera. However, the ‘follow-cam’ of the dual-locus configuration is usually too 
withdrawn and too slow to be able to create any noticeable physical effects in the player.  
The avatarial configuration 
In avatar-based 3D, the relationship between the player, the subjective point of view and the 
objective avatar can be configured in different ways. The first-person avatar, as established by 
pioneers like Ultima Underworld, Wolfenstein 3D (id Software 1992) and Doom, is 
characterised by a strong integration between the objective and the subjective dimension; the 
navigable point of view is controlled directly, and the visible objective avatar is mounted onto 
the frame of vision as a pair of hands or a weapon. The properties that provide the prosthetic 
camera with an objective presence within the gameworld are integrated with the subjective 
avatar’s primary capacity to move, perceive and navigate; whereas any avatarial point of view 
would have a basic material solidity within the simulated environment (which a purely 
prosthetic point of view does not need to have), the integrated body of the first-person avatar 
puts flesh and bone, as it were, on this minimal objectivity. The first-person avatar has a 
particular weight, it has a set of properties and capabilities that make the avatar and the 
gameworld playable – moving, jumping, crouching, shooting, taking damage, triggering 
mechanisms and so on – and it is recognised as an agent in the fictional world in the same 
way as an extended avatar would be. In other words, the first-person point of view retains the 
full presence of objective avatarhood within itself. It also locks the player into a focussed 
tunnel vision that is optimised for precise shooting action, gives a strong sense of speed and 
disorientation, and encourages a persistent awareness of threat. This ‘camera-body’ is highly 
integrated, highly restrictive and radically situated. 
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The ‘over the shoulder’ point of view in games like Max Payne (Remedy 2001) or Hitman 2: 
Silent Assassin (IO Interactive 2002) presents a looser variant of the integrated first-person 
configuration. This configuration detaches the extended avatar from the camera, as a playable 
character or avatar-character, but keeps the camera behind the extended avatar at all times, 
always moving and turning together with it in a fixed relationship. In physical terms, it is as if 
the camera is attached to the neck of the character, not on a flexible string but directly on a 
sturdy pole. This configuration works well for fast shooter action, as the player will always be 
targeting enemies from a point of view directly behind the extended avatar. The semi first-
person point of view is not all that different from a standard First Person Shooter 
configuration. It keeps the camera pulled back to give more overview, to give room for a 
more elaborate extended avatar, and to give some room for character description during 
play67. This character still works very much like an extended gun, even if the actual gun itself 
does not have the same dominating objective presence as it has in an FPS. In the FPS, the 
gun, and not least the sound of the gun, is indeed the central playable character in the game, 
always loud and spectacularly in-your-face68.  
 
A full dual-locus configuration, as found in ICO (SCEI 2002) or Prince of Persia: Sands of 
Time (Ubisoft Montreal Studios 2003), unlike the semi first-person configuration, allows the 
player to move the camera 360 degrees around the extended avatar. In between the semi first-
person and full dual-locus alternatives there a number of possible configurations that give 
various degrees of flexibility to the camera-character relationship. The original Tomb Raider, 
notably, is relatively restricted in how the player is allowed to control the camera; its avatarial 
configuration is actually closer to the semi-FPS setup than it is to the 360 degree camera that 
we find in later games like ICO. 
 
                                                 
67 The close similarity between a semi-FPS setup and a standard FPS means that swapping between the two 
alternatives during play is relatively frictionless. In Hitman 2: Silent Assassin (IO Interactive 2002), the player 
can change to full first-person at any time, and even play the entire game in (a relatively clunky and inefficient) 
FPS mode.  
68 It is fundamentally ambiguous, I would argue, whether, in a semi-FPS configuration, the player controls the 
extended avatar directly or indirectly. In a physical analogy, we could say that the objective avatar in Max 
Payne, rather than being mounted directly on the camera as in an FPS, is instead being pushed along the ground 
by the navigable camera, which is under direct control by the player but which is being ‘dragged down’, as it 
were, by the avatar-character. This ‘reversed’ perceptual interpretation is impossible to do if the camera is 
relatively independent from the extended avatar.  
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Prosthetic perception in the action adventure was not ‘liberated’ until the current generation 
of consoles (PS2, Xbox, Gamecube), which has implemented as standard a second analogue 
stick that can be dedicated to camera control in dual-locus configurations. This flexible dual-
locus/dual-stick configuration gives a better visual grasp of the capabilities and appearances 
of the extended avatar. If we compare Tomb Raider to PoP: The Sands of Time, the latter is 
arguably more similar to a 2D configuration in the way it combines visual overview with a 
strong emphasis on the characteristics of the extended avatar. This new flexibility is to a 
certain extent a ‘return to form’ that makes the world of the avatar somewhat less immediate 
and less claustrophobic – and, we could add, somewhat more miniature. The player’s 
perception is still captured by the prosthetic point of view, but this ‘body’ is no longer tied as 
closely to the extended avatar as in Tomb Raider.  
 
It should be noted that a strong emphasis on the extended avatar does not necessarily imply 
that the avatarial configuration emphasises fast action or acrobatics. ICO is strongly focussed 
around the characteristics and behaviours of the extended avatars, but these avatars are 
primarily geared towards relatively slow-paced physical navigation and environmental puzzle 
solving rather than fast-paced combat69. The distinct expressiveness of Ico and Yorda does 
not come from spectacular movements or exaggerated characterization, but from subtle 
nuances in character animation, particularly in the way they interact with each other.  
 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the specific significance of the 3D avatar does not 
follow automatically from the implementation of three-dimensional game spaces; it is not 3D 
in itself that matters, but 3D-generated forms of embodiment. Through the avatarial 
configuration, it is possible to make three-dimensional spaces playable while downplaying or 
almost abandoning the role of the avatarial point of view. In games that encourage multi-
player co-operative play without resorting to a split-screen solution, the relative distance and 
‘neutrality’ of point of view is an absolute necessity; with a standard avatarial camera, players 
would be given very little space to play, uncomfortably locked together like Siamese twins. 
Lego Star Wars (Traveler's Tales 2005), which is optimised for co-operative single-screen 
play, also illustrates on a more general level the possibilities that emerge from de-emphasising 
the role of the avatarial camera. Players move in three dimensions, but the computer-
                                                 
69 ICO has one central avatar, but the player can also form a kind of ‘associative avatarhood’ with the second 
character, princess Yorda, through leading her by the hand, pulling her up ledges and so on. Also, after 
completing the game, two players can play co-operatively, the second player controlling Yorda. 
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controlled point of view is kept pulled back all the time, mostly following the extended 
avatars through a kind of sideways ‘tracking’ rather than chasing them along the depth axis 
while the action is going on. This kind of mildly subjective (or co-operatively subjective) 
point of view resembles the sidescrolling frame of view of 2D action adventures as well as the 
isometric perspective of party-based role-playing games. The pulled-back approach 
constitutes a less exclusive and less imposing – and in one sense more playable – subject-
positioning than what you find in other 3D action adventures. The semi-3D navigable camera 
also gives more room to play out the various expressions and capabilities of the (highly 
malleable and destructible) environments and extended avatars of the Lego Star Wars 
universe.  
Relative independence 
Dual-locus configurations imply a relative independence between the subjective and the 
objective dimension of the avatar, and a relative independence between action and perception. 
The player does act and perceive through the navigable camera, but in addition the player can 
also act through the extended avatar in relative independence from the actions of the 
prosthetic camera. In this respect, the 3D extended avatar is similar to the 2D avatar. Relative 
independence allows for a vicarious body that is less rigid, more malleable and more complex 
in its capabilities and appearances than the integrated avatar. Dual-locus configurations do not 
provide the same thrill (or anxiety) of focussed tunnel vision – and are less able to facilitate 
fast and precise aiming – but they open up for a broader variety of interactions and 
challenges. The player is given more overview, and has more alternatives in how to interact 
with the environment through the extended avatar – typically in acrobatic ways, as illustrated 
by Super Mario 64 and other platform-adventure games. For example, in Super Mario 64, 
Mario is able to climb a tree or a pole, get up in a handstand at the top, and go directly into a 
tall spectacular jump. First-person avatars, in contrast, give relatively little room for 
acrobatics, as this would easily produce intolerable – and unplayable – disorientation and 
vertigo for the player.  
 
Relative independence also means that the properties of humanoid or otherwise animated 
extended avatars are given more attention and significance also as characters that the player 
controls, and whom the player may identify with in various ways. Quite often, as for example 
in Jet Force Gemini (Rare 1999), variations and differentiations in the capabilities and 
limitations of the extended avatar are expressed as different playable characters; Juno, Vela 
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and Lupus (boy, girl and their dog) are different variants of the same avatarial relationship, 
each offering a unique ability that allows the player to perform different actions and reach 
different areas in the game. A similar kind of differentiation and variation could of course also 
have been implemented through a first-person avatar, but then the characters’ unique 
appearances and personalities could not have become a part of the avatarial relationship in the 
same way. One of the strengths of extended avatars like Mario, Link or Ico is that during play, 
they can more easily draw attention to character – and by implication, to story – than what 
merely a pair of waving hands or the barrel of a gun can do. The objective appearances and 
behaviours of the avatar as a character are particularly accentuated in full dual-locus and dual-
stick configurations, where the player can move the camera 360 degrees around the extended 
avatar. At the same time, as noted above, sometimes the barrel of a gun may be the central 
‘character’ than the player wants to focus on.  
 
The first-person configuration is more radically prosthetic than the dual-locus configuration; 
on one hand, it allows faster, more fine-tuned and more flexible control of the avatarial 
camera than what is possible with the more unwieldy ‘nunchako’ setup; on the other hand, it 
has no relative independence in relation to the player – no relative freedom to act on its own 
accord, no freedom to compromise, undermine or loosen up the avatarial relationship.  
 
Dual-locus avatars are more flexible in this respect. This flexibility applies to the extended 
avatar as well as to the avatarial point of view, both in relation to each other and in relation to 
the player. The avatarial camera retains the prosthetic relationship to the player, while the 
extended avatar can move and act in relative independence from the player’s actions. In 
Beyond Good & Evil and The Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time (Nintendo 1998) for 
example, Jade or Link jump automatically when they are close to an edge; this is something 
the player quickly gets used to (and which may be a welcome alternative to common 
convention), as there is generally a relative independence or ‘slack’ between the player’s and 
the extended avatar’s actions anyway. This space for independent action also gives more 
opportunities for the development of character, because it allows for more elaborate and 
extended sequences of movement and posture, which may be triggered by a single press of a 
button. With a first-person avatar, however, similar forms of ‘automatic’ or independent 
action – which may include, for example, jumping forwards or sideways, climbing ladders or 
even walking up to another character to engage in conversation – would neither escape nor 
loosen up the avatarial relationship, and nor would it be able to convey anything about 
 157
character; in a first-person configuration, there is only one, unified avatarial prosthesis. If this 
starts moving on its own accord, it simply means that the avatar, and the player, is being 
moved – is being taken for a ride.  
 
I will return to this ‘ride’ aspect of the navigable camera in chapter 8. The main point here is 
that the first-person avatar does not acknowledge any relative independence between action 
and perception; with first person avatars, it is either full avatarial integrity, or no avatarial 
relationship at all – take it or leave it. The dual-locus avatar, on the other hand, has more 
flexibility not just in terms of how the extended avatar is able ‘roam’ within the parameters of 
the avatarial relationship as a whole, but also in terms of how the camera is able to act 
independently – even in directly unpredictable and unreliable ways. When not controlled 
directly by the player, the camera does not merely follow the extended avatar passively, in a 
fixed relationship, but is operated by the computer in a more or less intelligent fashion, with 
an aim to present the extended avatar and the environment from angles that is adequate for the 
task at hand. In Super Mario 64, this camera, when set to its most independent modus, is even 
given a personified ‘camera operator’ within the diegetic world of the game, the ‘Lakitu 
brothers’, who are, presumably, broadcasting Mario’s adventure as some sort of televised 
contest.  
 
The relatively independent behaviours of intelligent ‘Lakitu’ cameras loosen up the integrity 
of the avatar, potentially challenging the distinction between on one hand the avatarial point 
of view, which is prosthetic and has an objective presence, and on the other hand a filmic 
camera, which moves and cuts through space on its own accord, and which does not have any 
extensional body in game space. In Super Mario 64, Prince of Persia: Sands of Time and 
similar variants of the dual-locus configuration, the semi-independent camera keeps the 
umbilical string to the extended avatar intact, does not move in disembodied jumps or cuts, 
and avoids (at least ideally) unpredictable or obstructive behaviour70. The survival horror 
genre, however, is a notable exception to the general rule of predictability and control in 
avatarial configurations. The genre-defining Alone in the Dark (Infogrames 1992) and 
Resident Evil (Capcom 1996) combine a 3D extended avatar with pre-defined camera 
positions, with the camera cutting from one position to the next as the player moves along. 
                                                 
70 An exception to the rule of fluency (although not to the rule of consistency and predictability), in Super Mario 
64, is when the extended avatar is moving through doors. In these cases, the camera does not follow in a 
continuous movements, but instead fades out and fades in again at the other side of the door.  
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Whereas this configuration frames the action from a filmic angle of view, it also makes it 
noticeably harder to control the extended avatar, and gives the player a perceptual ‘prosthesis’ 
that is suitably restrictive and unreliable – in keeping with the horror atmosphere and the 
generally disempowering imperative of the genre. Rather than aiming to provide the player 
with optimal (and fluent) perceptual control, the independent and rigid behaviour of the 
camera aims instead to obstruct, challenge and destabilise the player-avatar relationship.  
 
To conclude, we may see the highly independent point of view in Resident Evil – which 
moves with the extended avatar in filmic cuts rather than as a tangible and coherent prosthetic 
extension – as the extreme dual-locus variant of 3D avatar, and the uncompromising integrity 
of the first-person avatar as the extreme variant at the other end of the spectrum. As generic 
types, they represent different ideals and principles for avatarial embodiment in three-
dimensional gameworlds.  
3D Sound space 
Martti Lahti’s concept of ‘prosthetic vision’, while drawing attention to the avatarial 
significance of the navigable point of view in computer games, leaves out the role of sound in 
prosthetic perception. Through the modelling of three-dimensional sound environments, the 
alternate space of the subjective avatar is defined in terms of navigable hearing as well as 
navigable vision; the subjective avatar has ears as well as eyes. Game designer Stephan 
Schütze explains: 
 
Three-dimensional (3D) sounds in computer games are sounds that are placed within 
the virtual world and a 3D audio engine governs their output. The 3D engine calculates 
how the sound will be heard in relation to the virtual listener. In most cases the listener 
position will be attached to the game camera. As the camera moves around the game 
world, the 3D engine outputs what the camera would hear in that location. Thus, as the 
player is viewing the game world through the game camera, they hear the world in a 
manner equivalent to real-world expectations. (Schütze 2003:173). 
 
These ‘real-world expectations’ are based in our bodies’ natural integration of seeing and 
hearing. Consequently, in games of the dual-locus configuration, it is the navigable point of 
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view that should be wearing the ears, as it were, not the extended avatar – as is also the case 
in most contemporary action adventures71.  
 
Moreover, the fact that sound environments can be navigable in themselves makes it possible 
to leave out any screen-based visual representation altogether, and still have a playable three-
dimensional game environment, as has been demonstrated by the so-called ‘audio games’ that 
have been developed especially with visually impaired players in mind72. The same logic, 
however, works also the other way around; screen-based 3D environments do not require 
sound to be navigable and playable.  
 
Nor do navigable soundscapes, as long as they are integrated with a visual 3D environment, 
need to actually distribute directional sound in physical space through stereo or surround 
sound devices (the latter which is usually referred to as ‘positional sound’). Via the screen-
based 3D avatar, the player can experience an environment of sound objects purely in terms 
of the sound’s characteristics and amplitude, as this simulates distance, reverberation, 
absorptions and occlusions relative to the player’s position. It is possible, in other words, to 
navigate a the screen-based soundscape in mono, even if it would be harder to tell exactly 
which directions the sounds were coming from (a problem that sometimes also occurs, we 
could add, in real life situations). Distributed or positional sound obviously adds a new 
dimension to tactical play, and it may enrich the experience of being immersed in a 
soundscape, but spatially distributed output is not essential to the simulation of inhabiting a 
sound environment through an avatar.  
 
What positional sound does, however, is exploiting and consolidating the integrity of alternate 
bodily space; as players, we instinctively accept that sounds from a screen-projected universe 
are emitting from beyond the screen. It would be much harder to accept distributed off-screen 
sound in for example Pac-Man (Midway 1980); it would at least be a very different (and 
possibly interesting) type of experience. The genre that definitely makes most use of 
                                                 
71 Partly due to time constraints, I have not been able to find any example in which a dual-locus avatarial setup 
places the listening position on the extended avatar rather than on the camera. However, such a consistent split 
between hearing and seeing would provide an interesting case of dual-locus subjective perception. We could 
imagine this strategy being chosen for reasons of diegetic consistency – the idea being that the player should be 
able to listen through the character rather than through the subjective point of view – but on the other hand it 
would definitely be less realistic in the sense that it goes against the integrity of natural perception, as well as 
against, I would argue, the principle of the subjective avatar as a mode of fictional participation.  
72 For more information on audio games, including a list of downloadable games, see 
http://www.audiogames.net/ 
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positional sound is the First Person Shooter, with its slightly paranoid and restlessly narrow 
field of vision. The discrepancy between visual and auditory perceptual scope adds an 
important tactical element, and it solidifies the autonomy of the action-space. More generally, 
simulated sound environments are central to the establishing of a sense of threat and horror; 
the first-person avatar, constantly facing potential destruction from any direction, has tunnel 
vision but not tunnel hearing.  
Continuous interfaces 
On video games consoles, control pads with analogue sticks established their dominance after 
being introduced by the Nintendo 64 console in 1996. The 360 degree continuous movement 
enabled by the analogue stick provided a precision and fluidity that was lacking from the 
digital 8-directional (or 4-directional) digital pad, and this advantage proved to be much more 
significant in 3D space than in 2D space. The analogue stick not only expanded the range and 
subtlety of possible action in three-dimensional environments, but it also responded more 
adequately to the spatial continuity of the new perceptual regime. When acting into 
continuous space, an avatarial connection that is only capable of mediating movement in 
discrete directions and increments becomes an unnecessary restriction, and it also forces a 
layer of abstraction onto the player’s embodied participation in the game space73.  
 
On today’s consoles, the dual-stick configuration of Sony’s ‘DualShock’ controllers – which 
were first launched in 1997 and later adopted as a standard also by its competitors – adds to 
the 3D avatar an extra dimension of realistic agency by separating locomotion from looking 
and turning. This configuration mirrors the keyboard-and-mouse interface that was introduced 
by Quake (id Software 1996) and which has become the configuration of choice on PC-based 
shooters. In first-person configurations, the left analogue stick (or keyboard) controls the 
avatar’s locomotion, whereas the right stick (or mouse) controls the avatar’s movement 
around its own axis (looking and turning). In dual-locus avatarial configurations, the right 
stick (or mouse) is typically used for controlling the camera, whereas the left stick (or 
keyboard) controls the extended avatar. Operated in combination, the dual-stick or mouselook 
                                                 
73 Because Sony initially provided the Playstation with d-pad control input only, Tomb Raider follows precisely 
– for better or for worse – this somewhat alienating logic of abstract movement. Although mostly abandoned 
after the introduction of analogue stick controllers, abstract movement in three-dimensional space has not 
entirely disappeared from contemporary games – as exemplified by, notably, the avant-garde arcade-adventure 
game Killer 7 (Capcom 2005a).  
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setup offers to the habituated player a flexible, intuitive and reasonably precise control of 
motion and perception in three-dimensional simulated environments. 
 
As explained in chapter 6, the avatarial prosthesis does not require mimetic gestures as part of 
the physical interface. Any kind of consistent movement can be integrated or ‘absorbed’ by 
the avatar, and incorporated by the player as second nature. At the same time, the continuity 
of alternative bodily space, unlike the miniature sub-space of the 2D avatar, also opens up a 
possibility for continuous interfaces, according to which we are able to act intuitively through 
the screen as a transparent window, based on pre-established perceptual habit. Classical 
continuous interfaces would be the lightgun, the steering wheel or the flight stick. 
Contemporary variants may rely on various kinds of motion-sensing (or tilt-sensing) 
equipment – which is a technology that will come built into the hardware interface of the 
upcoming Nintendo Wii.  
 
From the point of view of fictional participation, continuous hardware interfaces imply that 
mimetic gestures become part of the simulation. Continuous interfaces are in this sense also 
fictionalised interfaces. However, continuous physical interactions are not to be confused with 
gestural simulations, or gestural games of make-believe, as described in chapter 4; they are 
not independent mimetic gestures that would in some way be in dialogue with the events on 
the screen, but are integral to model-based make-believe, integral to the acting into a screen-
projected simulated environment.  
 
Continuous interaction is accommodated by the 3D avatar, which is premised on the 
simulation of continuous space. However, as pointed out in chapter 6, mimetic gestures must 
either be limited to a metonymic function – as exemplified by the shoulder or ‘trigger’ buttons 
on modern controller pads, which in a limited sense may give the player the feel of handling a 
handgun – or they must be otherwise strictly limited and disciplined in the service of the 
screen-projected vicarious body. Continuous interfaces in avatar-based games can therefore 
not be directly compared to the continuous interfaces of Virtual Reality installations. In 
avatar-based play, continuous interaction is not a way of projecting oneself directly into a 
simulated world, but is filtered through and subordinated to the demands of the avatarial 
prosthesis; continuous interaction goes in the service of the avatar, not the other way around. 
The dominant imperative is vicarious embodiment, not virtual embodiment. In other words: it 
is not just the player who must incorporate the hardware interface as a prosthesis – whether 
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supported by pre-established habit or not – but also the avatar who must accommodate a 
particular set of pre-established habits, incorporating the continuous physical actions that the 
player performs.  
 
Mimetic gestures that are not subordinated to the avatar may be seen as either irrelevant, or as 
establishing separate channel for continuous fictional participation independently of the 
avatar, VR-style. – Or, as the third alternative, they may be meaningful as part of a gestural 
game of make-believe, which is a practice of imitation, performed in dialogue with the model-
based simulation of the gameworld.  
 
Through the spatial continuity that they establish, 3D avatars have the capacity to provoke 
irrelevant, yet intuitive physical actions and responses, as many will have observed either in 
their own play or by observing others; players ‘steer’ in racing games by twisting and turning 
the controller pad itself, or they instinctively lean over to peak around corners in First Person 
Shooters. These perceptually irrelevant and in this sense ‘misunderstood’ actions and 
reactions testify to the illusion of 3D navigable spaces; players react to the continuity that is 
established by the navigable point of view, which tricks the player into responding as if there 
was no actual physical interface, and if there was no avatarial relation.  
 
Martti Lahti reads this phenomenon as a general characteristic of the corporealized 
‘cybernetic loop’ between the player and the computer, and as a symptom of the desire to blur 
the distinction between player and avatar (Lahti 2003:163). However, while this interpretation 
does address the unique nature of avatar-based 3D as distinct from two-dimensional game 
spaces, it fails to distinguish, I would argue, between corporeal immersion on a general level 
– which would be a ‘delirium of virtual mobility’74 that applies equally whether we are 
actually in control of our vicarious body or not, and whether we are playing a game or not – 
and the more specific principle of avatarial embodiment. Misunderstood continuous 
interaction, I will suggest, is a mark of what we may call an immature avatarial relationship. 
This is a perceptually continuous and tangible relationship in which the player has yet not 
been (or does not want to be) properly trained and disciplined, has not yet incorporated the 
vicarious body as second nature, and has therefore not yet adequately ‘de-learned’ the 
inclinations of pre-established bodily habit. The competent player, on the other hand, 
                                                 
74 (Lahti 2003:163) 
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intuitively channels every action and every movement through the avatar, rather than 
attempting to throw himself or herself directly into screen-mediated space. The competent 
player, disciplined by the avatar, does not respond to the illusion75. 
  
Through various types of motion-sensing or motion-detecting technology, continuous 
interaction into three-dimensional simulated spaces does not need the principle of the avatar. 
Bypassing or downplaying the avatar gives more freedom to incorporate continuous 
interaction independently of avatarial constraints and demands; it allows more space for 
mimetic gestures that are interesting and fun in themselves, and which may also be more 
easily accessible. The motion-capturing EyeToy technology for the Playstation 2 avoids the 
restrictions of avatar-based play by projecting an image of the player’s own body on the 
screen. With the introduction of the Nintendo Wii console we will see a greater variety of 
continuous interfaces that bypass or challenge the principle of the avatar, as well as probably 
also new ways of attempting to incorporate metonymic gestures into high-investment 
avatarial relationships.  
 
Gestural make-believe may emerge from the particular dynamics of a given playing situation, 
but it will also be, we must presume, aided and encouraged by immature and physically 
laborious avatarial relationships. Gestural make-believe is about playing along, engaging in 
mimetic dialogue with what goes on in projected space; when playing GTAIII with friends, 
for example, we may adopt a suitably gangsta’ style of talking, along with the appropriate 
bodily postures. In some cases, this kind of dialogue is also embedded in or encouraged by the 
hardware interface itself, as would be the case with the Resident Evil 4 ‘Chainsaw Controller’ 
for the Gamecube, which is shaped like a (blood-stained) chainsaw but which functions just 
like a regular Gamecube controller76. In contrast, handling the steering wheel in a racing game 
like Gran Turismo (Polyphony Digital 1998) does not encourage gestural make-believe 
(unless very immaturely performed), because it is integral to the perceptual interaction of 
play; the player’s driving is no more an act of ‘imitation’ or ‘dialogue’ than the player’s 
looking and hearing within the game space. 
                                                 
75 This does not mean, of course, that competent players cannot engage in various forms of gestural simulation 
while they play. However, competent players do not misunderstand in terms of how they should be able to act 
into the screen-projected simulated environment. A competent FPS player, for example, is not going to 
involuntarily lean over to peek around corners, or attempt to physically duck a bullet.  
76 For an illustrative image of the RE4 Chainsaw Controller, see 
http://www.eurogamer.net/article.php?article_id=57928 (accessed 15 April 2006). 
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Finally, 2D interfaces may also have a gestural fictional significance, in so far as they require 
physical actions that also simulate something independently from the how they are acting 
onto the surface of the screen. A classical example of a fictionalised interface in 2D gaming 
can be found in the popular top-down arcade racing game Super Sprint (Atari Games 1986), 
which was fully equipped with steering wheel, gearstick and pedals. This interface adds a new 
dimension of fictional participation – a gestural simulation that acts in dialogue with the flat 
fictional world that the avatar inhabits. 
Mouselook 
As the example of the shoulder ‘triggers’ on console pads illustrates, metonymic interfaces 
are a matter of degree, and in some cases a matter of interpretation. The contemporary console 
interface, I would argue, has a stronger continuous resonance with the 3D avatar than the 
dominant PC-based interface. In games of the action adventure category, the analogue sticks 
are hardly superior to the keyboard and mouse interface in terms of precision and 
functionality – depending, to a certain extent, on whether we are talking about first-person or 
dual-locus avatars – but they structure our physical interaction in a way that is more 
continuous (or at least less discontinuous) with simulated subjective space. The mouse 
interface is more ‘continuous’, we could say, with two-dimensional space, and is therefore 
perfect for on-screen action; the mouse translates our movements on a physical surface – in a 
‘mystical transformation’, in Sudnow’s terminology – into movements on the screen surface. 
In the ‘mouselook’ interface that was (somewhat hesitatingly) established with Quake, this 
transformation from surface onto surface is de-learned and re-incorporated into looking and 
turning in three dimensions. In other words: a physical interface that is discontinuous and 
counterintuitive in terms of pre-established habit nevertheless becomes second nature, via the 
principle of the avatar.  
 
Still, I would argue that there will always be in the mouse-based interface a remnant, or a 
memory, as it were, of surface action, of point and click, and that it therefore retains an 
ambiguity in terms of perceptual interaction77. This is especially the case in First Person 
Shooters like Quake, where fluent and precise movement across the surface of the image 
enables a faster and more efficient avatarial relationship. At the same time, high-powered 
                                                 
77 A far less moderate variant of such surface-oriented physical action would be, quite simply, a direct touch-
screen interface, which would arguably be a paradox if applied to avatar-based 3D environments. 
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‘surface action’ also reflects, to a certain extent, a relative independence from avatarial 
constraints; via the mouse-controlled point of view, centred in the crosshairs on the screen, 
the competent player can turn 180 degrees in an instant, and aim anywhere with pixel 
perfection in a split second, almost without friction – almost as if the avatar had no objective 
presence within in the simulated environment. A thumb-operated analogue stick, in contrast, 
is not the natural or optimal choice for navigating crosshairs or a cursor on a framed surface ( 
– as any mouse-less laptop user can verify), and is therefore considerably less ambiguous with 
respect to the construction of space. With the right-hand analogue stick, the player actually 
has to ‘travel’ the distance of a 180 degree turn, with the limitations on speed and accuracy 
that embodied presence can be expected to produce. The player’s inefficient actions via the 
right-hand stick are therefore not so much hooked up to the crosshairs directly as to the 
simulated vicarious body of the avatar, a body which – in the case of shooters – is centred 
around the presence of the navigable gun. We could say that, whereas the PC player pulls the 
gun around with the crosshairs, the console player pushes the crosshairs around with the 
gun78.  
Rumble 
As a standard element of the contemporary avatarial hardware interface, the significance of 
tactile ‘force-feedback’ vibration technology should also be acknowledged. The idea of force 
feedback – introduced by Nintendo in 1997 as a an accessory ‘rumble pak’ that fitted into the 
socket on the N64 controller79 – is to give the player an extra sense of tangibility and 
physicality through vibrations that are synchronised with events on the screen. These (usually 
short) bursts of vibration give tactile response to the player’s hands when the avatar is 
subjected to rough contact or damage, when the gun is being fired, when the floor under the 
avatar’s feet is vibrating and so on. This possibility to give physical feedback is most 
successfully exploited in racing games and shooters, as a way to accentuate and enhance the 
aggressive physicality of the avatar (the gun, the vehicle). Tactile feedback does not create 
                                                 
78 According to the same logic, the inverted mouse interface would have to be placed somewhere in between the 
gun-directed analogue stick and the crosshairs-directed (non-inverted) mouse. Playing inverted keeps the speed 
and accuracy of surface navigation, while still establishing a continuous relationship to the avatar by simulating 
the leaning forward to look down, and leaning backward to look up. This parameter of physical simulation 
would of course also apply to the analogue stick interface. Moreover, I would argue, in both interfaces, the 
continuity implied by the inverted axis (pulling up, pressing down) has more significance with longer guns – in 
other words: the non-inverted axis may qualify as continuous when shooting with a pistol, but takes on a flavour 
of surface action when operating, say, the barrel of a tank. 
79 Immersion introduced their ‘force feedback’ technology for PC controller pads shortly prior to Nintendo’s 
launch of the ‘rumble pak’, but it was definitely the latter that made the bigger impact on the market. 
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the sense of tangibility, but is rather implied by it and confirms it; or as Martti Lahti observes, 
“[Tactile feedback] literalizes the implied bodily sensations conveyed through visual and 
sonic effects” (Lahti 2003:162). 
 
This is why a highly unsophisticated and generic ‘rumble’ sensation works just fine, in spite 
of its indiscriminating simplicity; the perceptual significance of each rumble is defined by the 
simulated action or event as a perceptually meaningful whole, not by the distinct quality or 
shape of the vibration itself80. In particular, the rumble function responds naturally to the 
presence of imposing sounds in the simulated environment; the generic vibration of the 
controller pad simulates the sound waves’ physical impact through continuous space. This 
close perceptual relationship between sound vibration and tactile vibration is key to the 
distinctive feel of force feedback in First Person Shooters.  
 
The perceptual role of tactile feedback in the FPS is premised on the 3D avatar’s simulated 
continuity of bodily space; it plays on and consolidates the integrity of the simulated body-
subject. In the FPS as well as in racing games, integrity and continuity is accentuated by 
tunnel vision and fast movement along the depth axis. Tactile feedback is therefore easily 
appropriated by the player as second nature and therefore invisible and not paid attention to; 
once you get used to rumble, something feels wrong when it is taken away; the controller pad 
feels dead in your hands81.  
 
We may of course also imagine a ‘rumble’ function being implemented in 2D environments – 
for example in arcade shooters like Robotron: 2084 (Williams 1982) – but the general rule as 
stated above would still apply: tactile feedback consolidates or ‘literalises’ a sense of 
tangibility that is already there. In 2D environments, this tangibility constitutes a flat 
microworld, coming alive in front of the player on a magically framed surface. 2D force 
                                                 
80 – That said, for the purpose of first-person shooting, some variants and instances of force-feedback may 
admittedly appear more dissatisfyingly ‘woollen’ than others. 
81 At the moment of writing, Sony has announced that the new PS3 controller will not include any force-
feedback functionality at all, instead replacing it with a tilt controller function. This is a significant departure, I 
would argue, in hardware interface conventions for console games. It remains to be seen whether this is actually 
going to be a success, or if Sony will be forced to produce a second version of the controller pad that re-
introduces the force feedback. In light of the general argument that I am making in this chapter, the lack of force 
feedback may not be a dramatic loss, but it will affect the experience in a negative way – in particular in racing 
games and shooters, in which players have gotten used to (although not necessarily paying much attention to) 
continuous tactile feedback. My guess is, therefore, that the PS3 console, in these two commercially important 
genres, will loose out to its competitors as far as multi-platform titles are concerned, unless the force-feedback is 
re-introduced.  
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feedback, in other words, would further consolidate the flatness and the miniatureness of the 
gameworld. 
The 3D avatar defined 
In the following I will conclude by summing up the specific characteristics of the 3D avatar, 
as these are rooted in the more general principles of the computer avatar that I have outlined 
in chapter 6.  
 
The 3D avatar the is a particular type of avatar, a subjective avatar, which mediates fictional 
embodiment in a more radical sense than the purely extended avatar of 2D gameworlds. 
Through the appropriation of the navigable point of view as an apparatus of prosthetic vision, 
hearing and movement, the 3D avatar rejects the miniatureness and flatness of the framed 
surface, and mediates embodied interaction through continuous space. This prosthetic 
continuity unifies perception and action, and constructs a vicarious body that reflects the dual 
nature of the body as both subject and object in the world that it inhabits. This simulated 
body-subject, which situates us perceptually and objectively within the gameworld, is the 
central prop in avatar-based 3D as a fictional form.  
 
In contrast, the 2D extended avatar mediates embodied interaction into a miniature world; it is 
a puppet, an magic hand, which relies on mental simulation in order to mediate for the player 
a fictional subject-position. This act of mental re-centring is disconnected from how the 
player perceives and acts in the game space, and hence does not help the player to actually 
play the game.  
 
In avatar-based 3D, the interdependencies between the avatarial point of view, the extended 
avatar and the player can be configured in a number of ways, from the maximum integrity of 
the first-person avatar in GoldenEye 007 to the full dual-locus and dual-control avatar in ICO. 
Whereas the first-person avatar is radically situated and radically prosthetic, the dual-locus 
avatar allows a varying degree of relative independency between player, the extended avatar 
and the intelligent follow-cam. This makes avatarial embodiment looser and more flexible, 
and lends itself better to the elaboration of character and story during play. 
 
The navigable (or scrollable) frame of view that can be found in 2D games like Super Mario 
Bros. or The Legend of Zelda: A Link to the Past, and the isometric perspective of Diablo, can 
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be seen as a proto-forms of the dual-locus configuration; even if they lack the perceptual 
continuity that negates the miniature, their dynamic point of view still provides a degree of 
unity between action and perception, between the ‘I’ that travels and the ‘I’ that perceives.  
 
Unlike miniature spaces, the spatial continuity of the 3D prosthesis invites physical 
interaction through continuous hardware interfaces. For the same reason, whereas miniature 
surfaces encourage direct touch, the 3D navigable point of view strongly discourages it82. At 
the same time, because avatarial embodiment is about vicarious interaction rather than 
continuous interaction, avatar-based play is counterintuitive with respect to the spatial 
continuity of prosthetic vision; in a mature avatarial relationship, any mimetic gestures must 
be rigidly disciplined by and incorporated into the body of the avatar. Undisciplined 
continuous interaction, unless simply rendered irrelevant, will either set up a space for 
alternative continuous interaction – undermining or bypassing the avatar – or it may take on a 
new significance as part of a gestural simulation, which is performed in dialogue with what 
goes on in the gameworld. Fictionalised interfaces in 2D games, because miniature worlds do 
not establish spatial continuity, are by definition gestural and dialogical rather than 
continuous.  
 
The modelling of three-dimensional sound objects and soundscapes contributes to the 
constitution of the vicarious body of the avatar; it integrates prosthetic vision and prosthetic 
hearing, and gives the avatar ears as well as eyes. In addition, the 3D avatar is also often 
given a certain degree of tactile perception through the implementation of force-feedback 
technology in the hardware interface, which confirms and consolidates the tangibility of the 
gameworld. Because tactile perception is channelled through and integrated with the 
perceptual apparatus of the avatar, mostly any unspecific rumble will do. 
 
The currently dominant console controller interface, the dual analogue stick gamepad, is 
primarily tailored to avatar-based play in three-dimensional environments; it allows for 
precise, flexible and sustained avatarial control while also being able to incorporate a certain 
degree of metonymic continuity as well as certain degree of tactile feedback. The PC-based 
mouse interface, on the other hand – which is more general-purpose – creates an interesting 
                                                 
82 In this respect, it could also be argued that lightguns, though a seemingly perfect example of a continuous and 
‘realistic’ 3D interface, are actually highly ambiguous in their relationship to the projected world of the avatar, as 
they operate – albeit indirectly – on the screen rather than through it, much like a touch-screen interface.  
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ambiguity with respect to the integrity of avatarial space (although in a moderate sense), not 
because it is non-continuous or arbitrary, but because it is continuous in relation to two-
dimensional surfaces.  
Self-contained fictions 
The perceptual continuity of the 3D avatar appropriates play space in a way that the two-
dimensional playable surface does not. When we play, whereas 2D worlds are being 
subsumed as a framed sub-space or a micro-space within the space of play, the 3D avatar does 
not recognise any space for fictional participation outside the projected world that it inhabits, 
and it does not recognise actions and responses (voluntary or involuntary) that do not act into 
projected space. This means that play space is subordinated to the integrity of the gameworld 
as a self-contained and playable ‘work world’. As argued in chapter 5, the principle of the 
work world is not compatible with the automaton as a model for fictional participation; when 
the world of the avatar is all there is, the player is given no position from which to engage in 
make-believe dialogue with the animated machine.  
 
Playing Super Mario 64 or Half-Life (Valve 1998), therefore, is all about discipline, about 
getting a grip on yourself; you learn to filter and extract your playful mastery and self-
expression through the regime of the avatar. The stronger the perceptual simulation, and the 
stronger the avatarial discipline, the less space there is for off-screen fictional participation. In 
this sense, the 3D avatar is more restrictive than the 2D avatar. The world of the radically 
subjective avatar is, we might say, tangible yet untouchable. 
 
At the same time, Lego Star Wars illustrates that 3D action adventures may still choose to de-
emphasise the avatarial point of view, emphasising instead a more detached playability that 
approaches the miniatureness of 2D game spaces. This semi-2D approach also implies that the 
separation between the avatar’s gameworld and actual play space is far less rigid and more 
permeable – not just as a matter of ‘immature’ avatarial relationships, but as a result of the 
avatarial configuration itself, which almost allows you to touch the screen. 
 
Finally, I want to add that the uncompromising integrity and restrictive embodiment of the 3D 
avatar also carries with it a built-in sense of threat and anxiety that framed miniature worlds 
cannot produce. As Chaim Gingold points out, the stable and authoritative ‘fourth wall’ that 
separates the miniature from the actual world provides the player with absolute control and 
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absolute comfort; the miniature garden is not a threatening place. It is confined in a snow 
globe, behind the screen. A horror version of The Sims, for example, would not be very 
horrifying, merely amusing; nor are there any chances of involuntary perceptual reactions, 
motion-sickness or other vertiginous pleasures. Microworlds are ‘‘miniature, malleable and 
safe’ (Gingold 2003:26). The world of the 3D is different, although some avatarial 
configurations are ‘safer’ than others. Strong perceptual re-orientation attacks the boundary 
between simulated world and corporeal reality. This co-opting of bodily space encourages a 
certain kind of seriousness, and accentuates the persistent threat of hostile environments.  
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Chapter 8: The avatarial camera 
The 3D avatar represents a particular type of avatarhood as well as a particular type of 
computer-mediated visuality and spatiality. Through computer games, avatar-based 3D has 
emerged as a recognisable and fairly stable cultural form, and as a distinctive paradigm of 
human-computer interaction. In this chapter I will focus on the role of the avatarial camera, 
and contextualise the cinematic aspect of avatar-based 3D within a broader field of new media 
and new media discourse. The avatarial camera draws heavily on the perceptual habits and 
conventions of cinema and 3D animation, but is at the same time rooted in the principles of 
realistic agency and vicarious embodiment. Through the avatarial camera, established 
traditions and imperatives of cinematic realism and cinematic corporeality are being re-
appropriated as a means to inhabit a gameworld.  
 
Theoretically, a central point of departure in this chapter will be Lev Manovich’s comparative 
study of digital aesthetics and digital genres in The Language of New Media (2001), a study 
that does pay some attention to the specific nature of visuality and interaction in 
contemporary 3D computer games, though admittedly in a generalised and tentative fashion. 
A central concern for Manovich is what he calls the ‘cultural interfaces’ of computer-based 
media. The cinematic camera that has been adopted as a standard convention of 3D computer 
animation is one such ‘cultural interface’; it defines a language or a grammar for how 
“computers present and allow us to interact with cultural data” (Manovich 2001:70).  
 
My discussion in this chapter is indebted to Manovich’ analysis of the role of the cinematic 
camera in 3D computer animation, and his account of how ‘synthetic realism’ draws on and 
differs from the realism of live action cinema. Manovich’ claim that navigable 3D 
environments should be understood as a distinct cultural form, which is related to a particular 
kind of (cinematic) cultural interface, is part of what has motivated my interest in avatar-
based 3D. At the same time, avatar-based navigable space excludes forms and ‘interfaces’ that 
are included in Manovich’ less game-specific and more software-oriented account. For 
example, a game like Zoo Tycoon (2001) definitely has navigable space, but does not rely on 
avatar-based spatial interaction, or at least does so to a very limited extent.  
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The simulated camera 
3D computer animation, according to Manovich, is a central and defining cultural form of 
computer-based media. This cultural form has adopted from cinema the mobile camera as its 
general interface: 
 
Originally developed as part of 3-D computer graphics technology for such 
applications as computer-aided design, flight simulators, and computer movie making, 
during 1980’s and the 1990’s the camera model became as much of an interface 
convention as scrollable windows or cut-and-paste operations. It became an accepted 
way of interacting any data represented in three dimensions—which in computer 
culture means literally anything and everything—the result of a physical simulation, an 
architectural site, the design of a new molecule, statistical data, the structure of a 
computer network, and so on. As computer culture gradually spatializes all 
representations and experiences, they are subjected to the camera’s particular grammar 
of data access. Zoom, tilt, pan, and track—we now use these operations to interact with 
data spaces, models, objects, and bodies. (Manovich 2001:80). 
 
It is this basic form of spatialisation that distinguishes Quake, Super Mario 64 and Tomb 
Raider from their predecessors. Based on the mathematical modelling of spatial properties, 
the computer is able to simulate three-dimensional space as seen through a framed, dynamic 
point of view. This dynamic point of view is automatically generated and drawn as a two-
dimensional moving image on a plane of projection, imitating the kind of visual perception 
that we are familiar with from the cinematic camera.  
 
When adopting the cinematographic image as their main interface to the world of the game, 
computer games inscribe themselves into the historical tradition of the perspectival image, 
where, as explained by Leon Battista Alberti, Albrecht Dürer and Leonardo da Vinci, the 
canvas or the screen is seen as a transparent window onto the world83. This way of looking at 
the world is automated by the photographic and cinematographic apparatus, and imported into 
contemporary computer games as a simulated camera. Through the mathematical models of 
projective geometry, this camera is able to draw the image of a three-dimensional object as it 
would appear from any direction.  
 
Hence, in 3D computer animation, mathematically modelled environments become 
perceptually accessible to us in a way that is similar to how we are used to experiencing 
                                                 
83 Alberti (1972), Damisch (1994). 
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physical environments: not as animated moving images, but as autonomous spaces and 
objects shot by a camera, projected through a camera lens onto a two-dimensional plane. The 
resulting image is distorted as compared to how the world appears to our eyes, but we have 
gotten used to looking at the world in this way, and accept it as realistic and natural. Visual 
realism in 3D animation, therefore, is premised on cinematic vision.  
Synthetic realism 
Perspectival plane projection has become, in Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, a perceptual skill 
or habit in our culture. A broad theoretical tradition offers various historical and critical 
interpretations of how this ‘scopic regime’ in art and visual culture changes not just ways of 
seeing but also ways of thinking and understanding84. In film studies more specifically, we 
can roughly distinguish between two opposing interpretations of the cinematic image. Andre 
Bazin (1967) emphasises the realism that follows from the camera’s indexical relation to the 
world: because something has been in front of the camera, and has been captured by it, the 
cinema screen, like Alberti’s window, allows us to perceive the world, in a basic 
phenomenological sense, directly and naturally. According to Bazin, filmmakers should 
accentuate and exploit this ontological transparency and indexicality rather than working 
against it by drawing attention to the artistic language of the image itself.  
 
On the other hand, according to the perspective of so-called ‘apparatus theory’ in critical film 
studies, Bazin’s ideal realism must be seen as no more than yet another historically and 
culturally contingent articulation of the natural. There is no ‘realism’ in the way the notion of 
‘Alberti’s window’ would lead us to believe; there is only – in Jean-Louis Commoli’s 
terminology – a reality effect, a particular way of constructing and sustaining a code of 
‘natural’ vision. The code for what counts as ‘realistic’ is produced by the (invisible) material 
and social conditions of film production, and the history of the development of this reality 
effect is discontinuous and uneven (Comolli 1980). In a similarly materialist (or anti-idealist) 
approach to the ‘apparatus’ of film production and film viewing, Jean-Louis Baudry (1986), 
drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis and Louis Althusser’s ideological critique, argues that 
the relationship between the camera, the screen and the viewer is an ideological relationship 
rather than an indexical or phenomenologically ‘true’ relationship. In the interpretation of 
                                                 
84 A central text that has influenced this tradition is art historian Erwin Panofsky’s essay Perspective as Symbolic 
Form (1991[1927]). See Kemp (1990), Bryson (1991), Damisch (1994) and Jay (1988). 
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Baudry and others, the screen is not conceptualised as a window, but as a mirror, into which 
the subject projects its own unified (and false) self85.  
 
Even if 3D graphics re-actualises the relationship between ideology, realism and the 
cinematic image, Lev Manovich argues, it does not merely reproduce the established codes 
and conventions cinema. What he calls the synthetic realism of computer-generated 3D 
environments has its own white spots and favoured reality effects; certain codes and markers 
have been privileged over others, depending on the particular challenges that have been faced 
by military and entertainment simulations. Manovich also emphasises that the images of 3D 
graphics, as compared to the cinematographic image, appear to us as too real unless they are 
consciously ‘degenerated’ to simulate things like limited depth of field or motion blur. It is 
therefore easier to produce a sense of utopian hyperrealism than traditional cinematic realism. 
This hyperrealism, Manovich argues, with particular reference to Jurassic Park, can be seen 
as a postmodern variant of socialist futuristic realism. Synthetic realism is a perfect and super-
human vision: 
 
It is the vision of a computer, a cyborg, an automatic missile. It is a realistic 
representation of human vision in the future when it will be augmented by computer 
graphics and cleansed of noise. It is the vision of a digital grid. Synthetic computer-
generated imagery is not an inferior representation of our reality, but a realistic 
representation of a different reality (Manovich 2001). 
 
Manovich sees this ‘different reality’ as an essential quality of synthetic realism; the 3D 
image is not just synthetically produced, but it also produces a synthetic reality. The notion of 
the ‘augmented’ super-human vision connects to theoretical ideas around the concepts of the 
post-human and the cyborg, which are reflected in Ted Friedman’s analysis of ‘cyborg 
consciousness’ as discussed in chapter 5 – only this time with an emphasis on visual 
(hyper)realism rather than on the incorporation of a computerised system through play. 
 
On a more general level, Manovich analysis of the utopian dimension of synthetic realism 
also resonates with Umberto Eco’s and Jean Baudrillard’s broader discussion of the 
‘hyperreal’ in contemporary (American) consumer culture. In the essay Travels in 
                                                 
85 A similar psychoanalytic perspective, although in a stronger semiotic interpretation, is presented by the third 
main figure of the ‘apparatus’ theorists, Christian Metz. See Metz (1982). See Mulvey (1986) for an influential 
feminist approach. 
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Hyperreality (Eco 1986), Umberto Eco uses the idea of the hyperreal or ‘the absolute fake’ to 
describe the replica worlds of theme parks and tourist attractions, which are environments that 
are more exciting and also in a sense more real than what they replicate. Baudrillard’s notion 
of hyperrealism in “The Precession of Simulacra” (Baudrillard 1994) expresses a similar idea. 
More radically than Eco (and more ambiguously), Baudrillard argues that the distinction 
between the authentic and the replica in media-saturated consumer culture has collapsed 
altogether; there is no longer a distinction between the real and that which imitates the real, 
between the terrain and the map; when the copy replaces the original, we can longer talk of 
copies and originals.  
 
The hyperrealism of synthetic realism can also, as suggested by Lister et al. (2003), be 
conceptualised as a form of spectacular realism. ‘Spectacular realism’ addresses the 
paradoxical nature of the computer-generated image; it presents a photographic image of 
something that was never photographed, a faked but still entirely convincing indexicality. The 
notion of the spectacularly real also highlights a set of dominant rhetorics and understandings 
that surround 3D animation and cinematic CGI effects, and situate these discourses in a 
broader historical context of spectacular entertainment86.  
 
3D animation has brought a new visual regime and a new concept of realism into computer 
games. Like cinema, the 3D avatar defines a subject-position that is perceptually imposed on 
the player. And like in cinema, this subject-position corresponds to a particular type of 
‘apparatus’, if you will, that has been designed – and is continually being designed – to secure 
for the player a sense of realistic transparency. The central technological and aesthetic 
convention of this apparatus, in games as well as in digital cinema, is the computer-simulated 
camera, which ‘co-opts’ us into relating to screen-projected synthetic spaces as real spaces, 
and which emphasises and exaggerates this paradox through various strategies of the 
‘hyperreal’. This common visual regime implies that the fictional worlds of games and films 
overlap much more strongly than they used to do. It also implies that avatar-based computer 
games, as they leave the flat surface of the microworld, resonate more directly with the full-
                                                 
86 For a historical study of technologies, practices and discourses of ‘spectacular’ entertainment in the pre-
cinematic period, see Vanessa R. Schwartz’ Spectacular Realities. Early Mass Culture in Fin-de-siècle Paris 
(1998).  
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scale fascinations and attractions of ‘hyperreal’ modern environments like theme parks, 
tourist attractions or shopping malls87.  
 
As a way of situating the avatarial variant of the cinematic camera in relation to other 
computer-based media – including some computer games – I will look at how Jay David 
Bolter and Richard Grusin’s Remediation: Understanding New Media (1999) and Manovich’ 
The Language of The New Media define the role of cinematic transparency and illusion as 
part of our interactions with computer-mediated spaces. 
Immediacy and hypermediacy 
Bolter and Grusin’s perspective could be seen as the opposite of Brenda Laurel’s dramatic 
approach, as referred to in chapter 6. Remediation emphasises the computer’s capacity to 
adopt, re-combine and re-interpret established media forms rather than its capacity to simulate 
direct interaction. The central paradigm is not cinema, virtual reality or drama, but multi- or 
hypermedia.  
 
‘Immediacy’ and ‘hypermediacy’, according to Bolter and Grusin, are two distinct logics 
through which the computer re-mediates other media. These general principles of mediation 
connect computer media to a historical lineage of visual culture that predates the digital as 
well as the modern. They express different cultural desires, which each in their way drives the 
formation of and interaction with visual representations. The desire for transparent immediacy 
is not about cinematic realism, but is directed at the disappearance of the interface altogether 
– the invisibility of the interface, of the medium, and of technology.  
 
Virtual Reality, three-dimensional graphics, and graphical interface design are all 
seeking to make digital technology “transparent”. In this sense, a transparent interface 
would be one that erases itself, so that the user is no longer aware of confronting a 
medium, but instead stands in an immediate relationship to the contents of that 
medium. (Bolter and Grusin 1999:24). 
 
Hypermediacy, on the other hand, is a ‘cultural counterbalance’ to the desire for immediacy:  
 
                                                 
87 For a recent introduction to the literature on the sociology of tourism, including a discussion of the concepts of 
‘theming’, ‘Disneyfication’ and ‘Macdonaldization’, see Rothwell (2004). 
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Where immediacy suggests a unified visual space, contemporary hypermediacy offers 
a heterogeneous space, in which representation is conceived of not as window on to 
the world, but rather as “windowed” itself—with windows that open on to other 
representations of other media (Bolter and Grusin 1999:34).  
 
There is an important paradox, however, that Bolter and Grusin is keen to emphasise. The 
space for re-mediation is opened up by the logic of hypermediacy, which addresses our hyper-
awareness of mediation and our hyper-awareness of the work of technology. This means that 
the relationship between transparency and hypermediacy is not a symmetrical one; 
hypermediacy may include representations that are transparent. It is the logic of hypermediacy 
that “...expresses the tension between regarding a visual space as mediated and as a “real” 
space that lies beyond mediation (Bolter and Grusin 1999:41). The concept of hypermediacy, 
in other words, represents the antithesis to our quest for the disappearance of the medium, but 
it also addresses the paradox that is created by the mediated-as-unmediated. In this sense, 
hypermediacy can be seen as a more general cultural ‘logic’ or language that underpins our 
culture’s fascinations with the hyperreal.  
 
Bolter and Grusin’s concept of re-mediation is problematic with respect to computer games, 
as it tends to reduce game spaces to hypermedia spaces, and reduce play to a question of 
mediation. Nevertheless, the notion of ‘immediacy’ draws attention to a cultural desire that 
has entered into computer games – for better or worse – with the simulation of transparency 
and continuous space that the simulated camera offers. One could argue that the idea of the 
‘disappearance of the medium’ is a contradiction in terms in computer games, where the basic 
imperative, irrespective of genre, is not to loose oneself but to assert oneself; to play, to 
struggle and to win. However, the paradox of hypermediacy that Bolter and Grusin points at – 
and which can be related to Gregory Bateson’s more general ‘paradox of play’ – does not 
compete with or suspend play at the expense of immersion; the desire for transparency and 
the hyperreal may be more rigid and more ‘monocular’, if you will, than the ideals of 
distanced playfulness that are expressed by game theorists and new media theorists alike, but 
it is still a paradox that carries play. This paradox is articulated primarily on the level of 
perception and embodiment, and is being utilised to create playgrounds that are different from 
what was available before the advent of the simulated camera. As I will return to below, 
Manovich’ ‘cyborgian vision’ is one element in these new kinds of playgrounds.  
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At the same time, the attraction of the 3D avatar is not merely a paradoxical quest for 
immediacy and illusion but also – and primarily – a challenge to take on and to master a 
vicarious and playable body. This challenge, and this attraction, is about more than the look; it 
cannot be reduced to ways of seeing, neither of the illusionistic nor of the cyborgian kind. We 
may here take cue from Eco, as I mentioned above; the avatar represents way to travel in 
hyperreality – and, more specifically, a particular type of embodied travel. 
Virtual mobility and navigable space 
In Window Shopping. Cinema and the Postmodern (1993), Anne Friedberg addresses the 
mobility of the perspectival image in cinema, with the main focus on the film frame rather 
than on the film screen; cinema, she argues, combines the virtual ‘gaze’ of the transparent 
(shopping) window with the mobile gaze of the flâneur. In this way, she argues, cinema 
presents a distinct paradigm of modern visuality, a ‘panoramic gaze’ rather than the ‘panoptic 
gaze’ that is described by Foucault88. The panoramas and dioramas of the 18th and 19th 
century, culminating in the attractions of the 1900 Paris exposition, were pre-cinematic forms 
of a mobile and commodified panoramic gaze: 
 
“protocinematic illusions such as the panorama and the diorama introduced a virtual 
mobility that was both spatial—bringing the country to the town dweller—and 
temporal—transporting the past to the present. The virtual tours that these new devices 
presented were, in a sense, apparatical extensions of the spatial flânerie through the 
arcades (Friedberg 1993:90). 
 
The virtual mobility of the panoramic ‘window shopper’, in other words, is a temporal 
mobility as well as a spatial mobility. This ‘subjective timelessness’89 is most easily achieved 
in cinema, where the spectator can, in Benjamin’s famous words, “calmly and adventurously 
go travelling” (Benjamin 1969:238). The fragmentation of space and time that is implied by 
the mobile gaze, Friedberg argues, is a development that has accelerated in postmodern 
culture: 
 
Postmodernity is marked by the increasing centralization of features implicit (from the 
start) in cinema spectatorship: the production of a virtual elsewhere and elsewhen, and 
the commodification of a gaze that is mobilized in both time and space. (Friedberg 
1993:179). 
                                                 
88 Michel Foucault introduces the notion of the ’panoptic gaze’ in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977). 
89 (Friedberg 1993:177) 
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In her more recent article “The Virtual Window” (2003), Friedberg extends upon the analysis 
of the mobile frame with a more focussed analysis of the role and meaning of the window, 
both concretely and in its virtual manifestations, as this has developed through the history of 
western visual and domestic culture. A crucial development in this history, she argues – 
echoing Bolter & Grusin’s model – has been the emergence of the windows-based visual 
interface of desktop computer interaction, which substitutes Alberti’s and Dürer’s monocular 
gaze with multiple perspectives within a single frame. This new regime of multiple windows, 
Friedberg argues, represents the “collapse of the single viewpoint” (2003:347), and implies 
the emergence of a new ‘post-perspectival’ or ‘post-Cartesian’ subjectivity, according to 
which “…we can be at two (or more) places at once, in two (or more) time frames in a 
fractured post-Cartesian cyber-time” (2003:348).  
 
Even if Anne Friedberg’s account is mainly concerned with much broader cultural formations 
and developments than I am addressing here, her analysis is useful for highlighting the 
distinctive nature of avatar-mediated travel and mobility. We could say that she approaches a 
notion of ‘generalised’ avatarhood, as this applies to the history of cinema. The mobile frame 
of view defines a kind of travelling vicarious embodiment that is commodified, compensatory 
and liberating. It enables everyone to become a ‘flâneuse’ of modern life, not by strolling the 
streets like Baudelaire’s flâneur, or by conquering the seas like the modern explorer, but on 
the contrary by remaining immobile in front of the virtual window. Like the displays of the 
shopping arcades, the images on the cinema screen present a ready-packaged visual journey, a 
commodity to be consumed, a possibility to project oneself into the “elsewhere and elsewhen” 
while going nowhere.  
 
This modern (or ‘postmodern’) experience resonates strongly also with computer games, and 
with the broad category of the action adventure particularly. What I have referred to as the 
‘subjective avatar’ draws on and elaborates on the cultural and technological topos of the 
mobile frame of view, from the early side-scrolling panoramas of Super Mario Bros. and 
onwards. Also, with respect to the metaphor of ‘window shopping’, there is little doubt that 
most computer games focus their reward structure almost obsessively around the activities of 
collecting, conquering, gathering, looting, buying and upgrading. In singleplayer commercial 
games, the computer game experience is one to be ‘completed’, referring at once to a world 
that is travelled, a universe that is conquered, a commodity that is consumed, and a job that is 
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done. As has been argued by Kline (Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and Peuter 2003), Stallabrass 
(1993) and Garite (2003), the aesthetic of computer games reflects and expresses the 
commodification of capitalist culture in various ways, both as a practice of consumption and 
as a practice of modern work90.  
 
The navigable camera in avatar-based 3D, through the way it enables and forces a subjective 
and travelling point of view, embodies and accentuates these cultural resonances. When 
disciplined by the avatar, the player must allow herself or himself to be captured and 
immobilised in order to be able to travel and to conquer. At the same time, as I pointed out in 
chapter 7, we must distinguish between the navigable camera and the avatarial camera. The 
latter has also an objective presence within the simulated space, and its significance must be 
understood in a game-specific tradition of avatars as well as from a broader tradition of 
avatar-based play more generally. On the most basic level, we should note, the avatarial 
camera excludes the temporal mobility that Friedberg emphasises. The body of the avatar, 
unlike the more abstract ‘eye’ of the conventional film camera, can never move from A to B 
without travelling the distance. Whereas the camera, according to the conventions of film 
editing, is free to move in time as well as in space, the principle of the avatarial extension 
implies a time-bound and more corporeal form of vicarious embodiment91. Avatarial 
embodiment excludes, as shown in chapter 6, the ‘virtual window’ of interactive photostories 
like Myst, which is referred to as a paradigmatic example of transparent or immersive digital 
visuality by Friedberg as well as by Bolter & Grusin – and which is also a favoured object of 
analysis in theories of new media and electronic literature more generally. 
 
Like Friedberg, Manovich also identifies a certain type of ‘avatarhood’ as a cultural form, but 
his analysis is concerned more specifically with the genres and conventions of computer-
based media, including the role and significance of computer game aesthetics. 3D navigable 
space, he argues, stands beside the computer database as a ‘true cultural form’. Both 
                                                 
90 For a critical analysis of the relationship between computer game consumption and work, see “The ideology of 
interactivity (or, video games and the Taylorization of leisure)" by Matt Garite (2003). 
91 The relationship between embodiment and the cinematic camera is analysed in a phenomenological 
perspective by Vivian Sobchack in The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (1992). 
Compared to my own application of phenomenological theory to avatar-based computer games, Sobchack’s 
approach is much broader in scope, and is strongly motivated by general philosophical, existential and cultural 
concerns. Also, whereas Sobchack’s cinematic body is more of a transcendental concept, centred around the 
notion of the perceiving cinematic ‘eye’, my own analysis addresses the camera more specifically as part of a 
computer-simulated prosthetic relationship. For a general account of the phenomenological approach to film 
aesthetics, see Casebier (1991). 
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alternative forms represent “...general ways used by the culture to represent human 
experience, the world, and human existence in this world” (Manovich 2001:215). Computer 
games, moreover, are paradigmatic manifestations of the latter form. Manovich’ prime 
examples are Myst and Doom, both which are, “...genuinely original and historically 
unprecedented aesthetic forms” (2001:216). Even if they are different kinds of games in many 
ways, he argues, both are variants over the same basic formula, the same basic cultural form: 
 
Both are spatial journeys. Navigation through 3-D space is an essential, if not the key, 
component of gameplay. Doom and Myst present the user with a space to be traversed, 
to be mapped out by moving through it. Both begin by dropping the player somewhere 
in this space. Before reaching the end of the game narrative, the player must visit most 
of it, uncovering its geometry and topology, learning its logics and secrets. In Doom 
and Myst—and in a great many other games—narrative and time itself are equated 
with movement through 3-D space, progression through rooms, levels, or words” 
(Manovich 2001:245). 
 
This passage describes the central imperative of adventure that structures the player’s 
interaction with avatar-based singleplayer worlds, and connects this imperative to the inherent 
‘bias’, if you will, of navigable 3D. The imperative to go adventurously travelling governs not 
only action adventure gameworlds like The Legend of Zelda or Halo, but also it is also a 
central element in the other large category of avatar-based play: racing games. In Gran 
Turismo (Polyphony Digital 1998) or Rallisport Challenge 2 (Digital Illusions CE 2004), the 
various tracks that the player must unlock and conquer present not just new types of 
challenges and topographies but also new geographical locations and landscapes, with the 
added flavour of racing in different types of weather and on different times of the day 
(including, notably, racing under a low evening sun). This adventurous and touristy 
dimension of sport games have become much more important with the establishing of the 3D 
avatar as a new paradigm of interaction.  
Navigable space as interface 
At the same time, a generalised notion of ‘avatarial’ spatial navigation does not pay attention 
to the dimension of embodiment in games, or to the different kind of pleasures and attractions 
that games offer. You do not ‘travel’ in Myst in the same sense that you travel in Doom. We 
may follow Manovich (and other new media theorists) and consider ‘Myst & Doom’ as one 
single cultural category or genre, but at the same time we also need to acknowledge that they 
are, as computer game genres as well as in terms of what kind of player preferences they cater 
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to, almost like oil and water. As examples of visual and fictional ‘mobility’ or travel, the 
central difference between the two is not just that one is fast and the other slow, though that is 
not unimportant; whereas Myst is essentially a hypertext puzzle – a hypermedia-based ‘world’ 
– Doom presents a tangible and inhabitable simulated environment.  
 
The Myst & Doom approach to computer game spatiality reflects a general neglect of the role 
of play and ‘gameness’ in computer games (as well as, more generally, a relative lack of 
interest in computer games as an art form), but it also reflects, I would argue, a lack of 
attention to the specific nature of embodiment and fictionality in computer games and in 
computer-simulated environments more broadly. This is a general tendency in theoretical 
studies of digital media. As in Bolter and Grusin’s Remediation, the emphasis tends to be on 
some form of interplay between, on one hand, hypermedia-based interaction (‘interactivity’), 
and on the other hand the total and transparent immersion that is expressed by the promise of 
Virtual Reality. In The Language of the New Media, Manovich chooses cinema as a dominant 
paradigm rather than Virtual Reality, emphasising the interplay between hypermedia and 
cinematic space rather than the interplay between hypermedia and sensory encapsulation. This 
re-orientation has been a decisive contribution to the field of new media studies, but it also 
constructs a dualist conceptual model that echoes the opposition between fiction and action 
that we find in much computer game theory of a ‘ludologist’ bent. In Manovich’ model, the 
‘cultural form’ of 3D navigable space is reduced to a question of cinematic language. 
 
However, Manovich does also point to the more specific nature the navigable simulated 
camera in contemporary games. After briefly reviewing some of the conventions of camera 
control in the new three-dimensional games that emerged during the mid- and late nineties, he 
concludes:  
 
The incorporation of virtual/camera controls into the very hardware of game consoles 
is a truly historic event. Directing the virtual camera becomes as important as 
controlling the hero’s actions (…) In games such as this one [Dungeon Keeper], 
cinematic perception functions as the subject in its own right, suggesting the return of 
“The New Vision” movement of the 1920s (Maholy-Nagy) Rodchenko, Vertov, and 
others), which foregrounded the new mobility of the photo and film camera, and made 
unconventional points of view a key part of its poetics. (Manovich 2001:84-85) 
 
Manovich’ observation that the controllable camera may be as central to play as the 
controllable character points in the direction of what I have called the avatarial camera, which 
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is indeed the kind of camera that “functions as a subject in its own right” – either directly, as 
in first-person 3D avatars, or indirectly, via the invisible string (or pole) that connects the 
subjective camera to the extended avatar. However, Manovich seems to interpret this ‘historic 
event’ as a sub-form of the cinematic interface, as an implementation of “the grammar of the 
kino-eye” (2001:85) – as a poetics of point-of-view. The navigable camera of computer 
games is being equalled with the navigable camera of interactive cinema.  
 
Like Bolter and Grusin’s analysis of digital hypermediacy, Manovich analysis is primarily 
framed as a problem of cultural interface. Navigable 3D, accordingly, represents a cinematic 
or ‘immersive’ interface (or ‘language’) for accessing and interacting with information, with 
‘cultural data’. In digital media, Manovich argues, the cinematic interface is mixed with and 
clashes with the ‘operations’ of software interfaces: 
 
In general, cultural interfaces of the 1990’s try to walk an uneasy path between the 
richness of control provided in general-purpose HCI and the ‘immersive’ experience of 
traditional cultural objects such as books and movies (...) Cultural interfaces attempt to 
mediate between these two fundamentally different and ultimately incompatible 
approaches (Manovich 2001:90). 
 
This ‘uneasy path’ between control and immersion must be negotiated, Manovich implies, in 
any kind of computer-based media, computer games included, irrespective of genres and 
principles of interaction. This general ‘law’ of digital media is emphasised in italics: 
 
Along with surface versus depth, the opposition between information and ‘immersion’ 
can be thought of as a particular expression of the more general opposition 
characteristic of new media—between action and representation. (Manovich 
2001:216). 
 
All computer-based genres, accordingly, are characterised by some kind of negotiation or 
tension between these two opposites. Web sites, virtual worlds and computer games, 
Manovich observes, are based on the oscillation between action and representation: “What at 
one moment was a fictional universe becomes a set of buttons that demand action” (Manovich 
2001:208). This oscillation, Manovich argues, marks an important cultural shift from the 
illusionism of traditional cinema as theorised by Bazin or apparatus theory: 
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In contrast to such totalizing realism, new media aesthetics has a surprising affinity to 
twentieth-century leftist avant-garde aesthetics. Playwright Bertold Brecht’s strategy 
of revealing the conditions of an illusion’s production, echoed by countless other leftist 
artists, has become embedded in hardware and software themselves […] The periodic 
reappearance of the machinery, the continuous presence of the communication channel 
in the message, prevent the subject from falling into the dream world of illusion for 
very long, make her alternate between concentration and detachment. (Manovich 
2001:207). 
 
This is reminiscent of the ‘immersion fallacy’-argument as discussed in chapter 3, only this 
time arguing from the point of view of digital aesthetics rather than by referring to the logic of 
play. The theory of the ‘periodic reappearance of the machinery’ asserts that the oscillations 
typically found in computer games – between real-time avatar control and menu operations, 
for example, or between play and cinematic cutscenes – are not merely a question of genre but 
are embedded in the aesthetic of computerised media as such.  
 
From this perspective, the question of the avatar boils down to how it is able to negotiate 
cultural interfaces. However, it is interesting to see that Manovich seems to make one 
exception to the rule of periodic reappearance. “Games modeled after [military] simulators”, 
he admits, perfectly blend “perception and action, cinematic realism and computer menus”. 
Flight or racing simulators, as well as Doom, Quake and Tomb Raider, are not based on 
oscillation but on “the coexistence of the two states—which are also two states of the subject 
(perception and action) and two states of the screen (transparent and opaque)” (Manovich 
2001:210).  
 
The category of ‘coexistence’ that Manovich here identifies seems to correspond more or less 
directly to the category of avatar-based 3D. This ‘art form’, in Manovich’ words, is indeed an 
exception to the general rule of action versus representation. However, if we consider avatar-
based play as more than merely a particular interpretation of interface conventions (derived 
from the military simulator), as I have tried to show in the chapters above, Manovich 
observation that “...the roles of viewer and actant are blended perfectly” (2001:210) becomes 
a somewhat artificial construction; in embodied fiction, the separation between ‘viewer’ or 
‘actant’ is irrelevant to begin with. This difference in perspective is more than merely a 
theoretical quibble; when the avatar is reduced to interface, it disappears from view. 
According to Manovich, we may successfully merge action and representation, “—but there is 
a prize to pay. The narrative is organized around a single and clearly defined goal—staying 
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alive” (2001:210). This is true as far as it goes, but it does not begin to consider the 
possibilities for play – as well as for artistic expression – that emerge from vicarious 
embodiment in a simulated world. There is considerable artistic, cultural and technological 
distance, for example, between military simulators and Super Mario 64.  
 
What Manovich’ analysis implies, is that computer games in the ‘military simulator’-genre do 
not fit into the general model of hypermedia, which highlights the constant tensions and 
negotiations between instrumental ‘interactivity’ and the immersive capacities of the 
‘remediated’ media elements. As Jim Bizzocchi and Robert F. Woodbury observes (2003), 
when the cursor function – or the hyper-mediator, as it were – becomes itself a part of the 
textual world that it allows us to interact with, ‘interface’ is subverted. This may be an 
artistically interesting strategy, but appears as a subversion or exception only from the point 
of view of interactive media, or, as in Manovich’ case, from the point of view of interactive 
cinema. The ‘unreliable’ cursor is a subversion that Mario established 25 years ago, but which 
yet, in comparison to interactive films and photostory-puzzlers of various kinds, failed to 
attract much academic attention on its own terms.  
Realistic embodiment 
Considered as cinematic ‘interface’ and as hypermedia, the navigable camera or ‘mobile 
frame’ enables us to access and navigate different places and different times. Appropriated by 
the principle of the avatar, however, the navigable camera defies the notion of ‘interface’. Or 
more precisely: it is an ‘interface’ only to itself (the interface is the message, as it were). The 
avatarial camera offers more than ‘travel’ in a metaphorical sense or in terms of access to 
‘cultural data’; it is concretised and corporealized as a prosthetic extension of our embodied 
selves, and it gives us an objective presence (and destiny) within a screen-projected 
environment. At the same time, this extension is still a cinematic extension in the sense that it 
is premised on the perceptual familiarity of photographic visual realism.  
 
In 3D animation, visual realism is based on simulated photographic indexicality; the computer 
draws an image as if there is no one actually ‘drawing’ anything, as if there is only a camera 
that captures what it sees. This construction of the camera itself, and the construction of 
cinematic space, is the central act of simulation in 3D animation, whether the simulator 
performs it in real time or not. In animated film, there are no animators that draw the images 
that correspond to the movements of the camera; instead, they build the three-dimensional 
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models and the animations that are to be drawn (rendered) by the simulated camera. In this 
sense, as Bazin states, “The photographic image is the object itself”; it generates the image of 
a synthetic reality, which exists independently of the image92.  
 
Manovich’ ‘synthetic realism’, as discussed above, is based on this principle of photographic 
indexicality: 
 
For what is faked, of course, is not reality but photographic reality, reality as seen by 
the camera lens. In other words, what computer graphics have (almost) achieved is not 
realism, but rather only photorealism—the ability to fake not our perceptual and bodily 
experience of reality but only its photographic image (Manovich 2001:200). 
 
Manovich is correct to point out that the camera lens does not simulate the natural perception 
of our bodies. On the other hand, it is not just visual ‘photorealism’ that computer game 
avatars seek to construct, but – precisely – a “perceptual and bodily experience of reality”, in 
some form or another. Photographic visual realism, in a slightly paradoxical way, becomes 
part of a more general perceptual realism, a realistic simulation of embodiment93. This 
simulation is realistic as well as ‘natural’ in the sense that perception and self-movement in 
united in one act, as argued in chapter 7; the ‘I’ that perceives is the ‘I’ that moves. As 
players, we are able to inhabit the environment through photographically mediated visual 
kinaesthesia; we re-position as body-subjects that move in relation to the screen-projected 
simulated environment.  
 
                                                 
92 “The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern 
it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, 
it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it 
is the model.” (Bazin 1967:14). 
93 A similar notion of ‘perceptual realism’ is also suggested by Stephen Prince (1996): “A perceptually realistic 
image is one which structurally corresponds to the viewer's audiovisual experience of three-dimensional space. 
Perceptually realistic images correspond to this experience because film-makers build them to do so. Such 
images display a nested hierarchy of cues which organize the display of light, color, texture, movement, and 
sound in ways that correspond with the viewer's own understanding of these phenomena in daily life. Perceptual 
realism, therefore, designates a relationship between the image or film and the spectator, and it can encompass 
both unreal images and those which are referentially realistic. Because of this, unreal images may be 
referentially fictional but perceptually realistic.”  
The main difference between Prince’s ‘perceptual realism’ and my own is that Prince uses this concept to argue 
against the relevance of Bazin’s realist ontology, and against the notion of indexicality. My argument is that 
because the realism of ‘unreal images’ is based on the simulation of an indexical relationship, they are indeed 
‘referentially’ realistic – in a Bazinian sense – as well as perceptually realistic. The ‘virtual’ or computer-
generated camera, which Prince does not emphasise much in his article, is premised on computer-simulated 
indexicality. 
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At the most general level, this perceptual realism is based on a real-time navigable point of 
view within three-dimensional space, which is fluent enough to be able to simulate a physical 
‘camera’, as tangible extension of our own body. In computer games, the technological and 
aesthetic development towards fully navigable and textured three-dimensional worlds has 
been a gradual one, from the abstract wireframes and limited range of movement in 
Battlezone (Atari 1980) to the entirely 3D-modelled avatar-based space in Quake94. In 
contemporary games, the simulation of perceptually realistic worlds also includes the real-
time calculation and rendering of light and shadow, complex textures and reflections, particles 
like smoke or dust, dynamic surfaces like hair and vegetation, and so on. This process of 
simulation is not a matter of eye-candy or merely ‘graphics’, but is at the core of a realistic 
simulation of vicarious embodiment within cinematic and synthetic space. There will always 
be, as Manovich points out, certain prioritized ‘icons of mimesis’ – water effects, for example 
– that reflect the uneven (and often inconsistent) attention to cinematic hyperrealism95, but the 
general imperative is to approach as much as possible a perceptually realistic cinematic space. 
 
This imperative also explains why the presence of the simulated camera lens is typically 
emphasised through the simulation of lens flare, which has become a common convention of 
avatar-based 3D. Also, as noted in chapter 7, the presence of the camera lens is often 
accentuated – particularly in first-person configurations but not exclusively so – by raindrops, 
snow, mud or blood hitting its surface (and often partly obscuring the view) in a way that is 
reminiscent of a documentary camera.  
 
My avatar-centred interpretation of ‘realism’ in games is built on the more general notion of 
realistic agency, as discussed in chapter 5. The 3D avatar offers not only realistic agency and 
tangibility, but also realistically situated and embodied agency, via the cinematic prosthesis. 
As noted above, motion (or self-movement), because it is a fundamental capacity of 
perception, is a defining characteristic of this form of realistic interaction; visual detail and 
verisimilitude is not merely a matter of looking at, but a matter of moving around, of 
                                                 
94 Even if the early classics like Wolfenstein 3D, Doom, Star Wars: Dark Forces (LucasArts 1994) and Duke 
Nukem 3D (3D Realms 1996) established the 3D avatar of the FPS genre, I would argue that it is the year 1996 
that really marks the start of the general transition to 3D spaces in the history of computer games. Quake was the 
first FPS to offer a fully mathematically modelled, polygonal 3D space (earlier games had depended on 2D 
models to give the impression of three-dimensional space), and Tomb Raider and Super Mario 64 established 
avatar-based 3D outside the (literally) narrow confines of the FPS genre. The latter two, along with GoldenEye 
007, were also pioneers in developing the conventions of avatar-based 3D for consoles.  
95 Manovich (Manovich 2001:195). 
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exploring the nuances of the environment and the autonomy of everything that goes on the 
simulated world. The more detail, consistency and sophistication in the simulation of (often 
minute) complex behaviours, the more there is to grasp, to investigate, to test out, and the 
more nuances are added to the construction and definition of the vicarious body. In this 
perspective, issues like specular highlights, for example, matter more than their apparently 
marginal effects could lead us to believe; because they simulate the behaviour of light and 
surfaces in a perceptually more convincing way, they add another layer of significance to our 
moving about in gameworld.  
Concretised abstraction versus cinematic naturalism 
In the context of this ‘avatarial’ perceptual realism, the notion of ‘photorealism’ becomes 
somewhat ambiguous, as it typically implies not just the mere simulation of photographic 
indexicality, but also a commitment to cinematic naturalism, which attempts to simulate live 
action cinema96. A realistic simulation of cinematic vision does not necessarily imply that the 
environments, objects and characters that the camera captures are realistic in any way. This is 
a distinction that applies not only to computer games. Toy Story (Lasseter 1995) does not 
portray anything that could conceivably take place in front of a camera. Dolls and toys are 
synthetic, and they do not move and talk as organic beings; mutated monsters or invading 
aliens may well do that for all we know, but not plastic toys. This explicitly synthetic quality 
does not affect the simulation of cinematic indexicality itself, which is secured by the 
simulation of the cinematic camera. But the synthetic world of Toy Story – like clay or puppet 
animation – would appear less photographically realistic if, for example, the figures did not 
cast any shadows. In other words, even if the worlds of 3D animation are, as Manovich as 
well as others have pointed out, ‘synthetic’ and ‘hyperreal’, we may still roughly distinguish 
between two types hyperrealism: on one hand those worlds that attempt to hide that they are 
synthetic, trying instead to imitate live action cinema, and on the other hand those that 
accentuate or exaggerate the synthetic97. Both, however, are premised on the realistic 
simulation of photographic vision.  
 
                                                 
96 A 3D image is generally considered photorealistic to the extent that it resembles the real world – or how the 
real world could possibly look like – as captured by a camera. Consequently, whereas the characters in Final 
Fantasy: The Spirits Within (Sakaguchi 2001) are referred to as ‘photorealistic’ (naturalistic), the characters in 
Toy Story are not.  
97 For a discussion of realism and hyperrealism in animation, see Paul Wells (1998). I am indebted to Seth 
Giddings for this reference.  
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In avatar-based 3D computer games, the distinction between realistic embodiment and 
cinematic naturalism – the latter which is a specific variant of the former – has a particular 
significance in relation to the gameworld that the player inhabits through the situated 
embodied agency of the avatar. As discussed in chapter 6, computer-simulated environments 
have the capacity to integrate the explicit rules of the game system through concretising them 
– making a world of rules into a gameworld, a world of playthings. The perceptual realism of 
the avatarial camera consolidates and expands this gameworld. On one hand, it creates an 
opportunity for less abstract and more naturalistic gameworlds, but on the other hand its 
cinematic indexicality also accommodates – and in a certain respect strengthens – the 
mechanisms of abstraction in computer games. What realistic embodiment makes possible, in 
effect, is a new type of ‘sculptural’ abstraction; objects and agents go full size (repressing or 
hiding the miniature), and we can perceive them and interact with them, from all directions, as 
solid, tangible and autonomous playthings, but they may yet appear in abstract shapes and 
behave in strange patterns – like sculptures come to life. This abstract sculptural quality of 
gameworlds is being accentuated or enhanced with increased perceptual realism, which 
concretises and solidifies abstract objects and shapes as unreal or hyperreal objects. The world 
of Quake, with its magically ‘floating’ weapons and resources, is more abstract in this sense 
than the minimalist wireframe world of Battlezone.  
 
Super Mario 64, which took Mario’s platforming action adventure into a three-dimensional 
world, illustrates well the principle of concretised abstraction in games. The surreal 
Mushroom Kingdom becomes more surreal (and also, I would add, more threatening) when 
we are able to interact with it from a situated and perceptually realistic point of view. The 
primary function of this type of sculptural abstraction is to further integrate or concretise the 
elements that define Mario’s world as a gameworld; like in its 2D variants, the sculptural 
shapes of the landscape define a platforming world, and scores and resources float above the 
ground as tangible stars and coins. At the same time, when going from the flat miniature to 
realistically embodied environments, the game-based artificiality of playthings also becomes 
more apparent or imposing considered as an artistic abstraction. On the ‘Whomp’s Fortress’ 
level in Super Mario 64, the player must combat walking blocks of asphalt or ‘whomps’, who 
‘pave our roads and streets’ without getting, apparently, the gratitude they deserve. Before the 
boss fight at the top of the fortress, the giant whomp will moan and complain over always 
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being stepped and stomped at, and declare that he is not going to just lay there and take it 
anymore98.  
 
Super Mario 64, released in 1996, was significant in defining a model for non-naturalistic 
perceptual realism in gameworlds, translating and solidifying the abstract worlds of its 2D 
predecessors into a new kind of playground and a new type of embodied fiction. Around the 
same period of time, Tomb Raider and GoldenEye 007 staked out the alternative path towards 
cinematic naturalism in avatar-based 3D games, the former re-inventing (in the Indiana Jones 
mould) the slower and more ‘grownup’ platform-adventure that had been established by 
Prince of Persia (Brøderbund Software 1990). As I have discussed elsewhere (Klevjer 
2006b), GoldenEye 007 re-interpreted the already established FPS formula in the generic 
image of a James Bond adventure. Goldeneye 007 abandoned a set of traditionally game-
based abstract elements like the floating weapons, arcade-style combat interaction and 
consistently slow-moving projectiles. Also, in line with the new Hollywood-style fictional 
universe, maze-based navigational structures and challenges, which used to be a staple of the 
role-playing and adventure-based ‘dungeon crawlers’, were discarded for a more linear but 
still mildly explorative structure99. GoldenEye 007 was also notable for translating the FPS 
genre – for the first time – successfully onto a console platform.  
 
Cinematic naturalism, in gameworlds as in other screen-projected synthetic worlds, is of 
course a matter of degree, and to a certain extent a matter of interpretation; as suggested by 
the film adaptation Doom (Bartkowiak 2005), for example, weapons may well be suspended 
in thin air also in a cinematically naturalistic universe100. The strong emphasis on futuristic, 
fantastic and technologised environments in many 3D action adventures is a central strategy 
for integrating realistic agency with the imperatives of the game system, and contributes 
strongly to the upholding of a fairly consistent cinematic naturalism; compared to natural 
environments with trees (leaves), grass, dust and naturally open landscapes, technologised 
environments – a space ship, for example – will much more easily come across as 
                                                 
98 The player defeats this boss by stomping on him.  
99 For a account of the development of the singleplayer FPS aesthetics from Doom to Halo, including a 
discussion of the trend towards cinematic ‘explorative linearity’, see my earlier The Way of the Gun (Klevjer 
2006b). 
100 In the Doom film, the BFG is found rotating in thin air, albeit aided by some sort of technologically advanced 
display device. 
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cinematically naturalistic even if they may be highly simplistic and ‘abstract’ in appearance 
and behaviour ( – who knows what a cryo sleep chamber actually looks like?).  
 
The troublesome paradox of naturalistic game simulations is that the rule of the more general 
paradox of hyperrealism still applies: with stronger perceptual realism, simulated synthetic 
worlds will appear more convincingly synthetic. This may not be a problem for cinematic 
naturalism as long as the advances in the simulation of organic and intentional movement – in 
bodies, in faces, in vegetation, in crowds – can reasonably keep up with the advances in the 
simulation of cinematic vision. To use a very obvious example: if the enemies in Quake, in 
the way they move and act, were treated with the sophisticated rendering of light, shadow and 
texture of contemporary photographic realism, they would appear a lot more believable as 
synthetic agents, that is, as dolls101. In contemporary games that strive to be at the front of the 
race towards ever stronger cinematic naturalism, this built-in logic of hyperrealism poses a 
particular challenge with respect to facial animations, which in many cases have not kept up 
with the developments in photographic vision. As a result, some games that are apparently at 
the cutting edge of the development, feature characters who appear more synthetic and lifeless 
than characters in older games. In certain recent cases, as with, notably, Peter Jackson’s King 
Kong (Ubisoft Montpellier Studios/Ubisoft Montreal Studios 2005), player communities 
complain that the main characters look unpleasantly uncanny and corpse-like102. 
Functional realism 
The third layer of realism in avatar-based 3D gameworlds would be what I have referred to in 
chapter 5 in terms of Geoff King’s notion of ‘functional realism’ or authenticity, which 
addresses the realistic functioning of simulations independently of the (computer-based) 
principle of realistic agency. In avatar-based 3D, when functional realism is integrated and 
compatible with the perceptually realistic world of the avatar, these concerns will have strong 
                                                 
101 The extent to which agents and objects appear synthetic and doll-like or not, particularly in contemporary 
games, has to do with physics as well as animation. An illustrative example: simulated human agents that 
implement a so-called ‘ragdoll physics’ to generate impact- and death animations, have a strong tendency to 
appear as very convincing simulations of (precisely) ragdolls. 
102 From a psychological point of view, part of the problem with respect to ‘hyperreal’ human characters can also 
be seen as one of a more general kind, which is independent of the relative ‘match’ between perceptual and 
naturalistic realism: characters generally become corpse-like and uncanny when they appear almost completely 
like humans. This is commonly referred to as the ‘uncanny valley’-principle, as formulated by Japanese 
roboticist Doctor Masahiro Mori. The uncanny valley, as explained by David Bryant, “—represents the point at 
which a person observing the creature or object in question sees something that is nearly human, but just enough 
off-kilter to seem eerie or disquieting”. (Bryant 2006). In this context, what my own argument implies is that the 
uncanny valley effect increases when the discrepancy between cinematic naturalism and cinematic perceptual 
realism increases.  
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impact on what kind of body the player is given and on what kind of play the world of the 
avatar affords – in terms of what kinds of physical capacities are available to the player, as 
well what mechanisms, principles and tactics of problem-solving define the space of 
possibility in the gameworld.  
 
Secondly – although admittedly the exception rather than the rule in avatar-based games – 
functional realism may also be implemented by not integrating its demands with any kind of 
realistic embodiment. A good example of this variant would be the tactical-military ‘realism’ 
that is heeded (and duly marketed) in Full Spectrum Warrior. In his analysis, King points out 
that functional realism may not be compatible with what he refers to as ‘graphical realism’: 
enemies who are clearly visible as being exposed to fire are yet being defined by the game 
(through abstract means) as being, by definition, under full cover and hence cannot take any 
damage from the avatar’s current position (King 2005). The dynamics of combat that result 
from this abstract articulation of key elements of the game space is (in all likelihood, we must 
assume) more functionally realistic than the dynamics of combat in a First Person Shooter; it 
forces the player to employ tactics that are presumably more similar to the tactics that actual 
soldiers in combat use. In ‘mapping’ this dimension of authenticity onto the gameworld, the 
game design chooses to suspend or ‘bypass’, as it were, the world that the subjective avatar 
projects around itself. Through implementing a general type of game mechanics that is 
borrowed from the strategy game genre, Full Spectrum Warrior de-emphasises, or 
undermines, realistic embodiment, and plays up the attraction of functional (militaristic) 
realism.  
 
Whether integrated with the realism of embodiment or not, the degree to which the design of 
a computer game is committed to some aspect of functional realism is generally a very strong 
generic marker. In the FPS genre, the role of functional realism has been conventionalised, 
and also to a certain extent institutionalised, through the establishing of the sub-genre of the 
‘tactical’ or ‘squad-based’ militaristic FPS. In this sub-genre, many of the typical elements of 
the standard action adventure variant of the FPS are played down or almost entirely rejected, 
in favour of a more cautious, disciplined and quasi-professionalised style of simulated warfare 
and combat. See Klevjer (2006b) for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between 
these two variants of the FPS genre. 
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The paradigm of Virtual Reality 
So far, I have emphasised how the basic principles of embodiment and realism in avatar-
based 3D are different from other forms of ‘immediacy’ or realism in digital media. This does 
not mean, however, that new media theory does not pay attention to corporealized (and 
playable) immersive embodiment in simulated environments, or that it does not pay attention 
to realistic embodiment in simulated worlds – quite the contrary. In addition to the 
hypermedia model and Manovich’ cinematic ‘interfaces’, there is also a strong third 
paradigm, namely the ultimate transparency and ‘immediacy’ of Virtual Reality. This 
paradigm is in some ways closer to the principle of the avatar, but yet in another way it also 
articulates a desire for something entirely different.  
 
VR can be thought of as a particular type of experimental medium, which uses Head Mounted 
Displays or other types of 360 degrees visual projections in combination with motion-tracking 
technologies (body sensors, data gloves, body suits, cameras) to give users the experience of 
being fully immersed and present in a computer-simulated environment. The promises of this 
medium have been described by pioneers and cyber-visionaries like Jaron Lanier (1989) and 
Howard Rheingold (1991), figures who have also contributed to the establishing of VR as a 
utopian (or dystopian) mythology of modern culture103. At the same time, Virtual Reality is 
also seen as a productive metaphor or paradigm for thinking about mediation, interaction and 
immersion in digital media. In Bolter and Grusin’s Remediation, VR serves as the ultimate 
model for ‘immediacy’. In Janet Murray’s account of narrative in digital media, the Star 
Trek’s ‘Holodeck’ represents the (utopian) model of immersion against which other forms 
and principles of participation is being discussed. In Brenda Laurel’s Computers as Theatre 
(1993), VR is the ideal model for intuitive and dramatically structured human-computer 
interaction.  
 
In the more narrowly VR-centred literature, which is typically more empirically and 
psychologically oriented, the central focus point is the notion of presence. This notion draws 
attention to a similar kind of invisibility or ‘immediacy’ that Bolter and Grusin emphasises, 
or, as Matthew Lombard and Theresa Ditton (1997) defines it, to the “perceptual illusion of 
nonmediation”. This type of VR-research aims to identify and analyse the different elements 
                                                 
103 Other central publications on the technological, cultural and philosophical aspects of VR are Texeira and 
Pimentel (1993), Heim (1998), Zhai (1998), and Grau (2003). 
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and factors that contribute to the user’s sense of presence, considering systematically the 
range, fidelity and richness of sensory input as well as forms and degrees of interactivity, and 
testing out how the different factors impact on users’ responses104.  
 
While VR-specific research may be useful also to computer game research in a number of 
ways, the strong focus on degrees of immediacy or ‘presence’ is of limited relevance to my 
study of avatar-based games as a generic form of interaction and fiction. More generally, I 
would argue that any unified concept for ‘measuring’ levels of engagement, according to 
which one could add together and weigh the impact of individual ‘criteria’ or factors, is 
problematic. Looking for ‘presence’ will too easily conflate or harmonise the different 
motivations for and modalities of participation into one common denominator, one single and 
rather vague ‘substratum’ that measures involvement. Does Myst, for example, produce more 
‘presence’ than Super Mario 64?  
 
Also, part of the reason why the emphasis on the sheer ‘being there’ is rather limiting for my 
purposes, is that it does not consider the dimension of fictionality. ‘Presence’ is a concept that 
draws attention to immediacy itself, not to immediacy to whom, and for what reason. This is a 
central difference between VR research and Marie-Laure Ryan’s Narrative as Virtual Reality. 
Ryan, whose analysis of fictional embodiment has significantly influenced the theoretical 
basis of my own analysis, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, uses ‘Virtual Reality’ not only as a 
metaphor of fictionality in a general sense, but also as the central model for what she refers to 
as ‘total art’, or ‘participatory interactivity’, which unifies the seemingly incompatible 
principles of immersion and interactivity. Whether future VR installations will in fact produce 
anything satisfying in any of those two respects or not, she argues, “...we can still use the idea 
of VR as a metaphor for the fullest artistic experience, since in the Platonian realm of ideas 
VR scores a double 10” (Ryan 2001:20). Inspired in part by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
of the body, and also in some ways echoing Torben Grodal’s uncompromising ‘life’-analogy 
as discussed in chapter 3, Ryan uses VR to highlight the difference between hypermedia and 
the embodied nature of participation in VR as well as in ‘RL’ (Real Life): 
 
                                                 
104 Central discussions on the relationship between presence and interactivity are Steuer (1992), Sheridan (1992), 
and Fencott (1999). For a discussion of the notion of presence as applied to 3D computer games, see McMahan 
(2003). 
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The main difference between VR and RL, on one hand, and textual environments, on 
the other, is the semiotic nature of interactivity. In a textual environment the user deals 
with signs, both as tools (the words or icons to click on) and as the target of the action 
(the text brought to the screen as the result of clicking), but in RL and VR all action 
passes through the body (Ryan 2001:284). 
 
With reference to James Gibson’s ‘ecological’ approach, Ryan emphasises the unique 
capacity of VR to situate the user as an embodied organism that inhabits an environment. The 
‘VR ecology’, she argues ‘…turns space into data that literally flow out of the body” (Ryan 
2001:71). Her description of embodied participation in VR environments could also apply to 
screen-projected avatar-based environments as we find them in computer games.  
 
In the virtual environment, as in certain shamanistic rituals described by Mircea 
Eliade, the body stands at the centre of the world, and the world irradiates from it. The 
‘lag’ that separates the user’s movements from the updating of the display in today’s 
imperfect VR systems should act as a reminder of the productive implication of the 
body in the phenomenal world. Through this generation of space in response to the 
movements of the body, VR technology offers a dramatization of phenomenological 
doctrine. (Ryan 2001:72). 
 
Ryan’s phenomenological interpretation demonstrates how VR as a phenomenon and as an 
ideal model can also throw light on avatar-based worlds, which do indeed ‘irradiate’ from the 
real-time and ‘lag-free’ embodiment of the avatar.  
 
Still, however, Manovich is correct in assuming that the ‘interface’ of Quake or Tomb Raider 
is based on a different artistic and perceptual ideal than immersive VR. With respect to 
computer games and similar media forms, the paradigm of Virtual Reality needs to 
distinguished from the paradigm of avatarial interaction.  
Virtual Reality versus the avatar 
The avatar and VR play on similar cultural attractions; both appeal to the desires of 
paradoxical immediacy and hyperreality, and both provide the participant with an alternative 
embodiment that is perceptually encapsulating. However, the alternative embodiment of VR, 
even if relying on similar mechanisms of prosthetic incorporation, is committed to a principle 
of natural embodiment rather than vicarious embodiment. The ideal VR embodiment, as 
expressed through the technologies and conventions of concrete VR installations, demands, as 
much as possible, immediate and continuous extensions of the body-subject.  
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In other words: merely pressing buttons with your fingertips will not do – no matter how 
second nature it may eventually may become, or to what extent these minute movements may 
be able to transform your perceptual self; what matters is the transformation of your natural, 
pre-establish sense of embodiment. Consequently, VR installations strive for an invisible and 
continuous hardware interface: head-mounted displays or cave projections for visual and 
auditory perception, and various types of motion tracking interfaces for interaction. Anything 
less than total immersion is a compromise, a step on the way. This ideal differs from the 
imperative of avatar-based interaction in four central respects: 
 
VR depends on continuous physical interaction; the body is the interface. Avatarial interfaces, 
in contrast, are typically non-continuous or arbitrary. Avatar-based interaction may also 
accommodate continuous interfaces, but these must be integrated or ‘filtered’ by the screen-
projected vicarious body of the avatar. The dominant type of game interface, in stark contrast 
to the ‘body-interface’ of VR, mediates action only through the players’ hands (or more 
narrowly even: through the players’ fingertips), eyes and ears. The rest of the body’s actions 
are ignored as irrelevant – as phenomenologically non-existent, cut loose from the perceptual 
loop that secures the disciplining of the player under the avatar. From the point of view of the 
‘fullest artistic experience’ of VR, this must seem like a harsh compromise, yet it is quite the 
contrary: the fingertip interface is not a compromise, but an attempt to optimise precision, 
consistency, range and diversity of fictional embodiment within the simulated world of the 
game. The idea is to make the player able to act fluently and intuitively via the prosthetic 
extension of the alternative body – as in VR – but without the physical body actually having 
to perform or in any way mimic the actions of the vicarious body. The fingertip interface is 
optimised for task-oriented and sustained embodiment; unlike the typical VR installation, 
high-investment computer game worlds seek to capture the player for days and weeks (or 
months), many of them structured in a way that encourages day-long continuous sessions.  
 
In the ideal dream of VR, continuous interfaces and continuous physical interaction is an end 
in itself. Continuous interface is the guarantor of an immediate and instantly convincing 
experience. Embodiment is not something that is supposed to be produced through 
incorporation and disciplining, but it must be already complete and ‘full’ from the moment 
you enter virtual reality. In artistic installations, this dream or popular paradigm of Virtual 
Reality is typically transformed or subverted in various ways, but this dimension of alienation 
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is then a goal in itself; it is not to be overcome and done with as a means to get on with the 
tasks at hand105. On the other hand, there is also of course a sense in which, in computer 
games, playing through avatars is also playing with avatars – some games are more self-
conscious about vicarious embodiment than others – and in this respect there are contact 
points and overlaps between avatar-based play and artistic VR. 
 
Secondly, whereas the avatar encapsulates the player merely in a perceptual sense, mediated 
through an absolute ‘disciplining’ that is channelled through the hardware interface (screen, 
speakers, controllers, force-feedback), VR always aims for total 360 degrees sensory 
immersion; a framed virtual ‘window’ will not do. Screen-projected visuals cannot 
accommodate natural perceptual interaction (looking and moving around, turning), and, most 
importantly, a framed projection plane also represents a vicarious body, namely the camera. 
In VR, the camera must disappear, and so must cinematic space. Like cinematic realism, VR 
also strives for maximum visual fidelity and granularity – both in terms of textures and 
movements and in terms of the overall resolution of the display itself – but the body that 
produces the hyperreal cannot be a camera; it must be a direct and invisible continuation of 
the physical body itself. The imperative of sensory immersion also implies, moreover, that the 
simulation of touch, as implemented through various haptic interface technologies, must be as 
differentiated and as broad in scope as possible. When playing through a standard computer 
game interface, in contrast, the exposed body of the avatar is funnelled into – or ‘passes 
through’, in Ryan’s words, the electro-umbilical hookup that connects to the player’s hands 
and fingers. In sensory immersive VR, without this mediation of an avatar, unspecified 
vibrations at your fingertips (one rumble fits all) would disrupt the sense of embodiment 
rather than confirm it.  
 
Thirdly, rejecting the projection plane requires a stereoscopic visual interface, which attempts 
to simulate the depth effect that is produced by our natural (stereo) vision. Without 
                                                 
105 Classical examples of total sensory ‘estrangement’, as it were, would be Char Davies’ Ephémère (1998) and 
Osmose (1995), which require the participant to come to grips with an initially awkward combination of 
movement, breath and balance (via Head Mounted Display and a motion-tracking vest) in order to navigate the 
translucent and largely abstract simulated environments. 
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stereoscopic vision, the associations of the monocular kino-eye would challenge and disturb 
the bid for natural embodiment106.  
 
Finally: VR is first-person point of view, by definition. Direct embodiment implies also a 
direct objective presence in simulated space; there is no compromise with an extended avatar 
which would be indirectly attached to our subjective body-subject like a semi-remote vehicle. 
If your point of view is detached from your body – or worse: if it starts moving around, 
unpredictably, on its own accord – the integrity of alternative embodiment is lost.  
 
My argument is not that the four imperatives above will be manifested directly in any given 
VR installation; what I am describing is general paradigm that drives the medium of VR, but 
which may also be – like all dominant languages and imperatives – critically explored and 
subverted in artistic practices. In any case, VR installations cannot fulfil the dream of the 
Holodeck; they need to compromise drastically, and in this sense there will always be a 
‘vicarious’ dimension of mediated, filtered or imperfect continuous embodiment. At the same 
time, avatar-based computer games do also, to different degrees, articulate ideals that are 
reminiscent of the dream of VR, as I will return to below. Also, as noted in the previous 
chapter, certain types of contemporary (and upcoming) console game interfaces bypass – 
entirely or in part – the principle of the avatar, in a bet to offer other kinds of experiences, and 
we may imagine that one possible direction for such strategies would be to follow the route of 
installation-based VR. 
 
Nevertheless, I argue that the ideal of Virtual Reality is generally at odds with the ideal of 
avatar-based play. The strong dominance of the VR paradigm in new media theory is partly to 
blame for why the avatar is overlooked other than either as a ‘playable character’ or as a 
functional mediator of agency. Marie-Laure Ryan’s reference to action that is ‘passing 
through the body’ means action that is bypassing the avatar. From this perspective, avatars 
become merely a necessary restriction, a temporary hurdle on the way to a sensation of ‘direct 
encounter with reality’ (Ryan 2001:284). In the ‘fullest’ artistic experience of VR, concretised 
forms of incarnated embodiment must disappear along with the medium. Consequently, in her 
discussion of computer games, Ryan pays very little attention to the role of avatars. She does 
                                                 
106 My point here is not that cinematic vision can never be stereoscopic (because it can be, in certain 
‘spectacular’ instances like Imax etc), but that stereoscopic imagery is not, by habit, associated with cinematic 
vision.  
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address the mediation of the ‘character’ that the player controls, but only, as noted in chapter 
3, in its purely instrumental function, of which the cursor would be the ‘minimal form’107.  
 
It also seems that the strong emphasis on the VR-model for alternative embodiment, at the 
expense of the game-based alternative, is rooted in an over-emphasis on the idea of sensory 
encapsulation, and an under-appreciation of perceptual encapsulation. The assumption seems 
to be that continuous interfaces and sensory immersion is a premise for allowing the body-
subject to be entirely captured by – and to act intuitively within – synthetically simulated 
environments.  
 
The 3D avatar is not the poor man’s VR. The paradigm of avatar-based interaction has 
emerged as a mechanism of play, of learning and of mastery – as a way to embody not just 
any kind of world but a gameworld, which lays out for the player a job to be done, a challenge 
to be taken. In this context, vicarious embodiment and non-continuous fingertip-interfaces 
secure a certain kind of high-investment and sustained engagement with virtual worlds that 
VR installations could never provide, as their continuous interfaces imply that we become 
much more limited by the capacities of our own bodies. So at least in games, then, the 
Platonic ideal of VR definitely does not score a double 10. However, there is also a case to be 
made for the avatar from a more general and artistic point of view; vicarious embodiment is 
not just immensely cheaper, but it is also dramatically more flexible, opening up a possibility-
space towards which there is limited freedom to explore in the commercial games market. In 
contrast to VR, the whole idea is to produce as much imaginative corporeality as possible via 
incremental but yet precise and flexible inputs. In this sense, avatars give you more 
embodiment for your bucks. 
Panoramic versus vehicular vision 
Unlike the dream of VR, avatar-based 3D is explicitly vicarious, it exploits the perceptual 
incorporation of non-continuous interfaces, and it gives more flexibility with respect to how 
alternative embodiment is configured and how you can play with it. In the following, I will 
look more closely at what we might call the corporeality of the avatarial camera, which 
distinguishes avatar-based play from VR-play in three-dimensional virtual environments.  
                                                 
107 “In third-person games, such as the Mario Brothers games for the Nintendo Play Stations, the user controls a 
tiny graphic of his character. The minimal form of this representation is the abstract shape of the cursor.” (Ryan 
2001:309). 
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As I have shown in chapter 7, there are many types of ‘cameras’ in games, and many ways of 
navigating them, from the scrolling frame of view in Super Mario Bros or the grid-based 
‘wipe’ in The Legend of Zelda to the fully integrated subjective cameras in First Person 
Shooters. The former two can be said to have ‘cinematic’ vision only in an extended or 
metaphorical sense, as a mere frame of view does not necessarily simulate photographic 
indexicality. What I want to suggest in the following, is that we may distinguish between two 
main types of navigable vision in avatar-based games, which can be seen as emerging from 
two distinct traditions of the visual representation of space – different traditions of ‘mobile 
windows’, in Friedberg’s terminology.  
 
In “Imaging Gameplay – The Design and Construction of Spatial Worlds” (2005), Bernadette 
Flynn distinguishes between panoramic space, isometric space and ‘3D space’ in computer 
games. She places the scrolling frame of view of Defender or Super Mario Bros into the 
historical lineage of traditional Japanese and Chinese scroll paintings. She also emphasises, 
like Friedberg in her analysis of the mobile frame of view in cinema, the continuity from the 
western panoramic tradition from the late 18th century, drawing attention to the invention of 
the immobile panoramic spectator through the cylindrical and rotating panoramas or 
‘dioramas’ that was introduced by Daguerre in 1822: 108  
 
The rolling panoramas moving past the immobile viewer marked a separation between 
the body and the eye. Critical here is a shift in emphasis to the eye away from the 
physical movement or performative actions of the viewer. (Flynn 2005:6). 
 
In Flynn’s account, whereas isometric perspective (as typically found in strategy games as 
well as in The Sims) represents a similar conception of navigation and a similar conception of 
space as the two-dimensional ‘panoramic’ perspective, 3D space, rooted in the Cartesian 
space of renaissance perspective, introduces a new and ‘empty’ visual conception of space. In 
computer games, this type of space exaggerates the discrepancy between the immobile 
spectator and the (sometimes extreme) mobility of the playable body that is offered by the 
game. 
                                                 
108 Flynn does not specify in her brief article which particular kinds of ‘moving panoramas’ or ‘rolling 
panoramas’ she refers to, but we must assume that she mainly refers to the diorama as invented by Daguerre and 
similar devices that followed in the pre-cinematic period. For a description of Daguerre’s Diorama, and how it 
differed from earlier circular panoramas, see Friedberg (1993:25-29).  
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Framed by the visual logic behind linear perspective of a receding interior and a 
defining horizon line the player enters space as a penetration into the frame. 
Exaggerated depth perspective emphasises the interior as a type of frontier. The 
structuring of 3D presupposes a fixed point of view from an immobile onlooker. In 
Splinter Cell this is oddly reversed with the player operating as a highly mobile 
physically articulate body. (Flynn 2005:12). 
 
We see that whereas Friedberg’s analysis above sees the cinematic camera in a direct lineage 
from the ‘panoramic gaze’ of the early panoramas and dioramas, Flynn’s game-centred 
analysis makes a central distinction between the panoramic tradition and the ‘penetrating’ 
logic of the camera games like Splinter Cell (Ubisoft Montreal Studios 2002); both types of 
navigable space are premised on the immobility of the ‘traveller’, but the former is not 
associated with the look of the renaissance linear perspective. In line with my analysis of the 
avatarial point of view in chapter 7, I agree with Flynn that this is an important distinction to 
make. At the same time, however, I would argue that the navigable camera of avatar-based 
3D has its own distinct lineage of visual mobility, namely the tradition of the motion ride. The 
motion ride tradition emerges from the same pre-cinematic tradition of spectacular ‘gazes’ 
that Friedberg and Flynn refers to, but emphasises the movement along the depth axis rather 
than lateral movement across scrolling panoramas.  
 
Unlike moving panoramas, the motion ride is a cinematic form; it depends on the cinematic 
apparatus to create the perception of being transported forward through space at high speed. 
The paradigmatic form for this type of ‘virtual mobility’ in the history of cinema is the so-
called ‘Phantom Ride’ film that is known from England as far back as 1898, and which 
enjoyed great popularity during the first decade of the 20th century. Phantom Rides were 
filmed from the front of a speeding train, and then projected for the audience as a re-creation 
of the sensation of the ride109. A subsequent and more elaborate version of this type of motion 
ride were the ‘Hale’s Tours’ in USA, based on an imaginative invention by Georg Hale and 
Fred Gifford from 1904, and launched as a commercial installation in 1905. Like the earlier 
cinematic spectacles that were shown at the 1900 Paris exposition – the Cinéorama and the 
Maréorama – Hale’s Tours combined cinematic projection with a physical re-construction of 
the vehicle itself. Patented as the ‘Pleasure Railway’, Hale and Gifford’s invention placed the 
audience on board a stationary but rocking railway car, in front of a projected ‘phantom’ film 
                                                 
109 See Raymond Fielding (1983:119). 
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that had been photographed from the front of a train or a trolley. A moving belt beneath the 
car simulated the sound of passing along the railroad tracks. Raymond Fielding explains: 
 
Except for the lack of color, the illusion was quite convincing; all the more so because 
of the way in which the moving image of the tracks slipped away under the forward 
edge of the coach. According to a trade paper account, the illusion was so good that 
when trolley rides through the cities were shown, members of the audience frequently 
yelled at pedestrians to get out of the way or be run down. (Fielding 1983:123-124). 
 
In today’s entertainment industry, the ‘motion simulator’ (or ‘motion ride’) capsule follows 
the same basic principle as Hale’s Tours, although in a technologically more sophisticated 
form, and relying on computer-generated 3D graphics rather than live action film. The 
contemporary motion simulator capsule, like Hale’s train cars, simulate high-speed rides 
rather than panoramic strolls. Hydraulically controlled movements of either the seats, the 
floor or the whole capsule are synchronised to the images of the 3D high-speed ride film that 
is projected in front of the passengers. As Erkki Huhtamo observes in his analysis of this 
phenomenon, the motion simulator may serve as the ultimate model for a range of similar 
attractions – the rollercoaster, the theme park ride, the Imax ‘ride’ film – that all seek to 
encapsulate the body and set it in motion. At the same time, however, Huhtamo ascribes the 
physicality of the experience to the mechanical movements of the capsule or seats rather than 
to the qualities of the cinematic image itself:  
 
Besides the customary cinematic effect of the dematerialization of the body, the 
physicality of the body is emphasized. This is mainly the effect of the moving seats. 
The synchronized movement of the seats is actually a physical extension of the virtual 
movement of the screen, adding to it a material—even a tactile—dimension. The 
essence of the motion simulator is based on this double operation, which merges sheer 
physical vertigo and virtual voyaging. (Huhtamo 1995:172). 
 
While Huhtamo here rightly points out that ‘the physicality of the body is emphasised’, I 
think that he overplays the significance of mechanical movement to the simulation of motion. 
The main element in the simulation of motion, as Bernadette Flynn also points out, is “the 
separation between the body and the eye”, that is: the simulation of a moving body via 
projected moving images. As noted above, this simulation is radically weaker and much more 
ambiguous in traditional narrative cinema, in which we could say that embodiment is, in a 
certain sense, ‘dematerialised’ through the omniscient and de-corporealizing effects of film 
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editing, according to which the ‘kino-eye’ can cut freely through time and space110. In motion 
rides, in contrast, there is no escape from the vertiginous corporeality of the camera-body. 
When there are also mechanically induced movements – which are, of course, not simulated 
but actual movements – these consolidate and strengthen the basic simulation of the moving 
camera. If we compare with standard computer game hardware interfaces, as discussed in 
chapter 7, the hydraulic movements of the motion simulator can be seen as a hugely expanded 
variant of gamepad force-feedback or ‘rumble’.  
 
In more technical terms, the effect created by the cinematic language of the motion ride is 
vection: the visually induced perception of self-motion. Whereas panoramic (or isometric) 
screen-projected space is based on rotational (or circular) vection, the 3D space of the motion 
ride is based on translational (or linear) vection – self-motion along the depth axis of the 
image111. Translational vection, moreover, is less dependent on sensorial immersion, and 
gives a stronger sensation of physical motion than rotational vection; it takes the spectator for 
a ride112. The cinematic ‘eye’ of motion rides and avatar-based 3D is, I will suggest, neither 
‘dematerialized’ nor ‘panoramic’, but vehicular; its archetypical model is the camera that is 
mounted on a speeding train113. According to a vehicular visual regime, the participant is 
encapsulated and captured by visually simulated self-motion, and this perception is 
strengthened by the fact that the vehicle itself (the train, the racing car, the helicopter) is 
always visible as framing the field of view114. The player of Quake or Splinter Cell, according 
to this logic of visual spatiality, like Hale and Gifford’s audience, is trapped and seated. 
 
The particular significance of vehicular corporeality within the overall aesthetic of a game is a 
matter of genre. Whereas racing games – particularly arcade-style racing games like Burnout 
(Criterion 2001) – are all about the speed and the power of the vehicle, action adventures like 
                                                 
110 It should be added here, however, that the phenomenological approach that is advocated by Casebier (1991) 
and Sobchack (1992) does not accept the notion of the ‘dematerialized’ embodiment that Huhtamo here refers to.  
111 For explanation of the concept of vection, see Prothero (1998). Prothero’s study is mainly concerned with the 
relationship between vection and motion sickness or ‘simulator sickness’ in simulated 3D environments.  
112 David Bordwell (1977) considers the phenomenon of self-movement in cinema. For a discussion of 
translational versus circular vection induced by 3D images, see Mohler, Thompson, Riecke and Bülthoff (2005). 
113 The principle of vection also implies that Huhtamo, in my view, overstates the difference between motion 
simulator capsules and the ride films of the Cinerama in the 50s or in contemporary Imax cinemas; these kinds 
of ‘movie rides’ also induce in the viewer the experience of being on board a vehicle or some kind of enormous 
ship that moves through space.  
114 In their recent study “Measuring Vection in a Large Screen Virtual Environment” (2005), Mohler et al., based 
on their empirical findings, suggest that the inclusion of a static referential frame will indeed strengthen and 
enhance translational vection, whereas its presence or absence produced no apparent differences in reported 
circular vection.  
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ICO or Prince of Persia: Sands of Time (2003) emphasise panoramic (including full circular) 
movements as much as vehicular ‘travelling shots’ along the depth axis. A large group of 
action adventures, from Super Mario 64 or Jet Force Gemini to the more recent Beyond Good 
& Evil or Lego Star Wars, have special sections along the way that are dedicated to racing 
action. This strategy is particularly common in contemporary platform- or ‘multi-adventure’ 
games like the Ratchet and Clank series (Insomniac 2002) or the Sly Cooper series (Sucker 
Punch 2002) – a genre that almost without exception makes sure to exploit the possibility for 
vehicular thrills that follow with avatar-based 3D.  
 
Vehicular vision in avatar-based 3D is also consolidated by the way in which activities on the 
fictional screen are often allowed to structure and dominate the gameworld. Various types of 
information overlays and interfaces like health and weapons indicators, quick menus, maps 
and surveillance data allow the player to access and configure the avatar’s functionalities 
during play, provide continuous instructions or hints on tasks and missions, and generally 
keep track of the state of the gameworld. As noted in chapter 7, drawing attention to the 
fictional screen as a structured surface does not conflict with the constitution of a fictional 
world as a whole. Instead, onscreen interaction contributes to the articulation of an 
information-dependent and machinic avatar, who’s ‘inner life’, as it were, is accessible and 
configurable through a data interface.  
Negative agency 
The vehicular immobilisation of the motion ride is not essentially different from the 
immobilisation or the ‘entrapment’ that is implied by any perspectival image. When we look 
at a portrait in a gallery, for example, our body will always remain fixed in relation to the 
projected space of the painting; we may move around in the room, but the person on the 
portrait will always look straight at us; we move, yet we do not move. With a screen-projected 
moving point of view, the basic relationship is exactly the same, only reversed. As Friedberg 
says, we are immobilised, yet we move. Or more precisely: we are being moved, just like we 
are being ‘locked down’ by a perspectival portrait. This implies that, with the fast forward 
movements of the motion ride, the sense of agency that follows with the constitution of a 
vicarious (self-moving) body-subject is being unavoidably addressed. The experience of 
being ‘taken’ for a ride implies agency in a very immediate but also negative sense: we should 
be able to move, but cannot. Hence, embodied agency is not the result of any actual response 
or impact from our actions (it is not, as it were, a matter of ‘interactivity’ or ‘dramatic 
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agency’), but it follows from the forceful visual re-positioning of our perceptions. Via the 
simulation of self-motion in relation to an environment, an alternate body-subject is forced 
upon us, in a similar manner as when we are taken for a ride in some kind of vehicle. Mark 
Seltzer writes: 
 
“The Railway, like the elevator, or like (in its recreational form) the Ferris wheel, puts 
still stilled bodies in motion. What these mobile technologies make possible, in 
different forms, are the thrill and panic of agency at once extended and suspended”. 
Seltzer (1992), quoted in Huhtamo (1995). 
 
It is this ‘suspension’ of a forced sense of agency, this vehicular entrapment, that is being 
simulated by the mobile cinematic camera and which is re-appropriated by the 3D avatar – 
but which is excluded from or downplayed by the panoramic visuality of scrolling 2D game 
spaces and isometric game spaces. On the other hand, a game like Lego Star Wars, as argued 
in chapter 7, even if projecting a three-dimensional game space, does not really emphasise 
much the functioning of the 3D avatar. This illustrates not only that there are gradual 
transitions between the panoramic and the vehicular, but also that there are built-in tradeoffs, 
ambiguities and tensions in the visual construction of space in avatar-based games. From a 
cultural point of view, as Flynn points out, there is a strong tendency that the ‘vehicular’ types 
of games are more popular in the Western markets, whereas the Japanese market is much 
more strongly rooted in the panoramic tradition. Typically, First Person Shooters, with their 
aggressively ‘penetrating’ and fast-forward tunnel vision, are not much enjoyed among 
Japanese players. 
 
The accentuated yet repressed agency of the motion ride must be distinguished from the 
notion of the cinematic ‘ride’ more generally, which points to the increased use of the 
travelling point of view that follows with the ‘virtual’ or computer-simulated camera, either in 
3D animation film or in the hybrid spaces of CGI-enhanced live action film115. Another 
important factor in the development towards an ever more dynamic or ‘liberated’ camera has 
                                                 
115 A number of theorists have discussed the aesthetic and cultural significance of the travelling camera in film 
and television, including the relationship between mainstream film and the spectacular ‘ride film’ tradition. See 
King (2000), Bukatman (2003), and Balides (2003). Margaret Morse (1998) discusses the role of the travel shot 
in television graphics. Some film theorists also argue there has been a recent shift in Hollywood cinema (or a 
return) towards aesthetic forms that more resemble the ‘Cinema of Attractions’ of early film, as this has been 
described by Gunning (1990). Andrew Darley (2000) argues that new spectacle cinema represents a shift away 
from prior modes of spectator experience based on an interpretive model towards a stronger emphasis on the 
intensities of direct sensual stimulation. 
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been the ‘Steadicam’ technology. Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining (1980) is a notable example 
of how the Steadicam makes an impact on cinematography116. However, in terms of fictional 
participation, cinematic travelling shots or ‘fly-throughs’ do not necessarily imply a subjective 
camera. The motion ride tradition, in contrast, is rooted in the idea of the subjective camera; 
the spectator is given a subject-position also in a fictional sense, a definite location and a 
manifested body within the projected space – a particular corporeality rather than just a sense 
of embodiment. The motion ride camera-vehicle is given an objective presence within the 
space that it traverses; unlike the typically non-determinate travelling cameras of conventional 
fiction film (including the contemporary digitalised Hollywood spectacle), it cannot fly or 
drive through windows, for example, and it needs to relate to the laws of physics in some 
way, as these are generally perceived by the spectator. This objective subject-positioning and 
corporeality implies that the negative or ‘repressed’ agency that is being addressed is also 
explicitly articulated as fictional agency; our fictional self is trapped in a vehicle.  
 
In terms of fictional re-positioning and negative agency, motion simulators and avatar-based 
3D games share a common relationship to the subjective camera that we know from narrative 
film. One particular example that has inspired several ‘avatarial’ adaptations is the 
documentary-style and blood-stained subjective camera lens that figures in the opening scenes 
of Saving Private Ryan (Spielberg 1998)117. Another notable example of ‘cross-media 
avatarhood’ – although in the reverse direction – is Gus Van Sant’s chase cam sequences in 
Elephant (2003); the long and unbroken over-the-shoulder subjective shots are strikingly 
similar to avatarial cameras as we know them from computer games. Indeed the opening 
drunk-driving scene could have been taken almost directly out of Grand Theft Auto III (DMA 
Design 2001), not just in the way the camera relates to the car, but also in the way the car 
behaves and the sound of the engine. Elephant’s artistic re-interpretation of the dual-locus 3D 
avatar is a central element in the film’s stylistic repertoire, and it establishes a sense of space 
and location that has similarities with the worlds of computer games.  
                                                 
116 For an historical account of the use of the Steadicam in cinema, and how it has impacted on film aesthetics, 
see Serena Ferrara (2000). 
117 The Omaha beach landing scene was directly re-created in Medal of Honor: Allied Assault (2015 2002), 
which is also a strong inspiration for the Stalingrad level of Call of Duty (Infinity Ward 2003). A cartoonish 
spoof version of the Omaha beach landing scene can be seen (or played through) in Conker’s Bad Fur Day (Rare 
2001).  
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Vertiginous machines 
How should we interpret the role of vehicular corporeality in avatar-based 3D? As noted 
above, this would depend on the overall significance of the avatarial camera, which is a matter 
of genre, but it also depend on how we choose to interpret the negative agency or entrapment 
that is implied by the mobile camera. To the extent that we give priority to this aspect of the 
player-avatar relationship, avatar-based 3D (and the first-person variant in particular) 
becomes primarily a matter of machinic and vertiginous pleasure. In his analysis of the central 
forms of play in culture, as I have referred in previous chapters, Roger Caillois gives an 
interesting description of what he sees as an essentially pre-modern and highly un-civilised 
generic mix of vertiginous and mimetic play: 
 
Games involving glass, special effects, and ghosts all lead to the same result – the 
creation of a fictional world in desired contrast with the ordinary life that is dominated 
by the conventional species and from which demons have been banished. The 
disconcerting reflections that multiply and distort the shape of one’s body, the hybrid 
fauna, legendary monsters, nightmarish detectives, the grafts of an accursed surgery, 
the sickly horror of embryonic gropings, larvae, vampires, automatons, and Martians 
(for everything that is strange or disturbing is of use here), supplement on another level 
the wholly physical thrill by which the vertiginous machines momentarily distorts 
one’s sensory stability. (Caillois 2001[1961]:135). 
 
Caillois here draws a link between vertiginous vehicles and a particular type of pre-modern 
fictional world, based on his more general thesis that the combination of ‘mimicry’ and 
‘vertigo’ represents in modern society a residue of primitive and ritualistic practices that have 
been expelled by the civilising process. As I have discussed at more length elsewhere (Klevjer 
2003, 2006a), this association between sensorially spectacular entertainment and the primitive 
and the grotesque finds broader support in psychology and anthropology as well as in literary 
and film theory. Due in large part to the influences of Edmund Freud and Mikhail Bakhtin, 
bodily and sensory vulgarity and excess has come to be associated, in one way or another, 
with the forces of the pre-modern, the medieval or with the bourgeois unconscious. However, 
this association is usually made without – or even explicitly in opposition to – Caillois 
negative normative evaluation of “everything that is strange or disturbing”.  
 
The vehicular tradition of cinematic vision in avatar-based games also calls attention to the 
notion of the cyborg, which has been widely employed as a theoretical model in the analysis 
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of computer game interaction. Martti Lahti argues that the player-avatar relationship in 3D 
action-based games constructs a ‘hybrid condition resonant with the cyborg’ (Lahti 
2003:164). Inspired by, among others, Huhtamo’s analysis of the ‘encapsulation’ of the 
motion simulator, he highlights the significance of ‘surrogate’ and machinic corporeality in 
computer games.  
 
Indeed, I will argue that video games epitomize a new cyborgian relationship with 
entertainment technologies, linking our everyday social space and computer 
technologies to virtual spaces and futuristic technologies (...) Games—in particular 
fighting, shooting, and racing games—are a symptomatic site of a confusion or a 
transgression of boundaries between the body and technology that characterizes 
contemporary culture. (Lahti 2003:158). 
 
This avatar-based notion of the cyborg is distinctly different from Ted Friedman’s notion of 
cyborgian consciousness, which addresses the cybernetic feedback loop between the player 
and the game system. For Lahti, it is the corporeality of the avatar that is at the heart of the 
‘cyborgian’ feedback loop, not the systemic operations and imperatives of game structure. 
This is an important correction to Friedman’s ‘demystifying’ approach, and it draws attention 
to the vertiginous pleasures that follow specifically with the prosthetic camera. On the other 
hand, I would also argue that there is a built-in ambiguity in avatar-based play with respect to 
how it articulates our relationship to technology, and which the notion of the cyborg may lead 
us to overlook. Because avatars mediate a vicarious corporeality on behalf of the player, they 
may serve to confirm the boundary between self and technology (and between self and 
environment) as much as they transgress it. While the relationship between the player and the 
body of the avatar may be seen as a corporealization of a technologically augmented self, this 
alternative body-subject does not necessarily facilitate a ‘meeting of minds’ between the 
player and the computer. The vehicular avatar, even when explicitly technologised as a 
futuristic or fantastic machine-body of some sort, gets in-between the player and the 
cybernetic machine, as a replacement for rather than as a manifestation of cyborg 
consciousness. For the same reason, the idea I have been advocating that certain types of 
computer game avatars embody a kind of primitivistic or grotesque sensibility of play 
requires more critical scrutiny; the world of the avatar may be grotesque and ‘subversive’ in 
some sense, but the body of the avatar is intact, sovereign and self-contained118.  
                                                 
118 For my own earlier discussion of the role of ‘cyborgian’ play, imagery and narrative in First Person Shooters, 
see Klevjer (2003; Klevjer 2006a). 
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More generally, the motion ride model may lead us to overplay the significance of vertigo in 
avatar-based 3D. The model draws more attention to the immediate and the spectacular than 
to the habituated nature of a mature player-avatar relationship. Even if the two traditions come 
together in the 3D avatar, we need to distinguish between on one hand the ‘vertiginous 
machine’ of vehicular embodiment – which is not a computerised form – and the other hand 
the avatar-based cybernetic interaction between the player and the computer. The central 
imperative of avatar-based play is to grow into the world of the game, to become at home in 
the environment, through the successful disciplining of the avatar, and to be able to focus on 
the tasks at hand. In a roller coaster or a theme park ride, in contrast, the whole idea is to not 
get habituated – to not incorporate your alternative embodiment as second nature; there are no 
tasks at hand, and it is usually only meant to last for a few minutes anyway.  
 
In other words, the notion of the vertiginous, as an analytical concept to describe avatar-based 
3D in general, or the FPS genre in particular, tends to emphasise the immature avatarial 
relationship over the competent one. This is a significant limitation, which is not adequately 
taken into account in my own earlier analysis of the FPS (Klevjer 2003), and which generally 
follows from a theoretical approach to games that focus on the ‘spectacular’ and the sense-
assaulting. Still, as I have argued above, the motion simulator paradigm is valuable for 
highlighting the vehicular dimension that follows with the avatarial camera. The vertiginous 
dimension may become habituated and contained, as it were, as part of the perceptual 
incorporation of avatarial embodiment, but the sensation of the vehicle will remain an integral 
part of corporealized mastery and control – especially, of course, in racing games or racing 
sections of games. One of the central attractions of ‘hardcore’ or high-investment games like 
Gran Turismo (Polyphony Digital 1998) is indeed the degree to which they combine speed 
and spectacle with a demand for absolute and finely tuned perceptual habituation and control.  
Steadicam 
In this respect, Gran Turismo is not so unlike the FPS genre, which combines a certain 
amount of explorative adventure with a strong sense of vehicular force, speed and aggression. 
As explained in chapter 7, the first-person perspective emphasises the integrity of the avatar, 
as there is no – or at least very little – relative separation between the I that perceives and the I 
that acts.  
 
 210
There are, however, first-person avatars in the action adventure genre that are distinctly 
different from the dominant FPS model, and which offer a different sense of vehicular 
corporality. One early example that illustrates some of the possibilities even within the 
relatively rigid first-person configuration is Jumping Flash (SCEI 1995), an action-platformer 
for the Playstation console in which the player takes on the capabilities (and frustrations) of a 
mechanical rabbit. In this game, vertical and vertiginous movements and jumps are just as 
pronounced as horizontal movement. Another game worth mentioning is Metroid Prime, 
which translated the Metroid series into avatar-based 3D. Metroid Prime defines its own 
variant of the first-person action-explorer in relative independence from the established FPS 
formula, and offers a more arcade-inspired, more complex more dynamic avatar. This avatar 
gives the player a sense of mechanical physicality and tangible encapsulation that is arguably 
unparalleled in the action adventure genre.  
 
The FPS, still, is by far the most popular and widely known form of the first-person avatar. Its 
distinctive characteristics have also been technologically, economically and institutionally 
hardwired into our culture, through the exchange and licensing of the so-called ‘engines’ of 
software code that define the basic features of a generic FPS world. Moreover, the leading 
FPS games have also become particularly influential as ready-mades for hobbyist and artistic 
game production or ‘modding’119.  
 
It is useful, I will suggest, to distinguish between the First Person Shooter and what we might 
call the ‘First Person Walker’, the latter category most typically (or extremely) exemplified by 
the Jurassic Park game Trespasser (DreamWorks Interactive 1998). This game de-emphasises 
the weapon’s function and presence quite radically as compared to what is the case in the 
traditional FPS genre, and it pioneered a configuration of the avatar that strives towards a 
more ‘natural’ sense of corporeality; walking and moving is a lot more cumbersome and 
unstable, even the most basic actions (like opening a door or lifting a crate) must be 
meticulously performed using separate functions for extending and using your arm, and the 
objective presence of the avatar is a lot more fully ‘fleshed out’, as it were, with the arms and 
hands being a visible and central part of the action-space of the game. The motivation seems 
to be a commitment to the idea that the camera should operate as the avatar’s eyes, carried by 
a (naturally simulated) body. The effect is highly alienating, and playing the game is a 
                                                 
119 For a discussion of modding and modding culture, see Sotamaa (2003). 
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struggle that goes far beyond the learning process that is needed in an FPS. The excessively 
unwieldy, slow and clumsy configuration strongly emphasises the vulnerability of the avatar, 
while at the same time making a reasonable degree of control and mastery almost 
impossible120.  
 
No other games have, to my knowledge, followed up the extreme strategy of Trespasser, but 
the game may still serve as a model for a type of first-person avatars that, to a greater or lesser 
degree, play down the vehicular at the expense of fluent control and navigation, have a 
stronger emphasis on melee combat at the expense of gunplay, and in some sense attempt to 
hide or ‘naturalise’ the avatarial camera by simulating a set of capacities that reflect more of 
the limitations of our natural bodies. Examples of games that, to a greater or lesser extent, 
follow this route are Breakout, Condemned (Monolith 2005) and Peter Jackson’s King Kong, 
as well as, albeit in a more hybrid form, The Chronicles of Riddick: Escape from Butcher Bay 
(Starbreeze Studios/Tigon Studios 2004). Peter Jackson’s King Kong, like Trespasser before 
it, is also notable for striving towards a more natural or ‘direct’ sense of visual perception 
than computer games usually do, by avoiding the ‘HUD’ layer of on-screen information. 
 
Compared to the dominant FPS tradition, the Trespasser variant is a relatively marginal 
group. Although elements of ‘naturalisation’, as it were, may be present also in the FPS genre, 
and although there are interesting hybrids like The Chronicles of Riddick, these elements and 
hybridisations only serve to highlight and place into contrast the machinic character of the 
FPS avatar. In Quake, Half-Life or Halo, the avatar is configured to be the optimal combat 
machine. The integrated camera-gun can neither be said to ‘run’ nor ‘walk’ but is rather 
floating effortlessly around the game space, much like a Steadicam. The aim of the gun, as a 
standard convention, is always placed at the centre of the screen, so that it cannot be 
controlled independently of the vehicular body; it is instead fixed onto it as a static limb that 
points the way121. This avatarial configuration gives the strongest possible integration of 
looking and acting, of vision and destruction122.  
                                                 
120 It is also interesting to observe that in Trespasser, as in the equally unconventional Metroid Prime, but unlike 
in the majority of First Person Shooters, the avatar-character is a woman.  
121 Admittedly, a number of console games, like Timesplitters, do implement an aiming function, which allows 
the player to aim, to a certain extent, within the frame rather than just with the frame. They have also, following 
the lead of console pioneers GoldenEye 007 and Medal of Honor (DreamWorks Interactive 1999), used an 
optional auto-aim function to compensate for the lack of speed and precision that follows from the analogue-
stick interface. However during the recent years both these functions seem to have been largely abandoned, 
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The FPS can also be distinguished from a naturalised first-person approach by the way in 
which it draws attention to rather than trying to hide the fictional screen as part of its 
vehicular corporeality. Unlike Trespasser or Peter Jackson’s King Kong, the typical FPS 
emphasises its steadicam corporeality through lens flare, weather effects and so on, and 
through the implementation of often quite elaborate HUD systems. One could argue, 
admittedly, that these elements primarily have to do with the first-person avatar’s integration 
of camera and character; in many games, as in Red Faction (Volition 2001) or Halo, the first-
person protagonist wears some kind of visor or suit or other type of transparent equipment 
that explains the use of overlays, sun flares and weather effects. On the other hand, many 
other FPS games, like the Medal of Honor series (DreamWorks Interactive 1999) or 
Timesplitters series (Free Radical Design 2000), display similar effects without providing any 
particular explanation for it. Nor do they really need to; cinematic and vehicular corporeality 
is integral the FPS regardless of how this corporeality is explained (or not explained) within 
the narrative space of the game.  
 
The comparison between the FPS and the Trespasser tradition illustrates that even if onscreen 
interaction does not matter to fictional participation as such, and does not undermine the 
autonomy of the gameworld on a general level, it may still matter to what particular type of 
corporeality the avatar is supposed to mediate; it makes a lot of sense to avoid or minimise the 
presence of a HUD if what one is aiming for is a sense of naked or vulnerable vicarious 
corporeality.  
The filmic camera 
The dual-locus configuration of the 3D avatar, as explained in chapter 7, loosens up the 
integrity of avatarial embodiment by allowing for a relative independence between the 
avatarial camera, the extended avatar and the player. Whereas the avatarial camera gives the 
player a cinematic, vehicular and rather inflexible perceptual access to the gameworld, which 
immobilises and takes the fictional body-subject for a ride, the extended avatar of games like 
Sly 2: Band of Thieves or Splinter Cell, as Flynn observes in the quote above, is in 
comparison a highly ‘physically articulate body’. With extended avatars, we can challenge 
                                                                                                                                                        
possibly because of the trend-setting success of Halo, which stuck to the standard fixed configuration, and which 
solved the problem of accuracy through a cleverly ‘invisible’ auto-aim function.  
122 See Klevjer (2006b). 
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and explore the environments in ways that we cannot do with integrated first-person avatars. 
The dual-locus avatar also has more freedom to articulate character, and to indulge in 
performances that are relatively independent from the actions of the player.  
 
At the same time, the dual-locus avatarial camera is also less vehicular and less intact than the 
first-person variant. The relative independence of the computer-controlled follow-cam – when 
not controlled directly by the player – implies that its role as a prosthetic extension is already 
compromised. With dual-locus avatars there is, in other words, an overlap or a grey area 
between the avatarial camera, which is committed to prosthetic embodiment, and the filmic 
camera, which acts independently from the player. This grey area can be exploited to follow 
strategies that do not merely seek to give the player the most optimal or convenient view, but 
which instead emphasise dramatic angles and cinematographically crafted special shots. 
These filmic strategies may be counterproductive or even directly obstructive to the player’s 
need for control and overview in challenging situations.  
 
As noted in chapter 7, the survival horror genre has specialised in the use of pre-determined 
angles of view – where the camera follows through pre-defined positions and movements 
(trackings, pans, tilts) rather than dynamically adjusting to extended avatar’s position – or 
similar variants of filmic and ‘uncooperative’ cameras. The genre-leading Silent Hill series 
uses a combination of follow-cam and pre-defined cinematic camera work to create a player-
avatar relationship that sacrifices control and predictability for perceptual unease and 
cinematic horror. In Project Zero II: Crimson Butterfly (Temco 2004), the camera follows 
behaviours that closely reproduce framings and scenes that are familiar from horror cinema – 
often in combination with triggered events in the gameworld (ghosts gliding past between the 
camera and the avatar-character). These kinds of hybridising strategies generally have a 
strong impact on avatarial embodiment and corporeality. By exploring the space between the 
avatarial and the filmic camera, the unreliable prosthesis makes the avatarial relationship itself 
less coherent, less well-defined and more slippery123. The survival horror genre also illustrates 
how dual-locus configurations give room for a more diverse and flexible interplay between 
avatar-based play and cinematic sequences; because the camera is already given a relatively 
independent role as part of the avatarial configuration, the transitions between play and non-
playable cutscenes are more fluent than in games with more integrated avatars.  
                                                 
123 In the innovative Eternal Darkness (Silicon Knights 2002), this imperative is expressed very directly; one of 
its so-called ‘insanity effects’ is to skew the camera slightly to the left during the heat of the battle.  
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Cinematic space as gameworld 
In this chapter I have discussed the significance of the avatarial camera in light of other and 
overlapping cultural forms. Through the prosthetic perceptual apparatus of the avatarial 
camera, computer gameworlds are made playable through the lens of cinematic vision. This 
new visual regime brings with it established cultural expectations of transparent immediacy 
and spectacular hyperrealism, and taps into existing traditions of virtual mobility and 
adventurous travel. On the other hand, the avatarial camera is much more than merely a 
navigable camera, and avatar-based interaction goes beyond the notion of navigable space; the 
avatar is neither a cinematic tool nor a mobile visual interface, but an incarnated body-subject 
that belongs to and is exposed to the world that it inhabits. The 3D avatar, therefore, is not 
interactive cinema, and it does not respond to a conceptual model that is primarily concerned 
with the interplay between representation and action, or between immersion and interactivity. 
The quest for immediacy and realism that is manifested by avatar-based 3D is primarily a 
quest for realistic embodiment; computer games’ appropriation of cinematic visual 
hyperrealism aims to further concretise and flesh out what has been the central imperative of 
the computer game avatar since Spacewar!: the desire for realistic agency in a fictional world 
of moving images.  
 
The quest for realistic embodiment through simulated photographic indexicality is not the 
same as a quest for cinematic naturalism, although that is also a part of it. The central drive 
behind cinematic realism in games is what I have referred to in chapter 5 as concretisation, 
which turns a game system into an inhabitable world of playthings, into a gameworld. The 
avatar’s appropriation of cinematic space has dramatically accelerated the development 
towards a new corporealization of gameness, epitomised by the sculptural abstractions of 
Super Mario 64. This development towards inhabitable and organic gameworlds may be seen 
as a ludic parallel to the dream of Virtual Reality, yet the two are distinct and incompatible; 
whereas VR strives for immediate and continuous embodiment, avatar-based interaction seeks 
vicarious and playable embodiment.  
 
A central implication of these diverging imperatives is that avatar-based play, unlike Virtual 
Reality, embraces a vehicular corporealization that follows with the appropriation of the 
simulated camera, and which has been a part of cinema since the beginning – albeit as a side-
track (literally) to the established mainstream. The vehicular camera has a unique capacity to 
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address our bodies’ sense of movement and agency, and the tradition of phantom rides and 
motion simulators feeds directly into a computer game tradition of fast, high-powered and 
techno-fetishist competitive action. At the same time, avatarial corporeality in computer 
games is far from uniformly machinic, but needs to balance and negotiate the vehicular 
dimension with other and partly conflicting aspects of avatarial interaction. Across the generic 
landscape of the contemporary 3D avatar, this negotiation goes on between vehicular and 
panoramic vision, between the habituated and the vertiginous, between the machinic and the 
naturalised, between the extended avatar and the subjective avatar, and between the avatarial 
and the filmic camera.  
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Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to describe what the avatar is, how it structures our play and 
our participation with a fictional world, and how avatar-based singleplayer computer games 
are different from other kinds of singleplayer games; the avatar exploits the concretising 
realism of the computer as a simulating machine, and situates us in a gameworld via 
prosthetic and fictional embodiment.  
 
More specifically, I have looked at what it is that makes avatar-based 3D different from other 
kinds of avatars, and different from other kinds of 3D – in games as well as in other media. 
Indeed the 3D revolution, which transformed the aesthetic of computer games during the mid-
nineties, was mainly about navigable and inhabitable spaces, about the role of the avatar. 
Three-dimensional simulated environments emerged from a desire for a particular kind of 
embodiment and a particular kind of corporealization of computer game play. The 
implications of this new realism and new corporeality of gameworlds have not been given 
enough attention in the study of computer game aesthetics.  
 
As a generic form of computer game play, and as a cultural form more broadly, the avatar re-
invents older forms of avatar-based mimetic play, and re-invents older forms of game play 
and game spaces. At the same time, avatarial embodiment presents a distinct – although 
hardly very new – modality of human-computer interaction, and a generic form of digital 
media and digital art. Still, avatar-based 3D has so far not caught the same attention from 
theorists and artists of new media as Virtual Reality and hypermedia. Part of the reason for 
this could be that avatar-based interaction has emerged from the centre of commercial 
computer game culture, and has become a dominant and almost invisible generic form of 
mainstream entertainment. In the awareness of new media theorists and visionaries, avatarial 
embodiment has somehow gotten lost in the enthusiasm for VR, hypertext, digital cinema and 
Myst. Nevertheless, the artworks that have most centrally defined virtual spatiality and 
embodiment since the early nineties have not been Myst or VR installations but Doom, Super 
Mario 64 and Grand Theft Auto III.  
 
With respect to computer game theory, the avatar-centred approach is also meant as a 
contribution to our way of thinking about fiction and immersion – and by implication, about 
narrative – in games. The concept of fiction that I am suggesting emphasises the objective and 
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shared (and non-diegetic) nature of fiction, as well as the central role of subjective re-
positioning in the establishing of fictionally actual worlds. Combining a theory of make-
believe with a phenomenological perspective on vicarious embodiment, I have drawn 
attention to the role of the avatar as a prosthetic bridge to the fictional world.  
 
The relatively narrow focus on avatar-based play, and on the particular mechanisms of avatar-
based 3D, is also meant as a contribution to the theoretical conceptualisation of genre i 
computer games. In my analysis I have tried to show that avatar-based play, and the various 
ways in which the player-avatar relationship is being configured, is a central generic variable 
in game play and game fiction. This means that I have also used the notion of the avatar to 
describe other forms and modalities that make up the generic terrain of games today. These 
other and partly contrasting and conflicting forms have been described, as it were, through the 
lens of the avatar: system simulators, hypermedia games, instrument play, automatons, role 
playing and non-avatar-based physical interfaces. At the same time, some of the more general 
theoretical ideas that I have applied to the analysis of the avatar – fictionality and subject-
positioning, model-based and gestural simulation, realistic agency and tangibility, 
miniatureness and spatial continuity – could also be productive in a broader and less avatar-
centred investigation of computer game aesthetics.  
 
A number of important questions and issues that relate to avatar-based computer game play 
have not been addressed in this study; the goal has been to describe the basic principles and 
mechanisms that define the avatar as a form. This raises a number of questions that have to do 
with what kinds of things we are actually doing and experiencing in avatar-based 
gameworlds. One central task for further study would be to look more specifically at different 
types and categories of avatars – how they have developed historically, and how avatars 
develop (or do not develop) throughout a game in different genres. This would include a 
closer investigation of the function of role playing and role playing elements in avatar-based 
play, which is a dimension that I have considered as separate from the basic configuration of 
the avatar, but which is yet an important and genre-defining element in a broad range of 
games (not least sport and racing). Also, the structural characteristics of singleplayer 
gameworlds have not been analysed beyond a general account of how the notion of the 
gameworld relates to avatarial embodiment. Further studies in this direction would need to 
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address the central role of the quest and various types of quest structures, a topic that has 
already been addressed by a number of studies in the field124.  
 
The role of narrative has not been directly discussed in this study, other than, we could say, in 
a negative sense; fictional participation through avatarial embodiment is not dependent on 
storytelling and a storyline, and the notion of the diegesis should be held separate from the 
notion of fictionality and the notion of the gameworld. At the same time, different forms and 
techniques of narration often play a crucial role in the description and characterisation of 
gameworlds (particularly in action adventure games but also, to a lesser extent, in racing and 
sport games) and the player’s progress through the game is usually contextualised as a 
coherent linear story, a narrative adventure, with a beginning, a middle and an end. A 
dedicated study of the relationships between avatar-based play and avatar-based formats of 
storytelling would be an obvious next step in the analysis, particularly with respect to the 
contemporary 3D action adventure. The fusions, overlaps and tensions between embodied and 
story-based fictional participation in singleplayer computer games is a complex and diverse 
area of study. Studying this interplay would centrally involve the role of dramatic scripting 
and other forms of dramatic structuring of characters and events in the gameworld, and it 
would involve addressing the interactions and interdependencies between avatarial 
embodiment and the language of the filmic camera. 
 
                                                 
124 See Tronstad (2001), Tosca (2003) and Aarseth (2005a). 
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